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COMPENSATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES: EXAMINING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEACHER SALARIES AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT FOR 
SCHOOL DIVISIONS IN VIRGINIA 
 
By Matthew G. Steele, Ph.D. 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010 
 
Major Director: Blue E. Wooldridge, D. P. A., Professor, L. Douglas Wilder School of 
Government and Public Affairs 
 
This research presents the results of general linear modeling (GLM) of 131 school divisions in 
Virginia.  The purpose of this research is to answer the question: What is the relationship 
between teacher salaries and student achievement as measured by Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP)?  Utilizing an equity theory and distributive justice perspective, data related to 
achievement in English and mathematics by high school students, as measured by the 
requirements of AYP, were culled from the Virginia Department of Education for every school 
division in Virginia in the subjects of reading, writing, algebra I, geometry, and algebra II.  
These data represent the dependent variables and are analyzed with teacher salary and principal 
salary data, which represent the independent variables.  Intervening variables identified in the 
education, public policy and economic literature are also included in the modeling.  An analysis 
of nine general linear models produced evidence that the relationship between teacher salaries 
  
 
 
and student achievement, as measured by AYP, is relatively weak.  Though the results do not 
support a wide range of policy recommendations, one recommendation is for school divisions in 
the northern region of the state to consider a readjustment of their pay scales in order for teacher 
salaries in those Northern Virginia school divisions to be more competitive with other school 
divisions in the state when adjusted for cost-of-living. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In 1983 the National Commission on Excellence in Education published A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative of Educational Reform describing the state of the American educational system as in 
need of reform and improvement to avoid mediocrity for students, teachers, and administrators 
(The National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983).  This report lead to legislation at 
the state and federal levels intended to improve public education, but student achievement 
continued to decline in comparison to other countries, especially in math and science (National 
Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996).  As reports of declining student 
achievement in the American educational system have surfaced, education and public policy 
focus has turned to the teaching profession (Jupp, 2005; National Commission on Teaching and 
America’s Future, 1996).  Research among educational experts, economists and public policy 
researchers report that teacher inputs such as experience and education have a positive impact on 
student achievement (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Jupp, 2005; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; Gill & 
Meier, 2001; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Goldhaber & Anthony, 2007; Goldhaber & 
Brewer, 1997; Jepsen, 2005; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004).  
Another input that might impact student achievement is teachers’ salaries.  Gill and Meier (2001) 
have found in their research of school districts in Texas that a positive correlation exists between 
teacher salaries and student achievement on standardized tests.  Understanding compensation, 
often the largest portion of educational budgets, is one of the key elements to determining what 
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steps might be taken to improve effectiveness in school districts as measured by student 
achievement (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002). 
 
 Whether in the private, non-profit, or public sector, institutional rewards (Katz, 1964) such as 
pay and benefits can influence individual behavior which impacts organizational success 
(McGregor, 1960; Herzberg, 1966; Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1971, 1990, 1992, 2000; Kalleberg, 
Marsden, Reynold & Knoke, 2006).  As Odden and Kelley (1997, 2002) have suggested, 
teachers have the greatest direct influence on students within the educational setting, and student 
achievement represents the greatest proportion of educational outcomes.  As the concern for 
improving the American public educational system has increased, economists, public policy and 
education scholars have pointed to several areas in teacher compensation packages to reward 
teachers for successful outcomes, such as: better work environments; increased training; and, 
moving from a single pay schedule to a more progressive system that can reward teachers for 
student achievement (Jupp, 2005; Solomon, 2005; National Commission on Teaching and 
America’s Future, 1996; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002). 
 
Two initiatives during the presidency of George W. Bush have placed primary and secondary 
education at the forefront of federal public policy: ―No Child Left Behind‖ and the ―Reading 
First‖ initiative.  The former is public law 107-110.  No Child Left Behind created a target of 
100% literacy among school children within twelve years of its inception (Linn, Baker, & 
Betebenner, 2002).  The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) amended the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 mandating strict accountability on states to improve 
education (Linn, Baker, & Betebenner, 2002).  The NCLB Act of 2001 reinforced existing 
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infrastructures in many states for creating and fostering an atmosphere of high performance 
among primary and secondary school children (Linn, Baker, & Betebenner, 2002).  What 
differentiates the NCLB Act of 2001 from the Education Act of 1965 is that the NCLB Act of 
2001 allows the federal government to redirect funds from low performing school districts to 
higher performing school districts (U.S, Department of Education, 2008). 
 
This study utilizes a secondary analysis of data for Virginia’s school divisions provided by the 
Virginia Department of Education for the 2007-2008 school year.  Distributive justice and its 
antecedent, equity theory, provide a theoretical perspective for understanding the relationship 
between individual inputs and organizational outcomes.  A multivariate data analysis approach 
will provide evidence as to whether a relationship exists between elements of teacher 
compensation and student achievement while considering intervening social and economic 
variables. 
 
Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this research is to identify the influence that teachers’ compensation has on 
student achievement.  The overall research question is: what is the relationship between teacher 
salaries and student achievement as measured by adequate yearly progress (AYP)?  This research 
will consider this question with regard to variables that might mitigate the link between salary 
comparisons and student achievement.  For the purposes of this research, student achievement 
will be represented by the pass rate in five academic areas for school divisions in Virginia as 
measured by AYP.  Six intermediary factors identified in the public policy and education 
literature, which will be treated as moderating variables in this research, include: student 
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ethnicity, the percentage of students eligible for school lunch programs, the drop-out rate, teacher 
education beyond a bachelors degree (Goslin & Glass, 1967; Lomax et al., 1995; Gill & Meier, 
2001), change in school division size over a five year period, and percentage of participating in 
limited English programs.  
 
Importance of Study 
One area of the public sector with standardized organizational outcomes is public education (Gill 
& Meier, 2001).  According to Gill and Meier (2001), one of the best ways to study 
organizations with an objective organizational outcome variable in the public sector is to look at 
public school districts.  Among the number of bureaucracies in the United States, school districts 
are the most prevalent.  School districts, more than other bureaucracies in the United States, have 
well defined organizational outcomes in the form of standardized tests (Gill & Meier, 2001).  
Though the use of standardized tests is criticized for different reasons, they remain the most 
popular and effective measure of student achievement (Goslin & Glass, 1967; Paris, Lawton, 
Turner, and Roth, 1991; Lomax, West, Harmon, Viator, & Madaus, 1995).   
 
As educational issues begin to permeate both public policy and education policy, accountability 
and improvement have moved to the forefront.  In Virginia, the Standards of Learning (SOL) 
exams are used to measure student achievement and determine whether schools gain 
accreditation from the state.  Along with other measures of student achievement (i.e. student 
attendance, assessments), the SOLs are factored into calculating AYP, which is used for 
determining compliance with the NCLBA.  Compliance with the NCLBA and school 
accreditation is the common goal of teachers and administrators in each school in Virginia 
  
5 
 
(Virginia Department of Education, 2010).  Though the organizational goal is the same, there are 
differences in pay between teachers and administrators and between teachers working in 
different regions of the state (Virginia Department of Education, 2008).  This research is 
designed to determine whether interregional teacher comparisons or the difference between 
teacher salaries and administrative salaries have an impact on student achievement, and 
ultimately school compliance with NCLBA and accreditation. 
 
Gill and Meier’s (2001) research elucidated the positive correlation between teachers’ 
compensation and student achievement on standardized tests.  Gill and Meier approached their 
research from an organizational management perspective with an emphasis on the impact of 
individual inputs on organizational outcomes.  In education, inputs are the characteristics and 
tools teachers bring with them to the profession, and organizational outcomes are student 
achievement on standardized examinations and progress towards NCLBA compliance (Kukla-
Acevedo, 2009; Solomon, 2005, Jupp, 2005; Gill & Meier, 2001; National Commission on 
Teaching and America’s Future, 1996). 
 
Standardized test scores have become a driving force behind local, state, and federal policy 
(Paris et al.,1991; Lomax et al., 1995).  The state of Virginia uses SOL examination scores for 
budgetary and accreditation reasons, and the federal government uses test scores along with other 
measures of student progress to determine compliance with NCLBA (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2008; Virginia Department of Education, 2008). The objective nature of standardized 
testing has been debated by researchers, education consultants, and educational and public policy 
scholars (Lomax et al., 1995).  Whether or not standardized testing is inherently flawed, it is 
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likely to remain the primary measuring standard for academic achievement (Paris et al., 1991; 
Lomax, et al., 1995). 
 
With a well defined organizational outcome variable in the form of AYP, school districts (Gill & 
Meier, 2001) offer researchers an opportunity to determine whether teachers’ compensation 
impacts organizational outcomes positively or negatively (Adams, 1965; Jasso, 1980, 1986; 
Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990).  According to Odden and Kelley (2002), ―Because teacher 
compensation is the largest portion of the education budget, how teachers are paid is key to 
effective use of educational resources…If better methods exist for paying teachers they should 
be considered and adopted, especially if they will contribute to improved schools and…higher 
paid teachers‖ (p. 2).  While merit pay and pay for performance systems (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 
2002) have been considered and implemented in several school districts with an emphasis on 
teacher traits (i.e.: educational attainment, specialized training) (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Jupp, 
2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Goldhaber & Anthony, 2007; Goldhaber & Brewer, 
1997; Jepsen, 2005; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004), relatively 
little focus has been given to the impact of salaries on organizational outcomes. 
 
Student Achievement and Public Policy 
Accountability in education has shaped public policies such as No Child Left Behind and 
Virginia’s SOLs to improve student achievement (U.S. Department of Education, 2008; Virginia 
Department of Education, 2008; Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Once the focus of educational policy 
and curriculum creation, standardized test scores have become a driving force behind local, state, 
and federal policy (Paris, Lawton, Turner, & Roth, 1991; Lomax, West, Harmon, Viator, & 
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Madaus, 1995).  For teachers, pressure mounts for them to perform at high levels in order to 
ensure that students produce high scores on state mandated tests and compliance with federal 
policy (Gill & Meier, 2001).  Among the obstacles faced by teachers are socioeconomic factors, 
such as the number of students receiving free and reduced lunches, and racial isolation among 
African-American and Latino within school districts (Roderick, Jacob, & Byrk, 2002; Gill & 
Meier, 2001; Winfield, 1990; Edmunds, 1979; Good & Brophy, 1986; Kyle, 1985; Mackenzie, 
1983; Purkey & Smith, 1983; Stedman, 1987; Stringfield & Teddlie, 1988). 
 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 has impacted not only federal public policy, but also the 
public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia.  The goal for Virginia, as well as the other 
states, is to raise proficiencies in reading and mathematics while narrowing the achievement gap 
among minorities within Virginia’s school aged population (Virginia Department of Education, 
2008).  Beyond the pillars of NCLBA, the federal government has established guidelines and 
benchmarks for the states, which include: minimum proficiency in reading and mathematics by 
2013-2014; students with limited proficiencies will improve to minimum standards; by 2005-
2006 all teachers will have achieved teaching qualifications; schools will be drug and violence 
free; and, all students will graduate (U.S. Department of Education, 2008; Virginia Department 
of Education, 2008).  Prior to the NCLBA, many states, including the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, had initiated policy to increase proficiency in academics and promote high school 
graduation among all students (Linn, Baker, & Betebenner, 2002). 
 
The initial standards were developed in the 1970s and 1980s and were approved by the Virginia 
Board of Education in 1995 (Virginia Department of Education, 2008).  While the SOLs are 
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primarily born from educational policy, they do impact state public policy just as the NCLBA 
impacts federal public policy.  In Virginia, allocations for school divisions are found in the 
budget proposed by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor (Virginia General 
Assembly, Legislative Information System, State Budget, 2005).  A definition of Virginia’s 
Standard’s of Learning is provided in Figure 1. 
 
 
According to the Virginia Department of Education: ―The Standards of Learning for Virginia 
Public Schools describe the commonwealth's expectations for student learning and 
achievement in grades K-12 in English, mathematics, science, history/social science, 
technology, the fine arts, foreign language, health and physical education, and driver 
education.‖ 
 
Figure 1:  A Definition of Virginia’s Standards of Learning 
Source: http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/Superintendent/Sols/home.shtml 
 
Teacher Compensation and Educational Outcomes 
In public education, organizational outcomes are generally measured by results on standardized 
tests (Edmunds, 1979; Winfield, 1990; Mackenzie, 1983; Purkey & Smith, 1983; Kyle, 1985; 
Good & Brophy, 1986; Stedman, 1987; Stringfield & Teddlie, 1988; Gill & Meier, 2001; 
Roderick, Jacob, & Byrk, 2002).  Since standardized test scores are used to determine where 
resources are allocated in school districts, student achievement on standardized tests is 
paramount (National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996; Linn, Baker, & 
Betebenner, 2002).  One factor that impacts student achievement on standardized test scores is 
teacher salaries (Gill & Meier, 2001).  An intersection of education policy and public policy is in 
education budgets.  The State of Virginia budget for years 2004-2006 included major spending 
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increases as proposed by HB1500/SB 700
1
.  Included in the proposed spending increases were 
several programs and a teacher salary increase of 3%, which amounted to $54.8 million.
2
 
 
The public policy and education policy literature provides examples of the impact of teacher 
salaries on student achievement on standardized tests (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Gill & Meier, 
2001; Goslin & Glass, 1967; Paris et al., 1991; Lomax et al., 1995).  However, there is a dearth 
of information related to the impact of comparative salary calculations that an individual might 
use to measure a ratio of their inputs (i.e. effort, training, and education) to the pay they receive 
in light of organizational outcomes (i.e. student achievement on standardized tests).  As Jasso 
(1980, 1986) explains, justice evaluations based on comparative ratios between employees 
(Adams, 1965) might influence individual behavior, and if inequity is determined by individuals 
making ratio comparisons, individual inputs might be impacted and effect organizational 
outcomes.  Changes in behavior might also include a change in career direction on the part of 
individual employees (Lawler, 1971, 1990, 1992; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002). 
 
Within the educational setting, it has been suggested that because teachers have the most 
involvement with students that they have the largest contribution to student achievement 
(National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996; Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Jupp, 
2005; Solomon, 2005).  However, counter to the concept of equity based fairness (or 
contribution based fairness) in distribution (Deutsch, 1975); teachers receive lower compensation 
                                                 
1
 From the Overview of Proposed Amendments to the Budget for 2004-2006:  ―The Governor’s budget 
recommendations provide approximately $1.4 billion in general fund spending adjustments.  Of this total, five 
commitments account for approximately $1.1 billion of the spending adjustments…5) Providing $81.0 million for 3 
percent salary increase for state employees, college faculty, teachers, and state-supported local employees, and $31.2 
million representing the employer’s share of the state employee health insurance premium increase.‖  Source: 
Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information System, State Budget, 2005. 
2
 Ibid 
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than administrators who have little direct interaction with students (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 
2002).  Odden and Kelley (2002) suggests that this situation exists because there has been no 
update to teacher compensation systems since the early part of the twentieth century.  Like other 
agencies and departments in the public sector (Salamon, 2002; The Volcker Commission, 2005), 
public education continues to use single-salary pay schedule in formulating teacher 
compensation (Odden & Kelley, 2002)
3
.  Odden and Kelley (2002) suggests that continual use of 
this system might impact student achievement eventually as teachers leave their posts for more 
lucrative jobs. 
 
Compensation and Organizational Success 
When organizations are efficient and able to maximize resources such that organizational goals 
are reached, they are often described as ―high performing‖ organizations (Wood, 1996; Godard 
& Delaney, 2000; Kalleberg, Marsden, Reynold & Knoke, 2006).  High performance work 
organizations (HPWO) is a term that refers to practices utilized by human resources management 
(HRM) in order to maximize worker efficiency and production by providing mechanisms to 
increase worker motivation (Wood, 1996).  HPWO practices have their origin in the private 
sector where they were utilized to replace existing hierarchies that were put into place with the 
advent of mass production (Kalleberg et al., 2006).  In the public sector, a shift away from 
hierarchical management structures has occurred as well (Salamon, 2002).  According to 
Salamon (2002), in order for public organizations to remain competitive, they need to adapt to 
competitive environments and be flexible (Kalleberg et al., 2006; Godard & Delaney, 2000; 
                                                 
3
 Few authors have provided explanations as to why administrators, on average, have higher salaries than teachers, 
but Odden & Kelley (1997, 2002) and Stronge, Gareis & Little (2006) explain that the current single-salary pay 
schedule, used in 97% of the country’s school districts, is molded after the pay schedule used in the federal 
government.  According the Volcker Commission (2005), managers (i.e. administrators) are often paid more 
because of experience, length of time with the organization, or the addition of decision making duties. 
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Wood, 1996).  In becoming more flexible and adaptive, the public sector has adopted HPWO 
practices from the private sector as an incentive to motivate employees to achieve maximum 
efficiency in their work (Wood, 1996).  Among the motivating practices that are used by HRM to 
achieve high performance is salary (Herzberg, 1966; Corbo & Kleiner, 1991; Wood, 1996; 
Kalleberg et al., 2006). 
 
While there are numerous forms of monetary compensation, including salaries, pension plans, 
bonuses, and stock options, salaries are the most prevalent (Perry, 2003).  As Katz (1964) 
observes, pay and benefits work to motivate employees and encourage desired behavior on the 
part of employees to achieve organizational goals.  ―Instrumental system rewards‖, a phrase 
termed by Katz, refers to the use of compensation as a mechanism to encourage organizational 
membership and loyalty among employees (Perry, 2003; Harmon & Mayer, 1986).  While 
employees might vary in their desires for monetary pay (McGregor, 1960; Herzberg, 1966; 
Vroom, 1964), cash rewards tend to mitigate the desire for other non-monetary rewards because 
monetary rewards help individuals to meet basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter 
(Maslow, 1970; Dici & Ryan, 2000). 
 
For public school teachers and other public sector employees, the public service motivation 
(PSM) literature suggests that individuals who work in the public sector do so for reasons 
beyond self-interest (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008; Paarlberg & Lavigna, 2010).  Individuals are 
generally drawn to teach because they enjoy teaching certain subject areas or are interested in 
making an impact on students’ lives (Odden & Kelley, 2002), which fits well with the PSM 
model that suggests that individuals in the public sector are motivated by altruistic reasons rather 
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than self-interest (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008).  Though teachers, as well as other public sector 
employees, might be motivated by altruism, they are likely to expect to be compensated in a 
manner that reflects their effort and input (Lawler, 1971). 
 
Salaries provide employees with a measuring device to calculate a ratio of their inputs to outputs 
to compare to the ratios of others (Adams, 1965; Jasso, 1980, 1986; Greenberg, 1989, 1990).  
These ―others‖ may be any of a variety of individuals from within or outside the organization or 
industry of the individual making the comparison (Folger, 1986; Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001; 
Greenberg, 1996).  There is great potential for inequities to arise because individuals make these 
calculations either through seemingly rational or irrational justification (Greenberg, 1897, 1989, 
1990, 1996).  Equity theory (Adams, 1965) and distributive justice are theoretical perspectives 
that developed in the organizational behavior and motivation literature to explain why employees 
calculate these ratios and how they use them to determine fairness in the distribution of rewards 
(Jasso, 1980, 1986; Greenberg 1987, 1990). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Equity theory and distributive justice perspectives provide organization researchers with tools to 
understand whether inequalities in individual inputs to individual outcomes ratios impact 
organizational effectiveness (Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 1989).  Among several advantages 
school systems provide to organization researchers are: an objective outcome variable in the 
form of standardized exams (Gill & Meier, 2001) or AYP (U.S. Department of Education 2010a, 
2010b, 2010c); educational requirements for individuals employed within the teaching 
profession (i.e. bachelors and masters degree, continuing education, etc.); and, the common use 
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of a single-salary pay schedule (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  While the single-salary pay 
schedule is criticized, several reformation movements are gaining momentum throughout the 
country (Jupp, 2005; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002), it does provide researchers with a 
standardized individual outcome variable to observe. 
 
Equity Theory 
According Anderson and Patterson (2008), equity theory is a ―cognitive‖ ratio of inputs and 
outputs that are compared to the inputs and outputs ratio of another person in order to determine 
organizational fairness, but also to provide a measuring device of professional success for the 
individual making the comparison (Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 1996; Fadil, Williams, 
Limpaphayom, & Smart, 2005).  Each orientation is determined by how individuals perceive 
fairness in comparative terms to others (Adams, 1965; Folger, 1986).  In order for organizations 
to succeed, employee allegiance is important, and that allegiance is often determined by 
employees’ perceptions of fairness (Romzek & Hendricks, 1982).  Though the concept of 
fairness permeates the equity theory (Adams, 1965) and distributive justice literature, measuring 
the impact of an employee on production is difficult because determining the appropriate 
outcome of an organization, especially in the public sector (Gill & Meier, 2001), is debatable 
(Lawler, 1971, 1992).  
 
A review of equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1963; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964) provides insight to 
understand the impact of individually calculated ratios on organizational outcomes.  Equity 
theory (Adams, 1965) provides the foundation for the development of distributive justice.  While 
equity theory does not explain the resulting behavior or consequences of all potential situations 
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involving perceived fairness in distribution (Weick, 1966; Folger, 1986), it does provide the 
underpinnings of how obverse comparisons work (Folger, 1984, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982). 
 
Equity theory (Adams, 1965) was posited in the early 1960s to understand whether individual 
employees believed they were treated fairly.  The theory was founded on the basis that 
individuals calculate a ratio of inputs to outcomes and compare those results to a comparative 
other with a similar job and background characteristics (Admas, 1963, 1965; Adams and 
Jacobsen, 1964).  The theory has been criticized (Weick, 1966; Folger, 1986) for being too rigid 
and simplistic.  In the 1970s, Deutsch (1975) expanded the theory to include elements of the 
distribution of organizational resources: need, equality, and equity.  During the same time, equity 
theory became the basis for distributive justice, which is one of the four elements of 
organizational justice with procedural justice, informational justification, and social sensitivity 
being the other three (Greenberg, 1987, 1987, 1990; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Greenberg & 
Baron, 2008). 
 
Equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964) states that individuals make ratio 
comparisons between themselves and others to determine whether individual outcomes (i.e. 
salary) are fair based on a calculation of inputs performed by individuals to organizational 
outcomes achieved (Adams, 1965; Greenberg 1989, 1990; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003).  Inputs 
are individual contributions to organizations in the form of hours worked, effort put forth, and 
training.  Outputs are the results produced from individuals.  Individual outcomes are the rewards 
that individuals receive from organizations, and organizational outcomes are achievements based 
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on organizational goals and missions (Adams, 1965; Lawler, 1971; 1992; Greenberg, 1987, 
1989, 1990).  The ratios that individuals calculate to a comparative other (Adams, 1965; Folger, 
1986; Greenberg, 1996) are utilized by individuals to determine organizational fairness (Jasso, 
1980).  If these ratios are relatively equal, the employee determines their treatment by an 
organization to be fair, but if the ratios are inequitable, the employee will deem their relationship 
with an organization to be unfair (Adams, 1965; Greenberg 1996; Corpanzano & Ambrose, 
2001).   
 
Equity theory (Adams, 1965) posits that there are three results based on calculations made by 
individuals in measuring themselves to a comparative other: overpayment inequity, 
underpayment inequity, and equitable payments (Greenberg, 1989).  Overpayment inequity 
occurs when an individual makes a ratio comparison with another employee working to generate 
similar organizational outcomes and discovers they are paid a higher sum than their comparative 
other.  Underpayment inequity occurs when an individual makes a ratio comparison with another 
employee working to generate similar organizational outcomes and discovers they are paid a 
lower sum than their comparative other.  If an individual calculates a ratio to a comparative other 
and discovers that individual outcomes are equal, the individual is generally satisfied that 
payment is fair and equitable (Adams, 1965; Jasso, 1980, 1986; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990, 
1996; Randall & Meuller, 2005; Greenberg & Baron, 2007).  The ratios that individuals calculate 
and use to determine organizational fairness can influence behavior (Jasso, 1980; Randall & 
Meuller, 2005; Greenberg 1989, 1990). 
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Perceptions of fairness in pay might influence positive and negative behavioral patterns (Jasso, 
1980, 1986; Hegtvedt, 1990).  Underpayment inequity might result in less effort put forth by the 
employee or possibly corporate theft on the part of the individual who believes they are 
underpaid (Greenberg, 1989; 1996).  The psychological impact of underpayment inequity might 
result in an employee feeling they are not as important as another employee and accept that the 
other employee is superior to them.  Overpayment inequity creates a similar situation, but one 
where the individual attempts to justify the higher pay rate.  Overpayment inequity might result 
in an employee working longer hours or taking less vacation.  Overpayment inequity might lead 
to a situation where the higher paid employee accepts their higher salary as an indication of 
superiority to lower salaried employees (Greenberg, 1989, 1990, 1996; Colquitt & Greenberg, 
2003).  Inequity in pay can become a concern for employers if the resulting behavior based on 
calculated ratios leads to deteriorating production and lower outputs, as well as adverse changes 
in behavior, which might include: theft, itinerant attendance, and low morale (Jasso, 1980). 
 
Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice is one of the four elements of organizational justice that emphasizes fairness 
as a result of the distribution of outcomes by an organization (Greenberg & Baron, 2007; 
Greenberg, 1990, Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003).  Distributive justice posits that employees’ 
perceptions of fairness are related to decisions about how organizational resources (usually in 
form of pay and benefits) are distributed and the fairness of how those resources are distributed 
(Greenberg 1987, 1989, 1990, 1996; Folger, 1986).  There are four approaches to organization 
justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, information adequacy, and social sensitivity 
(Greenberg & Baron, 2007; Greenberg 1987, 1989, 1996; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003).  
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Distributive justice is the perceived fairness on the part of employees relative to the decisions by 
organizations concerning the distribution of resources such as pay and benefits.  Procedural 
justice is the perceived fairness on the part of employees in determining whether the procedures 
that determine organizational decisions are just.  Information adequacy is determined by the 
employee when they feel that they have received the necessary information about decisions made 
by organizations.  And, when employees feel they are respected in interactions with superiors, 
social sensitivity is achieved (Greenberg & Baron, 2007; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; 
Greenberg, 1989, 1990).  Distributive justice provides a perspective for gaining insight into the 
impact of calculated salary ratios by employees in determining fairness. 
 
The development of distributive justice coincides with researchers’ reservations about the 
applicability of equity theory to circumstances other than an obverse relationship where 
individuals in similar positions compare their inputs to outcomes ratios (Adams, 1965) to decide 
whether they are treated fairly by an organization (Weick, 1966; Folger, 1986).  Weick (1966) 
suggests that equity theory as developed is not flexible enough to explain how fairness is 
determined in relationships beyond a basic dyadic relationship where two individuals compare 
their calculated ratios.  And, individuals may base their determination of fairness on more than 
inputs (Deutsch, 1975; Folger, 1986; Patrick, Mahoney & Petrosko, 2008). 
 
Deutsch (1975) further developed the concept of fairness in inputs to outcomes ratios when he 
contended that organizational resources could be used to meet three types of distributive fairness: 
needs, equality, and equity.  According to Adams (1965), the ratios that individuals calculate in 
determining fairness are dependent on the contributions individuals make to production when 
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compared to a like other.  Deutsch (1975) expanded Adams’ contributions to equity theory by 
suggesting that individuals may deem the allocation of resources to be fair when they met needs-
based fairness, equality-based fairness, or equity-based fairness.  Needs based fairness is 
achieved when the individual or group needing the most resources receives the bulk of 
distributed outcomes; equality based fairness is achieved when each individual or group receives 
an equal share of distributed outcomes; and, equity based fairness is achieved when the 
individual or group contributing the most input is rewarded with a proportion of distributed 
outcomes based on contribution (Deutsch, 1975; Folger, 1986; Patrick, Mahoney & Petrosko, 
2008). 
 
Organizations that are successful (Kalleberg et al., 2006) are usually populated with employees 
who are satisfied that they are receiving equitable payment for their work (Adams, 1963, 1963; 
Adams & Jacobsen, 1964), and believe that the organizational rewards (i.e. salary and benefits) 
are distributed fairly (Greenberg 1987, 1989, 1996; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003).  Utilizing an 
equity theory and distributive justice perspective, this research is focused towards answering the 
three research questions that are stated here. 
 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1:   What is the relationship between teachers’ salaries and student 
achievement as measured by AYP? 
 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between teachers’ salaries when adjusted for cost 
of living and student achievement as measured by AYP? 
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Research Question 3: What is the relationship between student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, and the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries? 
 
Methodology 
The data that comprise the dataset are culled from the Virginia Department of Education 
(Virginia Department of Education, 2008).  The dependent variable (DV) is student achievement 
among high school students in Virginia in the areas of English and math.  The independent 
variable (IV) is teacher compensation.  The moderating variables are social and socioeconomic 
factors.  The DV is defined by individual school division performance towards compliance with 
AYP in the areas of: reading, writing, algebra I, geometry, and algebra II.  The IV is defined by 
elements of teacher compensation: teacher salaries; teacher salaries as compared to other parts of 
the state when adjusted for cost of living; and, the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries.  Intervening variables are socioeconomic and environmental.  The 
socioeconomic factors are: the percentage of African-American and Latino students within 
individual school divisions, the percentage of students receiving free and reduced lunches, and 
the drop-out rate.  The environmental variables are: the percentage of teachers with post graduate 
degrees, the percentage of growth for each division over a five year period, and the percentage of 
students involved in English as a second language (ESL) programs.  
 
The advantages to doing a secondary data analysis are: time savings, cost savings, and 
established credibility of the data set.  Due to the size of the datasets collected by the Virginia 
Department of Education (2008), replicating the collection of these data would be time and cost 
prohibitive (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  The data from this dataset has been 
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included in numerous published reports and articles.  While the data are easily accessible and 
expansive, there are several disadvantages to using secondary data that need to be addressed 
including: outdated data; the potential for inaccurate data to be included; and, missing data.  
Although these factors are cause for concern, the breadth of data published by the Virginia 
Department of Education (2008) makes the use of a secondary data analysis strategy conducive 
to this research (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). 
 
General linear modeling (GLM) will be utilized to investigate the relationships that exist 
between the IVs and the DVs.  GLM is recommended for the analysis of this dataset due to its 
inclusion of multiple DVs, IVs and intervening variables.  GLM allows for examining the mean 
differences on several DVs simultaneously with at least one IV (Rose & Sullivan, 1996; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  The data will be collected in Excel and transcribed into SPSS for 
statistical analysis.  All variables collected are ratio level variables. 
 
Definition of Terms 
 
Comparative Other – A person with whom an individual calculates an inputs to outcomes ratio 
to determine fairness.  A comparative other might be an equal, superior, or subordinate 
employee.  A comparative other might also be someone working in a different organization. 
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Distribution Principles – Refers to the multiple facets of the distribution of organizational 
outcomes.  As equity theory evolved, researchers noticed that organizations addressed areas of 
need, equality, and contribution when it came to resource allocations.  There are three 
distribution principles: needs, equality, and equity. 
 
Distributive Justice – One of the four elements of organizational justice.  Distributive justice is 
the perceived fairness with which outcomes are distributed to individuals by organizations. 
 
Equality Principle – Refers to an outcome distribution where resources are distributed equally 
among entities. 
 
Equity Principle – Refers to an outcome distribution where resources are distributed based on 
inputs; the greater the amount of inputs put forth, the higher the amount of resources received. 
 
Equity Theory – Developed to explain how individuals perceive fairness.  Individuals calculate 
ratios of inputs to outcomes and then compare them to another individual.  Fairness is generally 
perceived by an individual when the results of the ratio calculation are equal. 
 
General Linear Model (GLM) - Utilizes several multivariate techniques such as ANOVA, 
ANCOVA, MANOVA, MANCOVA, and multiple regression in its modeling.  GLM allows for 
multiple DVs and IVs to be included within the model.  
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Informational Justification – One of the four elements of organizational justice.  Informational 
justification is the perceived fairness associated with the quality and quantity of information an 
individual receives from an organization. 
 
Inputs – Traits brought to a job by individuals.  These might include: education, amount of time 
in a particular position, or hours worked during the day.  For teachers, inputs may also include 
skills and talents related to subjects taught. 
 
Motivation – The process of arousing individuals to work at high levels of efficiency and 
proficiency in order to meet organizational goals.  Common motivational tools are: pay and 
benefits; bonuses; merit pay; educational opportunities; or, teamwork. 
 
Needs Principle – Refers to an outcome distribution that is based on which entity has the 
greatest need for allocated resources.  Organizations may vary in how they define need, but 
generally departments within organizations with the least amount of existing resources have the 
greatest need. 
 
Organizational Justice – The perception of fairness formed from an individual’s satisfaction 
with: the distribution outcomes by an organization (distributive justice); how organizational 
decisions are made (procedural justice); the respect with which individuals are given in 
interactional situations (social sensitivity); and, the adequacy of information individuals receive 
from an organization (informational justification). 
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Outcomes – For an individual, outcomes are rewards given to individuals.  Outcomes might be 
rewarded in the form of: pay and benefits, bonuses, or time-off.  For an organization, outcomes 
are: the number of items produced; services rendered generating revenue; or, achievement 
measured by board reviews or standardized examinations. 
 
Outputs – The result of production.  Outputs may be tangible or intangible.  Tangible outputs 
might be a product sold on the open market.  Intangible outputs might be test scores or 
organizational improvement as measured by a set of agreed upon standards (i.e. survey results or 
performance reviews).  
 
Overpayment Inequity – A situation where an individual calculation ratio of inputs to outcomes 
results in a higher ratio when compared to another person.  Resulting behavior might be 
influenced by guilt. 
 
Procedural Justice – One of the four elements of organizational justice.  Procedural justice is 
the perceived fairness of how organizational decisions are made.  Generally, procedural justice is 
perceived if decisions are made based on existing organizational rules, and if those rules are 
deemed to be fair and just. 
 
Public Service Motivation (PSM) – Generally defined as a motivating force where individuals 
choose employment in the public sector for reasons other than self-interest.  Often individuals 
are motivated more by organizational goals or potential community impact than by self-interest. 
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Referent Outcomes – Outcomes that could have potentially happened in lieu of actual 
outcomes.  Individuals often measure outcomes in terms of whether an imagined outcome is 
more desirable than the actual outcome.  If several individuals apply for a promotion, the 
individual who comes closest to achieving the promotion but did not get it will feel a greater 
sense of loss than the individuals who were not as close to receiving the promotion. 
 
Rewards – Also referred to as outcomes, rewards are tangible or intangible resources awarded to 
individuals for production.  Rewards are also used by HPWO for motivational purposes. 
 
Social Sensitivity – One of the four elements of organizational justice.  Social sensitivity is the 
perceived respect with which a person is treated when interacting with organizational leaders or 
representatives. 
 
Underpayment Inequity – A situation where an individual calculation of inputs to outcomes 
results in a lower ratio when compared to another person.  Resulting behavior might be 
influenced by anger and/or frustration. 
 
Valence – The desire with which an individual possesses for particular rewards.  If an individual 
places a premium on cash rewards, then the valence for cash rewards is considered high for that 
individual. 
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Summary and Outline of Study 
The performance of an organization is often determined by the quality or quantity of a 
measurable outcome (Kalleberg et al., 2006).  Often with public organizations, finding an 
objective outcome variable to measure success is difficult.  The universal usage of standardized 
tests and AYP has made individual school divisions within the State of Virginia an attractive unit 
of analysis for researching organizational success (Gill & Meier, 2001).  The purpose of this 
research is to determine if organizational outcomes, defined by AYP requirements for school 
divisions, are impacted by teachers’ compensation. 
 
Chapter two provides a review of the literature related to teacher compensation, what variables 
impact student achievement, equity theory, and distributive justice.  Chapter three presents the 
methodology for the study.  In chapter three, the use of secondary data analyses will be discussed 
along with GLM.  Chapter four will present a detailed description of the dataset and the results of 
nine GLMs.  Finally, chapter five will present the findings, recommendations, and opportunities 
for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Salaries are one of the most discussed topics in public education, specifically primary and 
secondary education teacher salaries (Odden & Kelly, 1997, 2002).  While there has been much 
attention given to teacher salaries from an individual perspective, little attention has been given 
to studying teacher salaries from a comparative perspective.  As Adams (1963, 1965) and 
Greenberg (1987, 1989, 1990) have observed, employees working in industries in the public, the 
private, and the non-profit sectors are likely to make comparisons with other individuals to 
determine whether they are treated fairly by their organization.  To whom an individual makes a 
comparison is debated among scholars (Weick, 1966; Folger, 1986), but individuals are likely to 
make comparisons to referent others who hold a similar position or who have held a similar 
position (Folger, 1986).  As Odden and Kelley (1997, 2002) note, most education administrators 
began their careers in teaching.  In the context of Deutsch’s (1975) expansion of equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), it is possible that teachers might view they are not compensated fairly, and 
possibly not treated fairly, since they have more of a direct influence (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009) on 
organizational outcomes than administrators. 
 
Organizations in the public, private and non-profit sectors utilize salaries as a motivational 
device, and, generally, successful results are often tied to the amount of salary awarded to 
employees (Herzberg, 1966).  In education, student achievement on standardized assessment 
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measurements, usually in the form of standardized tests, is often used as a barometer to measure 
the effectiveness of a teacher (Goslin & Glass, 1967; Lomax, West, Harmon, Viator, & Madaus, 
1995).  There have been attempt in several areas of the country to include merit pay or incentive 
based programs to their compensation structures, but they have not proven effective (Springer, 
Ballou, Hamilton, Le, Lockwood, McCaffrey, Pepper, & Stecher, 2010; Liu, Johnson & Peske, 
2004; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  It is possible that studying teacher salary and student 
achievement data from a distributive justice perspective may elucidate alternative approaches to 
the calculation of teacher salaries. 
 
This chapter is divided into two major sections.  The first section is focused on elements of 
teacher compensation and organizational outcomes.  The second section is focused on 
distributive justice and its antecedent, equity theory.  The first section contains the following 
subsections: teacher inputs and student outcomes; the single-salary pay schedule and alternative 
compensation models; educational staffing and promotion; and, measuring student achievement.  
The second section contains the following subsections: the use of organizational theory in 
studying educational issues, equity theory; equity theory as an antecedent to distributive justice; 
and, distributive justice.  A review follows each section of this chapter.  The hypotheses drawn 
from the review of the literature are stated towards the end of section II.  A summary is included 
at the end of this chapter. 
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Section I 
Teacher Inputs and Student Outcomes 
In mid 1990s, the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future (1996) released a 
report entitled What Matters Most: Teaching for America’s Future in order to move the teaching 
profession from its current state to one where the profession fulfills the mission of educating 
students while attracting and retaining the best talent.  The Commission outlined three premises: 
 
1) Teachers’ knowledge and ability are important influences on students 
2) The best strategy to improve school is to recruit, train, and retain the best teachers 
3) Concerted effort is necessary to create an environment for teacher to teach to the best of 
their capabilities. 
As well as outlining the mission of the Commission (1996), the report highlights several barriers 
to student achievement including: low student expectations in achievement, inconsistent teaching 
standards, lack of rewards, and environments that are not conducive for effective teaching.  
Along with these barriers, the report also focuses on teacher compensation, which has followed a 
single pay schedule from early part of the twentieth century (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; Jupp, 
2005).  The report suggests that better teacher practices, accountability, and progressive pay 
systems will benefit school systems by rewarding teachers for the inputs they bring into the 
educational system (National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996). 
 
Recent inquiries by economists and public policy researchers have elucidated what many 
educational researchers have observed for a number of years; teacher inputs have a significant 
impact on student achievement (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Gill & Meier, 2001; Odden & Kelley, 
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2002; 1997; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Goldhaber & Anthony, 2007; Goldhaber & 
Brewer, 1997; Jepsen, 2005; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004).  
In making the case for a more progressive compensation system for teachers, Solomon (2005) 
argued that as teachers add education and experience to their skill set, they should be rewarded 
monetarily.  In support of this position, Goldhaber and Brewer (1997) observed that there is a 
statistically significant positive relationship between teachers holding BA and MA degrees in 
math and student achievement.   
 
Kukla-Acevedo’s (2009) research also suggests that there is a strong relationship between 
teacher characteristics and students achievement.  Kukla-Acevedo (2009) performed a secondary 
data analysis of a dataset provided by Kentucky Educational Professional Standards Board.  The 
dataset consisted of teacher characteristics such as: degrees held by each teacher; undergraduate 
GPA in math; number of units taken towards a degree in math; and student achievement (Kukla-
Acevedo, 2009).  Her research also included numerous mediating variables based on previous 
education literature such as: race; gender; and, school lunch program eligibility (Winfield, 1982; 
Edmunds, 1979; Good & Brophy, 1986; Kyle, 1985; Mackenzie, 1983; Purkey & Smith, 1983; 
Stedman, 1987; Stringfield & Teddlie, 1988; Gill & Meier, 2001).  Kukla-Acevedo’s research 
was predicated on the impact that teacher inputs have on students outcomes.  Utilizing test scores 
by fifth graders on standardized math examinations provided by the state testing program, 
Kentucky Core Content Test (KCCT), Kukla-Acevedo (2009) found that teacher characteristics 
(i.e.: undergraduate GPA and units of math taken) had a positive impact on student achievement 
in math across various demographic groups including: African-American students, European 
American Students, and students receiving subsidized lunches. 
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The implications of Kukla-Acevedo’s (2009) research are that increased teacher inputs are 
valuable tools for generating positive student outcomes.  As research has shown the positive 
relationship between increasing teacher inputs and student achievement (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; 
Gill & Meier, 2001; Odden & Kelley, 2002; 1997; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Goldhaber 
& Anthony, 2007; Goldhaber & Brewer, 1997; Jepsen, 2005; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, 
& Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004), there remains no consensus (Cochran-Smith & Fries, 2005) 
among scholars and observers on how to achieve this success consistently (Kukla-Acevedo, 
2009). 
 
While there are statistically significant links between teacher inputs and student achievement, 
environmental elements might moderate the impact that teachers have on students (Kukla-
Acevedo, 2009; Odden & Kelley, 1997; 2002; Tuck, Berman, & Hill, 2009).  The education, 
economics, and public policy literature provide a number of factors that might limit teacher’s 
abilities to influence student achievement, with poverty being the most prevalent (Roderick, 
Jacob, & Byrk, 2002; Gill & Meier, 2001; Winfield, 1990; Edmunds, 1979; Good & Brophy, 
1986; Kyle, 1985; Mackenzie, 1983; Purkey & Smith, 1983; Stedman, 1987; Stringfield & 
Teddlie, 1988).  As Kukla-Acevedo (2009) observed, teachers’ skills and knowledge influenced 
student learning, but characteristics such as poverty stunted student achievement (Tuck, Berman, 
& Hill, 2009; National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future 1996).  As Tuck, 
Berman, and Hill (2009) observe, when the teaching environment is made less conducive by 
external forces, teachers might transfer districts, or leave the profession altogether (Solomon, 
2005; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future 
1996). 
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The emphasis on teacher salaries when looking at student achievement is due to the amount 
influence that teachers have on students (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Jupp, 2005; Odden & Kelley, 
1997, 2002; The National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996).  According to 
Kukla-Acevedo (2009), economists and policy researchers are emphasizing the role of teaching 
and student achievement due to recent research that suggests that improved and diverse teaching 
techniques are influencing student achievement (The National Commission on Teaching and 
America’s Future, 1996).  Improved teacher training, new techniques, and newly acquired skills 
have impacted student achievement on standardized exams, which are used as barometers for 
student, school, and school district success (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; The National Commission on 
Teaching and America’s Future, 1996; The National Commission on Excellence in Education, 
1983).  The recent research on teaching suggests that not only do teachers need to be encouraged 
to increase their skill set, but that their salaries should reflect their total inputs in terms of 
producing successful educational outcomes (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Jupp, 2005; Odden & 
Kelley, 1997, 2002). 
 
The Single-Salary Pay Schedule & Alternative Compensation Models 
The single-salary pay schedule evolved in the 1920s as a compensation formula to alleviate 
unfair practices in paying teachers.  Many large, urban school districts adopted the method, 
which is designed to pay teachers along a single pay scale with regards to education and 
experience on the job (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  For much of the twentieth century, teacher 
salaries remained competitive with salaries in other industries until 1980s when salaries in other 
professions increased at a higher rate than those in primary and secondary education (National 
Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  However, 
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as the private sector and parts of the public sector adopted methods of high performance (Lawler, 
1971, 1992, 2000; Wood, 1996; Godard & Delaney, 2000; Kalleberg, Marsden, Reynold & 
Knoke, 2006; Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000), the single-salary pay schedule 
remained in place in the majority of school districts in the country (Jupp, 2005; Odden & Kelley, 
1997, 2002).  Education scholars, economists and public policy researchers are suggesting that 
there is a need to review and potentially replace the single-salary pay schedule as the salaries of 
other professions are currently reflective of individual inputs (Lawler, 1971, 1992, 2000; Kukla-
Acevedo, 2009; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Goldhaber & Anthony, 2007; Goldhaber & 
Brewer, 1997; Jepsen, 2005; Jupp, 2005; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; 
Rockoff, 2004).  
 
Before the 1990s teachers entered the job market with a competitive starting salary but did not 
enjoy the major increases in salary that other professionals received during their careers (Odden 
& Kelley, 1997, 2002).  According to Odden and Kelley (2002) teaching salaries lessened in 
competitiveness to other professions during the economic boom of the 1990s because the salary 
structures in place in most public school districts throughout the country remained tied to the 
single-salary-schedule.  The Volcker Commission (2005) produced similar findings when it 
noted that highly talented employees were leaving the government for more lucrative jobs in the 
private sector.  The Volcker Commission’s (2005) recommendation was to move towards a 
compensation structure that paid individuals for their talents as opposed to paying individuals 
based on the requirements of the position. 
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As the marketplace becomes more competitive for public school districts in attracting and 
retaining quality teachers, changes are under consideration in a number of public school districts 
across the U.S. to address organizational structure and employee pay (Lawler, 1990, 2000; 
Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000; Schuster & Zingheim, 1992; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 
2002).  However, the public service motivation literature (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008) suggests 
that teachers, like other public sector employees, are motivated to teach for reasons other than 
self-interest (Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
 
In the private sector, extrinsic rewards (Vroom, 1964; Herzberg, 1966; McGregor, 1960; 
Kalleberg, et al., 2006; Salamon, 2002; The Volcker Commission, 2005) are used to motivate 
employees to add to their skill set such that organizations can profit from the employee’s 
advanced knowledge (Lawler, 1971, 1981, 1990, 1992, 2000).  Parts of the public sector have 
utilized these techniques (The Volcker Commission, 2005; Salamon, 2002), but education 
remains dubious of monetary reward systems because they might incite a breakdown in collegial 
communication, which is viewed as paramount to success in education (Jupp, 2005; Solomon, 
2005; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  While merit pay (Lawler, 1981, 1990) and bonuses have 
met with skepticism (Jupp, 2005; Solomon, 2005), there are movements within the profession to 
motivate school districts to pay teachers based on what teachers bring with them to the classroom 
(i.e. inputs) (Jupp, 2005; Odden & Kelley, 1997; 2002; Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Gill & Meier, 
2001; Odden & Kelley, 2002; 1997; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Goldhaber & Anthony, 
2007; Goldhaber & Brewer, 1997; Jepsen, 2005; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 
2005; Rockoff, 2004).  Though merit-based pay and bonus structures have been recommended 
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for use by the federal government (The Volcker Commission, 2005), they have been largely 
avoided by school districts throughout the country (Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
  
Solomon (2005) suggests pay that is reflective of teacher inputs is important for several reasons: 
increasing student achievement; keeping teachers involved; motivating teachers to improve their 
craft; and, accountability.  One of the positive impacts that pay for performance systems have is 
that a consistent set of standards are usually adopted when determining salaries (Solomon, 2005; 
Lawler, 1981, 1990, 1992, 2000).  Accountability, along with rewards, serves as a motivating 
factor in teacher development, which in turn might impact student outcomes positively (Jupp, 
2005; Solomon, 2005).  However, the Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) study in 
Nashville, Tennessee found that students in classes where teachers were not incentivized 
performed equal to students in classrooms where teachers were incentivized. 
 
The impasse over adopting alternative pay schedules to the single-salary pay schedule usually 
emanates from teachers who believe that the competitive element of pay for performance 
schemes contravenes the collegial interplay that exists in the teaching profession (Odden & 
Kelley, 1997, 2002; Jupp, 2005).  However, as Solomon (2005) argues and as reported in What 
Matters Most (National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996), alternative pay 
systems with standards of accountability might be necessary for improving the teaching 
profession and ultimately improving student achievement.  One attempt at using an alternative 
compensation method (signing bonuses) was used in Massachusetts (Liu, Johnson, & Peske, 
2004). 
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Liu et al. (2004) chronicle in their article on a bonus system utilized in Massachusetts that 
bonuses often devalue retention and ignore the schools where the newly hired teachers are 
placed.  In 1998, the commonwealth of Massachusetts instituted a signing bonus of $20,000 to 
entice teachers into the profession (Liu et al., 2004).  The initiative began out of need to find 
candidates that were capable of scoring high enough on the state’s licensure examination (Liu et 
al., 2004).  According to the Massachusetts State Legislature (1998), the Massachusetts Signing 
Bonus Program (MSBP) came about as an instrument to encourage candidates, who may 
otherwise find employment in other professions, to consider teaching
4
.  Section 19B of Chapter 
260 to the Act of 1998 describes the need for the bonus structure as well as the amount that 
qualified candidates will receive upon accepting teaching jobs within the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.  However, the signing bonus structure for enticing teachers produced varying 
results from minor success to teachers choosing to leave the field (Liu et al., 2004)   
 
As Liu et al. (2004) suggest in their Massachusetts study, there are caveats to implementing 
alternative pay systems to the single-salary pay schedule.  As Odden and Kelley (2002) explain, 
support for the current system is strong because the single-salary pay schedule is based in 
equality (i.e. pay increases are based on degrees earned and experience).  Whether the fear of 
returning to a pay system based on grade level taught or gender (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002) is 
                                                 
4
      Located on the Internet at: http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw98/sl980260.htm 
Section 19B states ―There shall be an incoming teacher signing bonus program to be administered by the 
department of education for the purpose of encouraging the best and brightest candidates to teach in the public 
schools. The goal of such program shall be to encourage high achieving candidates to enter the profession who 
would otherwise not consider a career in teaching. Funding for such program shall be subject to the provisions of 
section 35S of chapter 10.‖ 
Part 1 of section 19B states ―On an annual basis, the department of education shall select the best and 
brightest teaching prospects based on objective measures such as test scores, grade point average or class rank and 
such other criteria as the department may determine. The department shall establish a system for receiving a limited 
number of recommendations for outstanding candidates for such bonuses from institutions of higher education 
across the nation. In selecting bonus recipients, the department shall consider such recommendations.‖ 
And Part 4 of Section 19B states ―Recipients shall receive a $20,000 signing bonus over at least three years 
with at least $8,000 distributed in the first year of the bonus.‖ 
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rational or not, teachers currently fight alternative pay systems for several reasons including: 
inconsistent standards for quality teaching evaluation; opportunities for training; or, availability 
to fund programs like performance based pay (Tuck, Berman, & Hill, 2009; Solomon, 2005).  As 
Hill & Johnson (2005) suggest, teacher compensation packages are a large portion of state 
budgets, and making changes might not derive the desired outcome (Tuck, Berman, & Hill, 
2009).  However, as the A Nation at Risk: The Imperative of Educational Reform and What 
Matters Most: Teaching for America’s Future reports observe, not making a change in the way 
that teachers are reviewed and compensated might impact the future of student achievement (The 
National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983; National Commission on Teaching and 
America’s Future, 1996).  
 
Educational Staffing and Promotion 
The United States educational system has one of the largest support staffs in the world among 
developing countries (National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996).  Less 
than half of the resources allocated for education in the United States on average are allotted to 
teaching (National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996; Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995).  According to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (1995), in the early to mid 1990s, teachers in the U.S. accounted 
for 43.6% of the education staff, while administrative and support staff (not including principals 
and assistant principals) accounted for 33.9%.  As stated in the 1996 report by the National 
Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, ―teaching staff in other countries make up 60% 
to 80% of public education employees.  Rather than hiring many non-teachers who plan and 
manage the work of teachers, these countries hire more teachers and give them time to plan and 
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manage their work together—and hence to become ever smarter about what they do‖ (p. 48).  
Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the primary and secondary educational workforce 
in the United States, and Figure 3 provides a chart that compares the U.S. percentage of the 
education workforce that are teachers with seven other developed countries. 
 
These numbers reflect a steady trend in American education where educational staff has shifted 
from a high number of teaching positions to increasing numbers of administrative and support 
staff positions.  In 1950, teachers accounted for about 70% of education positions with 
administrative and support staff positions accounting for about 25%.  By 1990, teachers account 
for just above half the number of primary and secondary education positions (National 
Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996).   
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Figure2:  A Pie Chart of the Educational Workforce in the United States 
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Figure 3:  International Comparison of the Percentage of Educational Staffs that are Teachers 
Source (Figures 1 and 2): Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators (Paris: OECD, 1995), in Using What We Have To Get 
the Schools We Need: A Productivity Focus for American Education (New York: The 
Consortium on Productivity in the Schools, 1995) 
 
As noted by Odden and Kelley (1997, 2002) and Kukla-Acevedo (2009), there exists a link 
between teacher involvement and student achievement.  Gill and Meier (2001) flesh this point 
out in their research on Texas school districts by using a 20 step SWAT modeling technique to 
separate higher achieving school districts from lower and average achieving school districts.  
Odden and Kelley (2002) suggests that teacher motivation, which is a product of compensation 
(Lawler, 1971, 1981), and student achievement are linked.  In their review of motivational 
theory, Odden and Kelley (2002) observe interplay between expectancy theory, goal-setting 
theory, and participative-management theory contributing to teacher motivation.  However, there 
is little focus on individual compensation comparisons that are likely to take place between 
teachers and a referent other (Folger, 1984, 1986) as Adams (1965) and other have suggested is 
likely to take place (Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1996). 
 
In education, as in other occupations, there is a proclivity on the part of individuals to seek 
increased incomes by way of promotion (Lawler, 1971, 1981, 1990, 1992, 2000; Odden & 
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Kelley, 2002, 1997).  As the number of administration level jobs within schools and at central 
school district offices increases, the opportunity for promotions and salary increases rises 
(National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996).  However, in education, 
promotion often takes highly skilled professionals (Jupp, 2005; Solomon, 2005; Kukla-Acevedo, 
2009) out of the classroom (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  Odden and Kelley (2002) 
summarizes the teacher to administrator conundrum thusly: 
Finally, larger salaries are available to teachers but only for those who leave teaching and 
enter administration – assistant principal, principal, central office supervisor, or 
numerous out of the classroom jobs…teachers with a greater array of professional 
expertise do not earn more than those with fewer skills and competencies, and only in 
rare circumstances are teachers, who provide the most crucial direct service to students – 
instruction – able to earn more than individuals who do not work on the classroom (p. 
12). 
 
According to Odden & Kelley (1997, 2002), teachers will often seek out promotion opportunities 
to increase their earning potential.
5
  While this is a common occurrence in the private sector and 
the public sector, which includes education (The Volcker Commission, 2005; Lawler, 1971, 
1981, 1990, 1992, 2000), when teachers leave the classroom, they take their skill set and 
experience with them (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002). 
 
In the Commonwealth of Virginia, the average teaching salary in 2007 was $49,252, while the 
average assistant principal salary was $71,680 and the average principal salary was $86,409.
6
  In 
2008, those figures were $50,528 for teachers, $72,702 for assistant principals and $89,427 for 
principals.  As nearly all educational administrators come from the teaching ranks, promotions 
                                                 
5
 The Volcker Commission (2005) noted this in their review of government agencies.  Often, technically proficient 
employees will leave their posts for management positions that are paid based on a higher grade level than their 
current technical position.   
6
 Virginia Department of Education, 2010.  The averages presented in this text represent an average for teacher, 
assistant principal, and principal salaries published by the Commonwealth of Virginia at www.doe.virginia.gov. 
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(Lawler, 1971, 1990, 1992, 2000) are a popular choice among teachers for gaining and increase 
in personal income.  There are other avenues for teachers to make additional income like: 
coaching, tutoring, and club sponsorship, but promotion remains the most popular way to 
increase personal income.  Administrative incomes often surpass the combination of a teaching 
salary and a supplemental income (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  However, implementation of 
an alternative pay system (Herzberg, 1966, 1969; Lawler, 1971, 1981, 1990, 1992, 2000) that 
pays teachers for their inputs requires an objective measure of organizational success to ensure 
fairness (Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990) in rewarding teachers for their service.  
 
 
Measuring Student Achievement 
Though there is not a consensus on measuring success in public school education, standardized 
testing has often been the as a tool for measuring academic achievement among students, 
teachers, and schools (Lomax et al., 1995).  Standardized testing has been characterized 
positively as an objective measure of student success that ignores social class, race, and gender 
(Lomax et al., 1995; Madaus, 1991), but has also been characterized negatively as a rigid tool 
that is incapable of measuring higher level thinking, conceptual, or procedural knowledge 
(Lomax et al., 1995).  Despite the overwhelming usage of standardized testing at primary and 
secondary educational levels, standardized tests have come under scrutiny because they interfere 
with teachers’ curriculum planning, placing emphasis on test scores above lesson plans (Lomax 
et al., 1995; Madaus, 1991; Maduas & Kellaghan, 1992; National Commission on Testing and 
Public Policy (NCTPP), 1990).  Despite criticisms of standardized exams, they provide a 
politically viable measurement of student achievement that has led to the adoption of minimum 
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requirements for achievement in local school districts across the United States (Winfield, 1990) 
and the creation of policies such as the NCLBA (U. S. Department of Education, 2010a; Scott, 
2009) on the federal level and the Standards of Leaning (Virginia Department of Education, 
2010) on the state level. 
 
By the 1980s school districts began to apply greater accountability based on school test scores 
than in the previous twenty years of standardized testing (Winfield, 1990; Timar & Kirp, 1989).  
As the impetus on standardized testing has increased, the pressure to increase graduation rates 
has increased on school districts and individual schools (Winfield, 1990; Paris et al., 1991; 
Lomax et al., 1995).  As the school reform movement of the 1980s increased in popularity, 
minimum competency tests (MCT) were developed to gauge not only student competency, but 
curriculum development and implementation (Airasian, 1987; Winfield, 1990).  By the mid 
1980s, over two thirds of the states in the US were using MCTs, giving them to students in 
elementary, junior high, and senior high school (Pipho & Hadley, 1984; Airasian, 1989; 
Winfield, 1990).  The increased attention to standardized testing success has lead to increased 
pressure on curriculum development, assessment programs, and remedial help for students need 
to improve scores (Winfield, 1990).  Improved scores are necessary for meeting the guidelines 
established for Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) as defined by the NCLBA, which requires 
100% proficiency in English and mathematics by 2014 (U.S. Department of Education, 2010a, 
2010b; Scott, 2009). 
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AYP are the standards set by each state in order to be in compliance with the NCLBA of 2001.  
The National Longitudinal Study, written to explore the impact of the NCLBA on three school 
districts in two cities, summarizes AYP thusly: 
Each state is required to test all students in grades 3–8 and once in grades 10–12 on 
assessments that are aligned with challenging state standards for reading and 
mathematics; each state must also set standards for making ―adequate yearly progress‖ 
(AYP) toward the goal of 100 percent proficiency. To make AYP, schools must meet 
proficiency targets not only for the school as a whole but also for student subgroups, 
including major racial and ethnic groups, economically disadvantaged students, students 
with disabilities, and students with limited English proficiency. (p. xi) 
 
In the state of Virginia, these assessments are given as part of the state’s Standard’s of Learning, 
or SOL (Virginia Department of Education, 2010).  AYP emphasizes 100% proficiency in 
English and Mathematics by 2014, but also encourages progress in the areas of social science 
and science (U.S. Department of Education, 2010a).  SOL scores, along with other assessments 
and student attendance and drop-out rates are utilized to measure each school division’s and 
school unit’s progress towards AYP (Virginia Department of Education, 2010).  Failure on the 
part of a school division or individual school to meet compliance after a defined period will lead 
to ―restructuring‖, which might result in any of the following scenarios that are not necessarily 
undertaken independently of each other: staff replacement, conversion to charter school status, or 
administration by a private firm (U.S. Department of Education, 2010a, 2010b).  To keep track 
of school’s progress, states are required to create and publish a ―report card‖ to track school 
district’s and school unit’s progress towards AYP (U.S. Department of Education 2010c). 
 
In September of 2000, the State of Virginia adopted standards for accrediting school in Virginia 
(Department of Education, 2010c; Virginia Department of Education, 2010).  Prior to NCLB, the 
State of Virginia had regulations enacted through the state’s SOL program.  Since the 
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implementation of the NCLBA of 2001, Virginia has modified its standards to comply with the 
tenants of NCLBA (U.S. Department of Education, 2010a).  As with all 50 states, Virginia has 
submitted a plan charting its progress towards full proficiency in English and mathematics by 
2014 among all students in the form of a ―State Report Card‖ (Department of Education, 2010c).  
The ―Report Card‖ includes data on assessments (SOL test scores) for school divisions, school 
units, and student subcategories within school units.  Also included with AYP calculations are 
data related to student drop-out rate, attendance, teacher certification and education, and school 
safety.  The ―Report Card‖ represents in numeric form the state’s progress towards NCLB 
compliance as well as individual school divisions’ and school units’ progress towards AYP (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Virginia Department of Education, 2010). 
 
 
Section I Review 
As economists, education and public policy researchers have shown, teacher inputs have a 
statistically significant positive relationship with student achievement, which ultimately might 
impact the overall success of individual schools and school districts (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; 
Jupp, 2005; Solomon, 2005; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; Gill & Meier, 2001).  New 
compensation methods have been attempted across the county, but the single-salary pay schedule 
remains the most widely used compensation plan (Jupp, 2005; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  
For teachers looking to increase their salary, exiting the profession or promotion remain the most 
viable options (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  However, with a standardized format for 
measuring student achievement in place (U.S. Department of Education, 2010a, 2010b); the 
opportunity to address and amend existing compensation systems might be available currently 
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such that teachers are incentivized to remain in the classroom as opposed to taking positions in 
administration or leaving the profession (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  
 
Section II 
Organizational Theory and Education 
The use of organizational management theories in studying education is not unprecedented.  
Numerous organizational management theories have been utilized to understand phenomena that 
take place in educational settings, especially theories of motivation (Gill & Meier, 2001; Odden 
& Kelley, 1997, 2002).  Examples of organizational theories that have been used in educational 
studies and published articles are listed in Figure 4. 
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Theory Definition Usage in Educational Settings 
Contingency Theory 
(Lawler, 1990) 
Incentivizing programs can 
work provided the programs 
fit organizational 
characteristics 
Used often for implementing pay 
for performance systems (Odden 
& Kelley, 2002). 
Goal-Setting Theory 
(Locke, 1968) 
Motivates employees by 
outlining specific goals that 
are challenging worthwhile, 
and achievable. 
Study of effective schools in 
Tennessee; teachers enriched by 
collegial working towards shared 
goals (Rosenholtz, 1989). 
Expectancy Theory 
(Herzberg, 1968) 
Incentivizing works if: 1) 
employees believe the goals 
can be met; 2) employees can 
make the connection between 
the task and the relevance to 
their position; and, 3) 
employees value the reward. 
Study of effective schools in 
Tennessee; teachers enriched by 
collegial working towards shared 
goals (Rosenholtz, 1989). 
Social Dilemma Theory 
(Runge, 1984) 
Free-riding is the perceived 
unintentional result of group-
based incentive programs. 
Data from Kentucky school 
based award program for 1995-
1997 validated Runge’s (1984) 
position that free-rider is more 
theoretical than actual (Kelley, 
1998; Kelley & Protsik, 1997). 
Participative-
Management Theory 
(Vroom, 1964) 
A motivational tool to 
provide an avenue for 
employees to participate in 
organizational level decision 
making. 
Research suggests that teachers 
want to be involved at the 
management decision making 
level (Hart, 1994, 1995). 
Figure 4:  Organizational Management Theories Used in Educational Settings 
Source: Odden & Kelley, 2002 
 
While a number of articles, published reports, and books have looked at compensation and 
worker motivation (Gill & Meier, 2001; Odden & Kelley, 1997; 2002), there is little evidence 
that equity theory (Adams, 1965) or distributive justice (Jasso, 1980; Greenberg, 1987) have 
been considered in looking at individual teacher inputs and outcomes and their impact on 
organizational success. 
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Equity Theory 
Equity theory posits that individual perceptions of fairness result from ratio calculations that 
individuals make between themselves and a comparative other (Adams, 1965).  According to 
Adams (1965), individuals will calculate a ratio of inputs to outcomes to determine whether an 
organization is treating them fairly.  Equity theory researchers define inputs as the tools and 
resources that individuals possess for production (Adams, 1965; Jasso, 1980; Greenberg, 1987).  
Inputs include: effort, time on the job, education, and other personal traits or production items 
that a person might use in producing outputs.  Outputs are the result of production, and are not 
limited to tactile objects.  Outputs, especially in the public sector might be efficiency in the 
delivery of a service.  As individuals calculate inputs to outputs, they use the distribution of 
organizational resources, such as salary, to determine whether an organization is treating them 
fairly (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973).  If the calculations performed by 
individuals result in equity, it is likely that individuals will perceive their organization as treating 
them fairly (Adams, 1965; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; Jasso, 1980; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 
1990).  An illustration of equity theory is presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Individual Outcomes                         Comparative Other Outcomes 
                  _________________            =           _________________________ 
 
Individual Inputs                                  Comparative Other Inputs 
 
Figure 5:  Equity Theory Equation: Inputs-to-Outcomes between an Individual and a 
Comparative Other 
Source: Adams, 1965 
 
Adams (1963, 1965; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964) suggests that when employees are determining 
fairness within an organization there is a natural inclination for these individuals to compare their 
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inputs (i.e. hours worked, education) to outcomes (i.e. salary, benefits) ratio to a like other.  If the 
ratio produces an equitable ratio between an employee and a like other, then the individual 
making the comparison will likely believe that their organization is fair.  If the ratio produces an 
inequitable ratio between an employee and a like other, then the individual making the 
comparison might alter their work behavior depending on whether there is underpayment or 
overpayment inequity (Adams, 1963, 1965; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 
1990, 1996; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003;  Jasso, 1980, 1986; Hegtvedt, 1988, 1990, 1993).  This 
concept provides the foundation for the development of distributive justice (Greenberg, 1987, 
1989, 1990, 1996; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003).  Distributive justice, one of the four elements of 
organizational justice, is often studied in organizations to understand work behavior and 
satisfaction among employees (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003).  Salaries are often scrutinized as a 
measure of whether an individual believes resources are distributed fairly within an organization 
(Greenberg, 1989, 1990). 
 
Overpayment inequity is the result of ratio calculation where an individual is receiving more 
compensation than their comparative other.  Underpayment inequity is the result of a ratio 
calculation where an individual is receiving less compensation that their comparative other 
(Greenberg 1987, 1989, 1996).  Equilibrium is achieved when a ratio calculation is made 
between an individual and a comparative other and the outcomes are viewed as equitable 
(Adams, 1965; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964).  These calculations may result in changing behavior 
patterns exhibited by individuals (Jasso, 1980; Jasso 1986; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990; 
Hegtvedt, 1988, 1990, 1993).  An illustration of underpayment inequity and overpayment 
inequity is presented in Figure 4.  When calculated ratios are inequitable, behavioral response on 
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the part of the individual will vary depending whether the individual was underpaid for their 
assigned task or overpaid (Hegtvedt, 1988; Greenberg, 1996).  In a situation where an employee 
believes they are underpaid for their work in comparison to referent other, the employee may 
alter their inputs, which may impact outputs (Greenberg, 1989, 1996; Hegtvedt, 1988, 1990).   
 
 
 
Underpayment Inequity: 
 
Individual Outcomes                         Comparative Other Outcomes 
                  _________________            <          _________________________ 
 
Individual Inputs                                  Comparative Other Inputs 
 
Overpayment Inequity: 
 
Individual Outcomes                         Comparative Other Outcomes 
                  _________________            >           _________________________ 
 
Individual Inputs                                  Comparative Other Inputs 
 
Figure 6:  Underpayment Inequity and Overpayment Inequity 
Source: Adams, 1965 
 
Adams (1965) suggests that when individual outcomes are lower than expected (Herzberg, 
1966), an individual will make conscious decision to change inputs to bring the calculated ratio 
of inputs to outcomes with a comparative other to an equitable level.  The result of this change in 
inputs (Hegtvedt, 1988) may include: altering the arrival time to work, taking longer to perform 
assigned tasks, taking longer breaks, or shortening the work day (Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 
1987, 1989, 1990).  Greenberg (1996) suggests that modified behavior resulting from lower than 
expected outcomes could result in corporate theft or other criminal activity. 
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In an experiment by conducted by Greenberg (1996), respondents were given a scenario where 
they were underpaid for their work by an employer and asked to respond to a questionnaire.  
From the results of the questionnaire, it is apparent that employees may to take drastic measures 
to restore equity (Adams, 1965) in the relationship between the individual and the organization.  
There are several reasons explained by Greenberg (1996) as to why employees pilfer from their 
organization.  First, employee theft might be the result of aggression and anger felt towards the 
employer due to lower than expected outcomes.  Secondly, corporate theft on the part of the 
employee is an attempt at to address the underpayment issue, such that the employee might steal 
from an organization to bring the inputs to expected outcomes ratio to balance.  Thirdly, fair and 
honest reasoning given by an employer as to why pay cuts were necessary and how they were 
determined tends to moderate potential criminal behavior (Greenberg 1987, 1989, 1990, 1996; 
Clay-Warner, Hegtvedt, & Roman, 2005).  While underpayment inequity tends to generate a 
series of responses related to achieving perceived equality on the part of the individual, 
overpayment inequity has been shown to result in other types of responses (Greenberg, 1996). 
 
Pay comparisons to a comparable other might lead to behavior moderated by two paradoxical 
influences: motivation by self-interest versus concerns for fairness in an exchange (Jacques, 
1961; Adams, 1965; Loseman, Miedema, Van Den Bos, & Vermunt, 2009).  Motivation by self-
interest (Adams, 1965) is a reaction to the necessity to meet lower level needs such as 
physiological needs and safety needs (Maslow, 1970).  In contrast to self-interest is the concept 
of fairness in interpersonal exchanges (Adams, 1965).  While advantageous inequity tends to 
positively impact self-perception and esteem, it also provokes individual perceptions of fairness 
(Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 1987; Loseman et al., 2009).  An advantageous pay differential has 
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the potential to impact behavior (Jasso, 1980, 1986) and performance (Greenberg, 1989, 1990) 
by individuals who calculate a ratio of inputs to outcomes that result in higher outcomes (Adams, 
1965). 
 
In an experiment conducted by Loseman et al. (2009), the researchers hypothesized that 
individuals are likely to be motivated by self-interest over distributive fairness when there is a 
perceived threat.  The authors constructed their project around research that reported that when 
an individual is in a tenuous situation, their need for positive reinforcement will supersede their 
desire for fairness with a comparative other in the distribution of outcomes (Van den Bos, Peters, 
Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006; Loseman et al., 2009).  Loseman et al. (2009) summarize the impact 
of positive reinforcement for task completion thusly, ―the pleasure that people experience by 
receiving more than others follows, at least in part, from the immediate positive input on 
people’s self-image that this treatment entails‖ (p. 14).  Within the context of positive 
reinforcement, the authors tested their premise in two studies in The Netherlands (Loseman, et 
al., 2009). 
 
The first study included seventy-three participants (29 men, 44 women) who were customers at a 
mall in Utrecht and the second included ninety-two students (25 men, 67 women) from Leiden 
University.  The researchers arranged participants into three groups: advantaged, disadvantaged, 
and equitable.  The experimental design produced results that support the view that advantageous 
outcomes (Adams, 1965) are desired when a potential threat to the self is perceived.  The 
inclusion of a threat to the self in the experiment allowed the researchers to observe the impact 
that the threat had on the internal psychological conflict between self interest and comparative 
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equity (Jacques, 1961).  The perceived threats introduced in the research design were not of 
physical or life-threatening nature.  The researchers observed that self-interest superseded 
fairness when participants were placed in threatening conditions as opposed to non-threatening 
conditions.  The researchers concluded that in a situation where a threat to the self is perceived, 
individuals are not likely to abandon fairness concerns, but will subordinate fairness to self-
interest (Loseman, et al., 2009).  Building on the work of Miedema, Ven den Bos, & Vermunt 
(2006), Loseman et al. discovered that the concept of fairness is not abandoned in threatening 
situations, but that fairness is subordinated in favor of positive reinforcement (Loseman et al., 
2009).  While the positive reinforcement of an advantageous situation can have an immediate 
psychological impact as observed by Loseman et al. (2009), behavior alterations due to an 
advantageous pay situation might also arise (Greenberg, 1989, 1996). 
 
According to Greenberg, as underpayment inequity is capable of generating a sense of less self 
worth by an individual, overpayment inequity might also give an individual an inflated sense of 
self worth (Greenberg, 1989, 1996).  Individuals who receive a greater outcome for similar 
inputs when compared to a referent other may experience feelings that run the gamut from guilt 
to entitlement.  It is possible that those who receive a greater outcome may change their behavior 
to include working more hours, working over holidays, or skipping lunch breaks (Greenberg, 
1989).  In contrast to guilt is the potential for individuals to believe that they are superior to their 
referent other, and that the overpayment inequity justifies this belief (Greenberg, 1989, 1996; 
Loseman, et al., 2009).  However, these behavioral responses are dependent on choices made by 
individuals in terms of how outcomes are evaluated and valued (Jasso, 1980). 
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Jasso (1980) proposes, from a mathematical perspective, that behavior expressed based in a 
comparative ratio is the result of individual evaluations of the objective and subjective worth of 
outcomes.  Individuals who make justice valuations will be satisfied by their own choice, 
meaning that if they feel that the quality of the outcome is equal to a large quantity of another 
outcome, justice is achieved from their perspective (Jasso, 1980, 1986).  However, if injustice is 
perceived, individuals may alter their behavior (Greenberg, 1989).  While these results support 
the basic tenants of equity theory, there are situations for which the theory does not adequately 
account (Weick, 1966; Folger, 1986). 
 
Equity Theory as an Antecedent to Distributive Justice 
Organizational justice is broadly defined as the perception of fairness of an organization 
determined by individuals working within the organization (Greenberg, 1987; 1989; 1990; 
1996).  Early in the development of organizational justice, three elements of organizational 
justice were identified: distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice.  
Interactional justice consists of two subunits: interpersonal justice and informational justice 
(Greenberg, 1990).  As the literature on organizational justice has expanded, informational 
justice and interpersonal justice have been added to replace interactional justice as the third and 
fourth elements of organizational justice (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Colquitt & Chertkoff, 
2002).  Each element of organizational justice focuses on perceived fairness when it comes to 
particular areas of organizational decision making (Greenberg, 1987).  Distributive justice, the 
element of organizational justice most associated with fairness derived from outcomes, is the 
product of equity theory’s continuing evolution (Jasso, 1980, 1986; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 
1990, 1996; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003). 
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Though equity theory (Adams, 1965) suffers from rigidity and issues of application (Wieke, 
1966; Folger, 1986), it is the antecedent to distributive justice.  One of the deficiencies of equity 
theory (Adams, 1965) is that is tends to assume an obverse relationship (Folger, 1986) between 
the individual making the ratio calculation of inputs to outcomes and a referent other (Weick, 
1966; Folger, 1986).  While most experiments during the formative stages in the development of 
equity theory (Weick , 1966) have highlighted the importance of a sense of fairness perceived by 
individuals as a result of ratio calculations, little consideration has been given to other factors 
such as: individual choice (Jasso, 1980), the referent other (Folger, 1986), or the valence 
(Vroom, 1964) for which an individual shows towards particular outcomes.  In a review of the 
state of the literature in social exchange (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961), Weick (1966) suggests that 
elements of interpersonal interaction are precluded from the basic tenants of equity theory.   
Some of the elements that might impact equity are: who is the referent other to whom a 
comparison is made (Folger, 1986); the setting in which individuals form their perceptions of 
fairness; and, whether resulting actions are based on inequity or some other social exchange 
(Blau, 1964) factor.  One such example that Weick (1966) gives is a situation where one has to 
explain how higher outcomes do not necessarily bring about higher production.  Weick (1966) 
further notes that higher individual outcomes do not necessarily produce higher satisfaction 
among workers.  Equity theory (Adams, 1965), according to Weick, is limited by its dependence 
on inequity determining future action (Weick, 1966). 
 
Folger (1986) believes that equity theory has become less salient in the fairness literature 
because it suffers from three ―shortcomings‖ (p. 146) that limit its applicability.  First, inputs and 
outcomes are usually narrowly defined and rigid because outcomes that are influenced by 
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conditions particular to certain situations are not considered in the literal calculation of inputs to 
outcomes (Adams, 1965).  As Weick (1966) explains, higher outcomes do not necessarily lead to 
improved production if the conditions of the work setting are unsatisfactory.  Secondly, equity 
theory (Adams, 1965) is limited in its applicability because outcomes are considered irrespective 
of the procedures used to determine those outcomes.  And, thirdly, there is no set time for an 
individual to determine whether or not outcomes are just.  While a response to inequity is 
predictable (Adams, 1965), there is no indication of when an actionable response will occur.  
Folger (1986) also suggests that the distance between an individual and their desired outcome 
can also explain resulting behavior based on ratio calculations. 
 
In the early development of equity theory (Adams, 1965), inequity is usually explained as the 
result of a dyadic exchange or a relationship where a third party is involved in the determination 
of outcomes (Weick, 1966).  In expanding the applicability of equity theory, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) suggest that resulting behaviors to outcomes might be based on the distance 
between an actual outcome and a preferred outcome (Folger, 1986).  In a situation where two 
individuals are looking to gain the same desired outcome, the individual who comes closest to 
attaining the desired outcome is likely to be more disappointed that the other individual who was 
a greater distance from attaining the desired outcome (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Folger, 
1986).  Most individuals generally strive for maximal outcomes (Adams, 1965; Weick, 1966), 
and are likely to express a higher degree of frustration due to failure the closer they come to 
attaining a desired income (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
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Folger (1984, 1986) bases his referent cognitions theory (RCT) on the concept of referent 
outcomes, those outcomes which are imagined in relation to those outcomes that have occurred.  
Referent outcomes are considered high if the imagined outcome is greater than the actual 
outcome, and referent outcomes (Folger, 1984) are considered low if the imagined outcome is no 
more favorable that the actual outcome (Folger, 1986).  In a circumstance where an individual 
has experienced a less than desirable outcome, the individual’s behavior might be moderated by 
whether the situation has a high likelihood or low likelihood of amelioration.  If the likelihood of 
amelioration is high, an individual’s response is likely to be favorable, but if the likelihood of 
amelioration is low, an individual’s response is likely to be less favorable (Folger, 1986).  
Amelioration is impacted by the distance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) between the desired 
outcome and the actual outcome (Folger, 1986).  In this context, perceived justice is based less 
on social comparison and more on desired outcomes (Folger, 1984, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982). 
 
The development of equity theory (Adams, 1965) has provided researchers with insight into how 
individuals determine fairness (Greenberg, 1987; Folger, 1986) and the framework for 
distributive justice (Greenberg, 1987, 1989).  In its most elementary form, equity theory 
establishes that contributions are what individuals use to determine whether outcomes are fair 
(Adams, 1965).  Individuals are generally satisfied and believe they are treated fairly when their 
contributions are rewarded appropriately (Adams, 1965; Weick, 1966; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982; Greenberg, 1990).  While equity theory has provided insight into perceptions of fairness 
on the part of individuals, it has not been accommodating to circumstances that contravene a 
basic obverse relationship (Weick, 1966; Folger, 1986).  Despite the limitations of equity theory 
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(Weick, 1965), it has provided the foundation for further understanding how individuals perceive 
fairness in the allocation of outcomes and judge organizations in terms of organizational justice 
(Greenberg, 1987; 1989; 1990).  The following hypotheses are posited using an equity theory 
framework. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: High teacher salaries will lead to high student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1a (0): High teacher salaries will not lead to high student achievement as measured 
by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: In the presences of intervening variables, high teacher salaries will lead to high 
student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1b (0): In the presences of intervening variables, high teacher salaries will lead to 
high student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: When adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher salaries 
and student achievement as measured by AYP will occur. 
 
Hypothesis 2a (0): When adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher 
salaries and student achievement as measured by AYP will not occur. 
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Hypothesis 2b: In the presence of intervening variables, an inverse relationship between teacher 
salaries, adjusted for cost-of-living, and student achievement as measured by AYP will occur. 
 
Hypothesis 2b (0): In the presence of intervening variables, an inverse relationship between 
teacher salaries, adjusted for cost-of-living, and student achievement as measured by AYP will 
not occur. 
 
Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice emphasizes how perceptions of fairness are determined in relationship to 
outcomes (Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990; Hegtvedt, 1993).  Procedural justice emphasizes the 
relationship between fairness perceptions and the procedures used by organizations to make 
decisions (Hegtvedt, 1993; Corpanzano & Ambrose, 2001).  Informational justification refers to 
individual perceptions of fairness related to the amount of information received. Interpersonal 
justice refers to individual perceptions of fairness related to the sensitivity applies to 
interpersonal exchange (Greenberg & Baron, 2007; Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002), usually in a 
leader-member exchange relationship (Asgari, Silong, Ahmad, & Samah, 2008).  When 
outcomes resulting from inputs are the focus of perceived fairness, a distributive justice 
perspective is usually applied (Greenberg, 1990).  However, determining which types of 
outcomes are appropriate for which types of inputs might present a challenge.  To further 
understand the relationship of inputs to outcomes ratios (Adams, 1965) and their impact on 
perceptions of fairness, a review of the expansion of equity theory and its relationship to 
distributive justice (Greenberg, 1987) follows. 
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Adams (1965) predicated that perceptions of fairness derived from input to outcome ratios are 
based on contributive inputs or equity.  Deutsch (1975) expanded equity theory (Adams, 1963), 
and ultimately distributive justice (Greenberg, 1990), on the inputs side of the ratio equation to 
include three principles: needs, equality, and equity (Patrick, Mahoney & Petrosko, 2008).  The 
distribution of outcomes by an organizational might be subject to which principle is given 
priority: within the needs principle, outcomes are distributed to entities based on need, the higher 
the need the greater proportion of outcomes distributed to that entity; within the equality 
principle, all entities receive an equal portion of organizational outcomes; and, within the equity 
principle, the entity contributing the most receives the greatest share of organizational outcomes 
(Deutsch, 1975).  Experiments testing the three principles of distributive justice have elucidated 
differences between organizational types and gender (Hums & Chelladurai, 1994; Patrick et al., 
2008). 
 
Building on the work of Hums and Chelladurai (1994), Patrick, Mahoney and Petrosko (2008) 
looked at perceptions of distributive justice among the three division of the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) and gender.  In previous research, Hums and Chelladurai (1994) 
found that the principles of equality and need were preferred among coaches and administrators 
consistently across all divisions of college athletics, but that there were differences between male 
and female respondents with males showing a preference for equity and females showing a 
preference for equality. 
 
To test which distributive justice principle was preferred by which division (i.e. NCAA Division 
I, II, or III) or by which gender, Patrick et al. (2008) constructed a survey consisting of four 
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scenarios depicting likely events that impact athletic departments and mailed the instruments to 
athletic directors and senior women’s administrators at colleges across the nation and the three 
athletic divisions.  The first two scenarios were constructed based on work by Mahoney et al. 
(2002, 2006) and Hums & Chelladurai (1994).  The first scenario described a situation where a 
private donation is made to the department; the second scenario describes a situation where there 
are university-wide budget cuts; the third scenario describes a situation where the budget 
increases due to successful athletic seasons; and, the fourth scenario describes a situation where 
the budget decreases due to poor athletic seasons.  The researchers found variation among 
distribution principles (Mahoney et al., 2002, 2006) with the exception of scenario four where 
revenue producing teams endured poor seasons. 
 
The researchers observed a preference for equity (contribution) among Division I administrators, 
and a preference for equality among Division II and III administrators.  This finding suggests 
that Division I institutions are more likely to follow a corporate model of rewards distribution 
(Kalleberg et al., 2006) than Divisions II or III.  The research reaffirmed differences between the 
two genders with female administrators preferring equality and male administrators preferring 
equity or contribution based distribution (Mahoney et al., 2002, 2006; Hums & Chelladurai, 
1994; Patrick et al., 2008). 
 
These findings support pervious research highlighting the differences between organizational 
structure (Mahoney et al., 2002, 2006; Hums & Chelladurai, 1994) and sector in the context of 
outcome distribution (Kalleberg et al., 2006).  In a review of data from the 1996 National 
Organization Study, Kalleberg et al. (2006) observed that organizations differ in terms of how 
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rewards are distributed and what constitutes rewards offered.  As noted by Kalleberg et al. 
(2006), non-profit and public sectors have adopted elements of HPWO into their HRM 
strategies, but typically are unable to institute the same level of extrinsic reward (McGregor, 
1960; Vroom, 1964; Herzberg, 1966) systems that for-profit organizations utilize to motivate 
workers (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; Appelbaum & Batt, 1994).  Generally, 
corporate organizations utilize more pay-based reward systems for worker motivation than non-
profit or public sector organizations because non-profit and public sector organizations lack the 
resources to fund a pay-based incentive program (Kalleberg et al., 2006). 
 
However, Kallegerg et al. (2006) observed that workers expect (Herzberg, 1966; Vroom, 1964) 
to be rewarded for their contributions to the production of outcomes (Adams, 1963, 1965; Adams 
& Jacobsen, 1964).  Regardless of the reward offered (i.e. increased pay, bonuses, tuition 
reimbursement, or cross-training), individual workers tend to perceive an organization as fair if 
the reward offered appropriately matches what they feel they have contributed to the 
organization.  While rewards might differ (Kalleberg et al., 2006) and individual valence 
(Vroom, 1964) for specific rewards might vary, organizational success is impacted by worker 
satisfaction in relation to rewards offered (Lawler, 1992).  The following hypotheses are posited 
using a distributive justice framework. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Student achievement, as measured by AYP, will be higher in school divisions 
where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow. 
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Hypothesis 3a (0): Student achievement, as measured by AYP, will not be higher in school 
divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: In the presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, will be higher in school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Hypothesis 3b (0): In the presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, will be higher in school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Section II Review 
Equity theory (Adams, 1965) lays the ground work for peer to peer inputs to outcomes ratio 
comparisons.  Calculations of inputs to outputs ratios that are equal tend to suggest that an 
individual believes they are treated fairly (Adams, 1963, 1965; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964), but 
underpayment and overpayment inequity have the potential to influence individual behavior that 
might be counterproductive to the overall mission of an organization (Jasso, 1980; 1986; 
Hegtvedt, 1988, 1990, 1993; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990).  However, as critics of equity theory 
have explained, the assumption of an obverse relationship has made the application of equity 
theory difficult in understanding individual behavior in organizational settings (Weick, 1966; 
Folger, 1984, 1986).  Through the work of Deutsch (1975), distributive justice evolved from the 
tenants of equity theory to understand individual perceptions of fairness based on the distribution 
of organizational resources (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Greenberg, 1989, 1990).  
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Summary 
In light of equity theory (Adams, 1965) and distributive justice (Jasso, 1980; Greenberg, 1987, 
1989; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003), education is an industry where entry-level positions have the 
greatest impact on organizational outcomes (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  While teachers 
might compare their inputs to outcomes ratios with those in other professions (Folger, 1984, 
1986; Loseman, Miedema, Van Den Bos, & Vermunt, 2009; Van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & 
Ybema, 2006), they are more likely to compare their inputs to outcomes ratios with an individual 
from within their field (Adams, 1965).  As research continues to show, educational outcomes are 
often most influenced by teachers (Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Jupp, 2005; Solomon, 2005; 
Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Goldhaber & Anthony, 2007; Goldhaber & Brewer, 1997; 
Jepsen, 2005; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004).  From an equity 
in the allocation of resources perspective, there is a potential for teachers to believe that 
underpayment inequity (Adams, 1963, 1965; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964) exists in the allocation 
of outcomes based on the equity principal that resources should be allocated based on 
contribution (Deutsch, 1975). 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Social phenomena cannot easily be observed in a controlled environment, but they can still be 
tested using the scientific method and experimental designs that introduce an independent 
variable to observe change in a dependent variable (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000; 
Diesing, 1991).  Utilization of an experimental design is stout, especially when primary data are 
used (Diesing, 1991).  However, collecting primary data might be cost prohibitive to answering 
the research question.  In instances where the data are expansive and have already been 
collected, a secondary analysis of data design is an effective methodology (Frankfort-Nachmias 
& Nachmias, 2000) 
 
For this research, data have been culled from a large dataset collected by the Virginia 
Department of Education.  The data set for this research includes adequate yearly progress 
(AYP) scores for high school students in each of Virginia’s school divisions (excluding the City 
of Lexington) in the areas of English and mathematics; teacher and principal salary data; and, 
other pertinent data such as: the dropout rate, free and reduced lunch participation, percentage of 
African-American, Hispanic, and white students, teacher education, division change over five 
years, and students enrolled in English as a second language programs.  Given the amount of 
data collected for analysis, primary collection of these data would be time and cost prohibitive 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). 
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This chapter outlines the methodology for executing the research study.  The purpose of this 
research is to answer the question: What is the relationship between teacher salaries and student 
achievement as measured by adequate yearly progress (AYP)?  This chapter is divided into four 
sections.  The first section of this chapter lists the research questions and their associated 
hypotheses and null hypotheses.  The second section of this chapter summarizes the advantages 
and disadvantages to using a secondary analysis of data design.  The third section describes the 
construction of the dataset and the variables within the dataset.  The fourth section of this chapter 
will describe how that data will be analyzed.  A summary of this chapter follows the fourth 
section. 
 
Research Questions, Hypotheses and Null Hypotheses 
Research Question 1:   What is the relationship between teachers’ salaries and student 
achievement as measured by AYP? 
 
Hypothesis 1a: High teacher salaries will lead to high student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1a (0): High teacher salaries will not lead to high student achievement as measured 
by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: In the presences of intervening variables, high teacher salaries will lead to high 
student achievement as measured by AYP. 
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Hypothesis 1b (0): In the presences of intervening variables, high teacher salaries will not lead to 
high student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between teachers’ salaries when adjusted for cost 
of living and student achievement as measured by AYP? 
 
Hypothesis 2a: When adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher salaries 
and student achievement as measured by AYP will occur. 
 
Hypothesis 2a (0): When adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher 
salaries and student achievement as measured by AYP will not occur. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: In the presence of intervening variables, an inverse relationship between teacher 
salaries, adjusted for cost-of-living, and student achievement as measured by AYP will occur. 
 
Hypothesis 2b (0): In the presence of intervening variables, an inverse relationship between 
teacher salaries, adjusted for cost-of-living, and student achievement as measured by AYP will 
not occur. 
 
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, and the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries? 
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Hypothesis 3a: Student achievement, as measured by AYP, will be higher in school divisions 
where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Hypothesis 3a (0): Student achievement, as measured by AYP, will not be higher in school 
divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: In the presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, will be higher in school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Hypothesis 3b (0): In the presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, will not be higher in school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Secondary Data Analysis 
Secondary data analysis is usually applied to inquiries where the amount of data is expansive and 
the cost of collecting the necessary data is prohibitive (Justice, Breit-Smith, & Rogers, 2010; 
Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 2000).  The data culled for this research have been collected by 
the State of Virginia and have appeared in publish reports distributed by the Virginia Department 
of Education giving these data credibility (Justice, Breit-Smith, & Rogers, 2010).  While primary 
data collection and analysis is considered optimal (Diesing, 1991), a secondary analysis of 
existing data is appropriate for answering the research questions posed (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
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Nachmias, 2000).  The advantages and limitations of utilizing a secondary data analysis are 
presented here. 
 
Advantages 
According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000), secondary analysis involves analyzing 
data that have been previously collected.  Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) outline 
several advantages and limitations to utilizing secondary data in a research project.  One 
advantage is that secondary data analysis has a long tradition of usage with various researchers 
employing the technique, such as Durkhiem, Marx, and Weber (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2000).  Another advantage is that the design allows for replication, especially if 
utilizing historic data (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  Also, secondary data analysis is 
a time and cost effective way to do social inquiry (Nardi, 2006; Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2000).  In certain cases, the amount of data needed to perform a comprehensive 
analysis is cost and time prohibitive.  Also, if a government agency with numerous employees 
and resources has already collected the data, or recorded the data, as with public records, the 
process may be redundant if collected again by researchers (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2000). 
 
Experimental designs can be implemented using secondary data (Diesing, 1991; Justice et al., 
2010; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  An advantage for using secondary data in an 
experimental design is that the data are usually collected by a credible agency such as the federal 
government, state and local agencies, and research universities.  Moreover, the methodology 
used to collect the data originally conveys to the current study (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
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Nachmias, 2000).  Generally, secondary data have existing credibility as they might have been 
utilized in research projects by researchers within the particular field where the data originate 
(Justice et al. 2010). 
 
Justice, Breit-Smith, and Rogers (2010) suggest using secondary data because of the amount of 
data required to construct effective models in field such as education is often expansive. As the 
authors note, these datasets are usually published and available for a small fee or free (Justice et 
al., 2010).  The authors observe in their research that data already collected can be used to 
answer new scientific queries.  Whether data are collected for a specific purpose or required by 
an organization for legal reasons, if the researcher is knowledgeable of the existing data, these 
data may be used to answer research questions in a complementary study (Justice et al., 2010; 
Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  Justice et al. (2010) recommend using large datasets 
collected with the support of federal, state, and local funding in lieu of collecting datasets of 
primary data where the data to be collected are expansive. 
 
Data on school districts are often expansive and beyond the collecting ability of a single 
researcher.  Gill and Meier (2001) designed an experiment using organizational theory to discern 
the characteristics of superior performing agencies from an existing dataset of 534 school 
districts in the State of Texas.  The researchers (Gill & Meier, 2001) explain their reason for 
using school districts to understand high performing public organizations by stating, ―School 
systems are not only the most prevalent public bureaucracies in the United States, they also have 
some relatively objective measures of outputs that can be used to evaluate performance…that is, 
the measure of school system outputs – is based on students scores on standardized tests (p. 10).‖  
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The purpose of their research was to discern whether or not environmental constraints, financial 
resources, district policies, or teacher salaries impacted scores on standardized tests.  The 
researchers developed a design where standardized test scores represented the dependent variable 
and various characteristics of the school districts (i.e. teacher salary, student ethnicity, 
socioeconomic level, etc.) represented the independent variable.  Utilizing a SWAT analysis, the 
researchers deduced that high performing agencies produced superior results by maximizing 
existing assets to mitigate environmental influences (Gill & Meier, 2001).  This research 
benefited from the availability of secondary data. 
 
As Justice et al. (2010) and Gill & Meier (2001) have noted, existing datasets often provide 
researchers with a cost effective and time effective collection of data that can be used in 
experimental or exploratory research designs (Franfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000; Diesing, 
2001).  Secondary data might be used to create a complementary study to the original research 
for which the data were collected (Justice, et al., 2010), or used to better understand phenomena 
in one field by using data collected in another field (Gill & Meier, 2001).  The use of secondary 
data is attractive to researchers, but not without caveats (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2000). 
 
Limitations 
Secondary data analysis is not without its limitations.  While secondary data analysis does 
provide researchers with the advantage of having immediate data, the data are part of a previous 
collection that may have no bearing on the current research project (Franfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2000).  Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias (2000) outline three areas of concern when 
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using secondary data: inherent limitations, access, and insufficient data.  When using secondary 
data, the researcher assumes the limitations and inaccuracies of the original data collection 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  As Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias explain, if a 
researcher chooses to utilize data from an earlier project that used an experimental model the 
researcher assumes existing fallacies in the design as well as the internal and external threats to 
validity. 
 
Secondly, a researcher may be able to access portions of the desired dataset but not all 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  This is especially true when searching for data that 
has been placed on the Internet.  As with data warehouses on the Internet like the U.S. Census, 
certain search engines or security protocol may be necessary for gaining access to data or data 
may not be available through the Internet (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).   
 
Thirdly, available secondary data might not provide the desired variables for the research project 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  One of the most common issues with using secondary 
data is that the data are not complete, meaning that data are available for some units of analysis, 
but not all (Justice et al., 2010; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  However, researchers 
have had success utilizing secondary data analyses to determine whether there are relationships 
between dependent variables and independent variables despite these conditions. 
 
Dataset 
This section describes the data that are included in the dataset as well as explaining the reasoning 
for selecting these data to be included within the dataset. The dataset is comprised of data 
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collected by the Virginia Department of Education.  The units of analysis for this research are 
131 public school divisions within the state of Virginia
7
.  The advantage to using school 
divisions data is that the information is published by the State of Virginia and has credibility 
conveyed from its original collection.  The data are expansive and allow for this type of inquiry.   
 
The Virginia Department of Education provides a wealth of data at the school division level for 
conducting this research, including variables that can be identified as dependent and 
independent.  As evidenced by Gill and Meier’s (2001) work, school districts allow researchers 
to pose theoretically based questions where a standardized, well-defined outcome is present.  
There are limitations to utilizing school division data including: aggregate level data as opposed 
to individual level data; nuances in the data are muted; and, statistical differences within school 
divisions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
 
However, individual school units in Virginia might not collect the data required for this project at 
the building level.  Also, individual school units might not follow a standardized format for 
collecting the data like school divisions, which are required to follow certain standards by the 
federal government (i.e. AYP Report Card requirements).  Smaller school divisions might not 
have full-time staff to perform data collection in the way larger school divisions might to collect 
building specific data.   
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The City of Lexington school division is excluded from analysis because it does not provide instruction for 
students enrolled in grades 9-12. 
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Variables 
There are three types of variables that are included in the dataset: dependent variables, 
independent variables, and moderating variables.  The dependent variables are the percentage of 
students passing in two English subjects (reading and writing) and three mathematics subjects 
(algebra 1, geometry, and algebra 2).  The independent variables are the salaries of teachers, the 
salary of teachers when adjusted for cost of living, and the difference between teacher salaries 
and principal salaries.  The intervening (or moderating) variables are: percentage of students 
receiving free or reduced lunch; the percentage of African-America students per school division; 
the percentage of Latino students per school division; the drop-out rate per school division; the 
percentage of teachers with post graduate degrees; the percentage change over a five year period 
for each division; and the percentage of students enrolled in English as a second language 
programs (ELS).  Collection and conveyance of the variables for this research are outlined in 
Figure 7 on the next page. 
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable, student achievement, is defined by the percentage of high school 
students passing assessments that comprise AYP for 131 school divisions in Virginia from the 
2007-2008 school year.  According to the Department of Education (2010b) each state is 
required to test all students in grades 3-8 and once in grades 10-12 utilizing assessments that 
align with the standards of NCLBA.  Each state produces a ―report card‖ and publishes the 
results of each school district and school unit in the state (U.S. Department of Education, 2010c).   
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Variable 
Type Variable Name VA DOE Collection Dataset Collection 
SPSS 
Level 
Dependent 
Variable 
English AYP Reported in 
Virginia’s Report 
Card as a percentage 
of students passing in 
the subjects of 
reading and writing 
Recorded as a two 
digit decimal 
Scale 
 Mathematics AYP Reported in 
Virginia’s Report 
Card as a percentage 
of students passing in 
the subjects of algebra 
I & II and geometry 
Recorded as a two 
digit decimal 
Scale 
Independent 
Variable 
Teacher salaries Recorded as an 
integer 
Recorded as an 
integer 
Scale 
 Teacher salaries 
adjusted for cost 
of living 
Recorded as an 
integer 
Salaries are 
multiplied by a cost 
of living index for 
each area of the state 
and recoded as an 
integer 
Scale 
 Gap between 
teacher and 
principal salaries 
Recorded as integers Percentage calculated 
of teacher to principal 
salaries 
Scale 
Intervening 
Variable 
Free and Reduced 
Lunch 
Recorded as 
percentage 
Recorded as a three 
digit decimal 
Scale 
 Percentage of 
African-
American, Latino, 
& white students 
Recorded as integers Converted to 
percentages and 
recorded as a three 
digit decimal 
Scale 
 Drop-out rate Recorded as 
percentage 
Recorded as a three 
digit decimal 
Scale 
 Change over a 5-
year period 
Membership recorded 
as integer 
Percentage calculated 
and recorded as a 
three digit decimal 
Scale 
 ESL enrolment Membership recorded 
as integer 
Percentage calculated 
and recorded as a 
three digit decimal 
Scale 
 Teachers with 
post-graduate 
degrees 
Recorded as a 
percentage 
Recorded as a two 
digit decimal 
Scale 
Figure 7: Variable Type, Name, Collection and Level 
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Standardized tests are a commonly used barometer of student achievement (Gill & Meier, 2001), 
and the standardization of measuring student achievement though AYP (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2010b, 2010c) lends credibility to using Virginia’s AYP score for English and 
mathematics. The standardization of measuring student achievement makes it possible for 
answering the research question utilizing equity theory and distributive justice perspectives 
(Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1996).  Since every state in the 
union is required to submit a ―report card‖, a complimentary study (Justice et al., 2010) is 
possible in states other than Virginia. 
 
The dependent variables (AYP scores in English and mathematics) are recorded in Virginia’s 
Report Card (Virginia Department of Education, 2010) as percentages that have been transcribed 
into the dataset as two digit decimals for the purposes of analyzing them in SPSS.  As of school 
year 2010-2011, NCLBA requires 100% proficiency in English and mathematics by 2014 (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).  Researchers might want to consider social 
studies and science AYP scores for future projects, but currently 100% proficiency in social 
studies and science is not required (U.S. Department of Education, 2010a, 2010b).  For the 
purposes of this research, the dependent variables included in the dataset are: English reading, 
English writing, algebra I and II, and geometry.  These subjects are taught in grade levels 9 
through 12.   
 
Independent Variables 
This research utilizes teacher salary as an independent variable due to evidence that teacher 
salaries have a positive relationship with student achievement when utilizing standardized test 
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score as a barometer of student achievement (Gill & Meier, 2001).  In Gill and Meier’s (2001) 
analysis, as teacher salary increased, the achievement of students, as measured by standardized 
tests, increased.  The independent variable, teacher compensation, is defined by variations on the 
reported average salaries for 131 school divisions in Virginia from the 2007-2008 school year.  
There are three independent variables derived from the average: the state recoded average 
teacher salary for each school division included in the dataset converted to a daily rate; an 
adjusted average teacher salary for each school division included in the dataset based on cost of 
living converted to a daily rate; and, the difference between teacher day rate salaries and 
principal day rate salaries for each school division included in the dataset utilizing the averages 
provided by the state and converted to a percentage and recorded as a three digit decimal.  
Assistant principal salaries were considered for inclusion in this research, but were discarded 
after discovering that the average daily rate for assistant principals was not much greater than 
that of teachers.  Daily rates for teachers were calculated by dividing each average division 
salary by 200, which is the average number of days teachers are contracted to work in Virginia.  
Daily rates for principals were calculated by dividing each division average salary by 262, which 
is the average number of days principals are contracted to work.  The adjusted day rate for 
teachers was calculated by multiplying the teacher day rate by a cost-of-living index based on 
median household income (Beth Curran, Wolman, Hill & Furdell, 2006). 
 
The use of salary data in this context fits well within equity theory and distributive justice 
beyond discovering a positive relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement 
(Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990).  Within the context of equity 
theory (Adams, 1965), teachers in certain areas of Virginia might feel that they deserve a higher 
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allocation of organizational resources based on need (rural divisions), equality (small to medium 
sized divisions), or equity (high performing divisions).  Following Deutsch’s (1975) model of 
distributive justice, which incorporates three principles of distribution (i.e. need, equality, and 
equity) this research will seek to discover the how the relationship between teacher salaries and 
student achievement are effected when teacher salaries are considered in relationship to the areas 
of the state where teachers are employed.  Likewise, from a distributive justice perspective, those 
who directly contribute (teachers) to organizational outcomes (student achievement) might feel 
they are obligated a higher proportion of organizational resources (salaries) than those who 
contribute indirectly (administrators) to organizational outcomes (Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990).  
However, those who have attained positions in administration that indirectly impact 
organizational outcomes might believe they are entitled to their resource allocation (salary) due 
to their time with an organization and experience gained from previously holding an entry level 
position (Deutsch, 1975).   
 
Intervening Variables 
Intervening variables are included to understand the level of influence that independent variables 
have on dependent variables (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  As Gill & Meier (2001) 
observe, successful organization results are not achieved within a vacuum, and that while some 
variables influence student achievement more than others, their influence is moderated by 
environmental and socioeconomic factors.  The education literature suggests that qualified 
teachers are likely to have the largest direct influence on student achievement (Kukla-Acevedo 
2009), but caution that suggesting student achievement is gained through the sole efforts of 
qualified teachers is glib (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; Cochran-Smith & Fries, 2005; Gill & 
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Meier, 2001).  The intervening variables for this research are included below with a description 
of how they were collected by the state and how they are recorded into SPSS for use in this 
research. 
 
The intervening variables are: the percentage of African-American, Latino, and white students 
within a school division; the percentage of students receiving free and reduced school lunches; 
the dropout rate; the percentage of teachers within a division with post-graduate degrees; the 
change in each division over a five year period; and, the percentage of students enrolled in ESL 
programs.  The intervening variables are collected and reported by the Virginia Department of 
Education (2010) as required by the NCLBA to identify and assist school divisions and school 
units that are failing to make AYP (U.S. Department of Education, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).  The 
number of African-American, Latino, and white students is recorded by the Virginia Department 
of Education as integers.  This variable has been recorded in SPSS as a decimal.  Students 
receiving free and reduced lunches, as well as the dropout rate are reported as percentages and 
included in SPSS as decimals.  Division change over a five year period has been determined by 
using total division enrollment for school years 2002-2003 and 2007-2008 and calculating a 
percentage, which is recorded in SPSS as a decimal.  Students enrolled in ESL programs are 
collected as an integer, which has been used to calculate a percentage and recorded as a decimal 
in SPSS.   The state collects post-graduate information on teachers as a percentage, which is 
recorded in SPSS as a decimal.  The education, public policy, and economics literature 
recommends including these variables within any study about student achievement (Winfield, 
1982; Edmunds, 1979; Good & Brophy, 1986; Kyle, 1985; Mackenzie, 1983; Purkey & Smith, 
1983; Stedman, 1987; Stringfield & Teddlie, 1988; Gill & Meier, 2001; Kukla-Acevedo 2009). 
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Data Analysis 
The data are housed within an Excel spreadsheet and an SPSS dataset.  The data collected for 
this research will be analyzed using a general linear model (GLM), a multivariate technique that 
allows for testing the influence of one or more IVs on multiple DVs, reducing the potentiality of 
a Type I error
8
 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  GLM makes use of several statistical models 
including ANOVA, ANCOVA, MANOVA, MANCOVA, t-tests, and F-tests (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001; Rose & Sullivan, 1996; Mardi, Kent & Bibby, 1979).  As with any linear model, 
GLM assumes that there are no errors in measurement of the independent variables and the 
absence of collinearity among the variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  The models produced 
for analysis were run using SPSS syntax where the dependent variables were entered with the 
independent and intervening variables.  To limit the presence of highly correlated variables, tests 
of collinearity were run to reduce the number of intervening variables in the reduced models.  
The results of collinearity testing appear in Appendix B.  
 
Summary 
There are advantages and disadvantages to doing secondary analysis of data (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).  For this research, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.  
Since the dataset for this research is culled from large swaths of data that have been previously 
collected by the Virginia Department of Education (2010), collecting these data independently 
would be cost and time prohibitive.  This dataset has validity conveyed (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2000) to it due to the requirements of NCLBA that each state collect and publish their 
AYP data.  The dependent variables (student achievement) and independent variables (teacher 
                                                 
8
 A Type I error occurs when a researcher rejects the null hypothesis when it is true resulting in a ―false positive‖.  A 
type two error occurs when the researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis resulting in a ―false negative‖ 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
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and administration compensation) are defined by AYP scores and salary information for teaching 
and administration positions within each school division included in the dataset respectively.  
Analyzing these date requires a stout multivariate technique that is equipped to allow for testing 
the influence of one or more independent variables on more than one dependent variable.  GLM 
is appropriate for analyzing these data.  The results of the data analysis are presented in chapter 
four.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In this chapter the results of the data analysis are presented.  Four hypotheses have been posited 
from an equity theory perspective, and two hypotheses have been posited from a distributive 
justice perspective.  The primary focus of this chapter is on (1) examining the relationship 
between each of the variables using a correlation matrix (2) examining the relationships between 
the independent variables and dependent variables and (3) examining the relationship between 
the independent variables and the dependent variables when intervening variables are present.  
This chapter is comprised of three sections with a summary of the chapter following section 
three.  The first section of this chapter briefly gives general information on school divisions in 
Virginia for the 2007-2008 school year and provides a description of the variables included in 
the analysis.  The second section includes two correlation matrices, a description of how the 
variables interact with each other, and an explanation of how the GLM models were built for 
analysis in section three.  The third section presents the results of nine GLMs and hypotheses 
testing. 
  
Section I 
This section provides a general review of high school level data for school division in Virginia 
during the 2007-2008 school year and descriptions of the dependent, independent and 
intervening variables.  As presented in chapter three, the methodology utilized for this research is 
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a secondary analysis of data.  The dataset is culled from data collected by the Virginia 
Department of Education. The Lexington school division is not included because it does not 
include a high school.  Appendix A includes all the data analyzed for this research.  The data 
have been entered into an excel spreadsheet and transmitted to an SPSS file.  All predictive 
models are run using SPSS version 14.   
 
The dataset used in this research is comprised of data relevant to student achievement by high 
school students in Virginia as measured by adequate yearly progress (AYP), teacher and 
principal compensation, and demographic and socioeconomic data related to the student body.  
The dataset is comprised of 131 school divisions within Virginia that offer high school 
education.  Specifically, the school divisions included measure achievement in: English reading, 
English writing, algebra I and II and geometry.  For the purposes of this research, student 
achievement is measured by the standards required by AYP.  Student achievement in this context 
is measured by the percentage of students passing in specific subjects such that individual 
schools and school divisions are progressing towards 100% proficiency as defined by the U.S. 
Department of Education (2010a). 
 
Review of Virginia School Divisions for the 2007-2008 School Year 
The State of Virginia’s public high school enrollment is large and diverse.  The total student 
enrollment for all levels of instruction for the school year 2007-2008 (as recorded on September 
30, 2007) was 1,231,987, an increase from school year 2002-2003 of nearly 56,000 or about 
4.75%.  For high schools, the total enrollment for school year 2007-2008 was 384,972.  African-
American students represented a little over one-fourth of the student population, while 
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Hispanic/Latino students represented nearly one in every ten students in the population.  White 
student’s accounted for over 55% of the student population for the State of Virginia.  About one-
third of Virginia’s student population were eligible for free or reduced lunch in school year 
2007-2008 with fewer than 2 in every one hundred students dropping-out of school.  Nearly 
seven out of every 100 students is enrolled in a class to increase proficiency in English for 
students with limited exposure or practice with the English language.  The average teacher salary 
in school year 2007-2008 was slightly over $50,000 and the average principal salary was slightly 
less than $90,000.  A little more than four out of every ten teachers have a post-graduate degree. 
 
Achievement in English and math AYP was high with about nine out of every ten students 
passing.  Students tested best in English reading with 94%, while geometry posted the lowest 
passing rate with 87%.  Despite being the lowest score of the five subjects included for analysis 
in this research, nearly nine out of every ten students passed geometry.  Table 1 provides a brief 
overview of high school enrollment, compensation and achievement as measured by AYP for the 
State of Virginia for the school year 2007-2008.   
 
School divisions in Virginia vary in their population size and diversity.  The five largest school 
divisions in Virginia enrolled at least 50,000 students in school year 2007-2008 with Fairfax 
County enrolling over 165,000 students.  Three of the largest school divisions in Virginia are 
located in the Northern Virginia region of the state.  Three of the five largest school divisions 
experienced at least 9% growth over a five year period with Loudoun County experiencing a 
growth of nearly 44%.  The median household income in each of the five largest school divisions 
exceeded $60,000 with Fairfax County and Loudoun County each exceeding $100,000 in median 
household income. 
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Table 1:  High School Demographics, Compensation and AYP for the State of Virginia for 
School Year 2007-2008 
Demographics   
Total High School Enrollment 384,972 
5-Year Percentage Growth 4.75% 
Percent African-American 25.7% 
Percent Hispanic/Latino 9.0% 
Percent White 56.6% 
Percent Eligible Free/Reduced Lunch 33.0% 
Drop-out Rate 1.90% 
Teachers with Post-Graduate Degrees 43% 
Limited English Enrollment 6.8% 
Compensation   
Average Teacher Salary $50,527 
Average Principal Salary $89,427 
Achievement (AYP)   
Percentage Passing English: Reading 94% 
Percentage Passing English: Writing 92% 
Percentage Passing Math: Algebra I 93% 
Percentage Passing Math: Geometry 87% 
Percentage Passing Math: Algebra II 90% 
 
Enrollment in each of the five smallest school divisions for school year 2007-2008 was less than 
850 students with Highland County enrolling less than 300 students.  Three of the five smallest 
school divisions are located in the western part of the state.  Growth was relatively flat over a 
five year period for the five smallest school divisions with no division growing by 10% or more.  
The median household income for three of the five smallest school divisions is less than $50,000.  
Median household income was not available for Colonial Beach or West Point.  Table 2 lists the 
five smallest and five largest school divisions included in the dataset along with a few 
characteristics. 
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Table 2:  Five Largest and Five Smallest School Divisions in Virginia 
School Division Region Enrollment
5 Year 
Change
Median 
Household 
Income
Largest
Fairfax County Public Schools Northern Virginia 165,734 1.9% $104,984
Prince William County Public Schools Northern Virginia 72,989 20.6% $86,294
Virginia Beach City Public Schools Tidewater 72,477 -4.5% $61,234
Chesterfield County Public Schools Central Virginia 58,969 9.2% $69,583
Loudoun County Public Schools Northern Virginia 53,985 43.8% $107,200
Smallest
West Point Public Schools* Peninsula 807 2.0% N/A
Craig County Public Schools Western Virginia 749 7.0% $48,319
Bath County Public Schools Western Virginia 747 -4.7% $42,316
Colonial Beach Public Schools* Peninsula 579 2.7% N/A
Highland County Public Schools Western Virginia 282 -0.1% $36,521
*West Point and Colonial Beach are designated as towns according to the State of Virginia Department of Education  
 
Variables 
The dataset is comprised of data that represent the averages or proportion of the population for 
each of the school divisions included in the research.  For the purposes of this research, 131 
school divisions are included.  The Lexington school division is excluded because it does not 
offer instruction beyond the 8
th
 grade.  All data related to AYP are for high school results, which 
represent grades 9-12, and are means of the pass rates of the population of school divisions.  
Wage and teacher education data included in the analysis represent the means for the school 
division.  Data referencing ethnicity, the drop-out rate, free and reduced school lunch eligibility, 
and participation in limited English programs are represented by the proportion of the student 
population they represent.  As stated earlier, AYP scores represent the dependent variables; wage 
data represent the independent variables; and, division descriptors, such as ethnicity, school 
lunch eligibility, the drop-out rate, teacher education, growth rates, and participation in limited 
English programs represent the intervening variables.  Provided below is a brief description of 
the dependent, independent, and intervening variables included in the analysis.  The means and 
medians might not match the descriptive statistics reported by state because the statistics 
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presented here represent the 131 school divisions included within the dataset.  For the duration of 
this chapter, the population of school divisions included in the dataset will be referred to as the 
population. 
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables for this analysis fall into two areas: performance in English and 
mathematics as measured by AYP.  There are two AYP scores for the English component: 
reading and writing.  There are three AYP scores for the mathematics component: algebra I, 
geometry, and algebra II.  On average, students tested best in reading and worst in geometry.  An 
examination of how the population performed on each subject is presented here with results in 
English preceding the results in mathematics. 
 
For the population, school divisions recorded high results for performance in English subjects 
with a mean for reading and writing of over 91%.  The mean of the population for reading 
performance is nearly 94% with standard deviation of 3.10 and a median of 94%.  Two school 
divisions enjoyed a 100% pass rate for reading and only one school division experienced a pass 
rate of 85%.  For reading scores, the population is not widely dispersed and mostly concentrated 
towards the top of the scale.  The mean for writing performance is slightly less than reading at 
nearly 92% with a median of 92%.  The standard deviation is 4.04, and the range of high to low 
is wider than the range for reading with a high of 98% accomplished by three school divisions 
and a low of 79% recorded by three school divisions.   
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The population performed well in mathematics as well.  On average, the population experienced 
at least an 85% pass rate in all three mathematics subjects with a better than 90% pass rate in 
algebra I and II.  The most successful results in mathematics came in algebra I with a nearly 93% 
pass rate and a standard deviation of 4.44.  The median pass rate for algebra I was 94%.  The 
range of values for algebra I was the narrowest of the three mathematics subjects, but was wider 
than the ranges for the two English subjects.  One division achieved a 100% pass rate and one 
division reported the lowest pass rate at 77%. 
 
The population scored its lowest pass rate for mathematics in geometry, which was also the 
lowest score of the five subjects included in the analysis.  Although, the pass rate was the lowest 
of the three mathematics subjects, the population reported a near 86% pass rate for the subject 
and a standard deviation of 7.87.  The median for geometry was 87%.  The range of scores for 
geometry is the widest of all five subjects.  However, the range from a high of 98% scored by 
one school division to a low of 47% scored by one school division is somewhat deceiving 
because the next lowest score after the 47% pass rate is a 59% pass rate.  Even with the removal 
of the school division with a 47% pass rate, the range of high to low for geometry is still the 
widest of the five subjects. 
 
The population performed well in algebra II.  The population experienced a better than 90% pass 
rate for students taking algebra II with a standard deviation of 6.28.  The median for algebra II is 
91%.  The range of scores for algebra II is wider than the range of scores for algebra I, but 
narrower than the range of scores for geometry.  One school division achieved a 100% pass rate, 
while two school divisions reported a pass rate of 64%. 
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Overall, the population experienced more success in English subjects than mathematics subjects, 
but achievement was high across the five subjects.  A mean pass rate of better than 90% was 
achieved in four out of the five subject areas.  Performance in reading reported the highest mean 
and narrowest dispersion of scores, and geometry reported the lowest mean and widest 
dispersion of scores.  Table 3 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, and high/low pass 
rate scores for each of the five subjects included in the analysis. 
 
Table 3:  Dependent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median SD High (Frequency) Low (Frequency)
English: Reading 93.97% 94.00% 3.10 100% (2) 85% (1)
English: Writing 91.63% 92.00% 4.04 98% (3) 79% (3)
Math: Algebra I 92.56% 94.00% 4.44 100% (1) 77% (1)
Math: Geometry 85.64% 87.00% 7.87 98% (1) 47% (1)
Math: Algebra II 90.54% 91.00% 6.28 100% (1) 64% (2)
 
 
Independent Variables 
There are three independent variables included in this analysis: teacher day rate salary, adjusted 
teacher day rate and teacher-to-principal salary difference.  The teacher day rate salary is 
calculated by taking the mean teacher salary for each school division and dividing it by 200, 
which represents the standard number of teaching days included in a contract that most teachers 
sign when they accept employment or continued employment with their current school division.  
The adjusted teacher day rate salary is calculated by multiplying the day rate salary by a wage 
index calculated using median household income (Beth Curran, Wolman, Hill & Furdell, 2006).  
The wage index is calculated by dividing the median household income of each school division 
by the median household income of the state.  Once a wage index is calculated for each school 
division, the teacher day rate for that division is divided by the index to create the new variable, 
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adjusted teacher day rate salary.  Principal day rate salaries are determined by taking the mean 
principal salary for each school division and dividing it by 262, which is the standard number of 
days within a 12 month contract signed by principals when they accept employment or continued 
employment with their current school division.  The teacher-to-principal salary difference is 
calculated by dividing the teacher day rate by the principal day rate and calculating a percentage.  
The higher the percentage, the closer average teacher salaries are to average principal salaries. 
 
The mean teacher day rate for the population is nearly $206 with a standard deviation of 26.55.  
The median teacher day rate is a little over $201.  The range of values within the teacher day rate 
variable is fairly wide with a high of nearly $311 for one school division and a low of about $164 
for one school division.  When a wage index based on median household income is applied, the 
mean adjusted teacher day rate salary is about $269 with a standard deviation of 61.26.  The 
median adjusted teacher day rate salary is approximately $269.  The range of values for adjusted 
teacher day rate salary is wider than that of the standard teacher day rate salary with a high of 
nearly $405 for one school division and a low of just over $145 for one school division.  For the 
population, teacher salaries on average are about 68% of principal salaries with a standard 
deviation of 6.4.  The median is about 68%.  In one school division, on average, teachers make 
about 91% of principal salaries.  In one school division, on average, teachers make less than 51% 
of principal salaries.  Table 4 includes descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
included in this analysis. 
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Table 4:  Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
 
Intervening Variables 
There are six intervening variables included in the analysis: ethnicity; percentage of students 
eligible for free or reduced lunch; the drop-out rate; percentage of teachers with a post graduate 
degree; the percentage growth over a five-year period; and, percentage of students enrolled in a 
limited English program.  Means, medians, and standard deviations for each of the intervening 
variables, as with the dependent and independent variables, are based on averages for the 131 
school divisions. 
 
For the population, African-Americans accounted for about one-fourth of the student population, 
about one in twenty students were identified as Hispanic or Latino, and more than six in ten 
students were white.  On average, a little more than four in ten students in each school division 
were eligible for free or reduced lunch.  Less than two in one hundred students dropped out 
during the school year per school division.  More than four in ten teachers held a post graduate 
degree per school division.  The average growth rate for the population was three percent.  And, 
a little less than four percent of the student population was enrolled in a limited English program 
per school division. 
 
The mean percentage of African-American students within the population was about 25% with a 
standard deviation of 22.57 and a median of about 18%.  One division reported a high of over 
Variable Mean Median SD High Low 
Teacher Day Rate $205.82 $201.15 26.55 $310.52 $163.89 
Adjusted Teacher Day Rate $268.56 $269.01 61.29 $404.97 $145.30 
Teacher-to-Principal Ratio 
 
67.9% 67.5% 6.40 90.9% 50.8% 
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94% and several divisions reported having no African-American students within their student 
population.  The mean percentage of Hispanic/Latino students within the population was about 
5% with a standard deviation of 7.4 and a median of less than 3%.  One school division reported 
a high of 42% and several divisions reported having no Hispanic/Latino students within their 
student population.  The mean percentage of white students within the population was a little 
over 66% with a standard deviation of 24.19 and a median of a little over 70%.  One division 
reported a white student population of nearly 100% while one school division reported a low of 
about 2% of white students within their student population. 
 
For the population, the mean of students eligible for free or reduced lunch is nearly 42% with a 
standard deviation of 15.93 and median of nearly 42%.  One division reported that nearly 90% of 
the student population were eligible for free or reduced lunch while one division reported a low 
of less than 12% of the student population were eligible for free or reduced lunch.  The mean 
drop-out rate was less than 2% with a standard deviation of 1.24 and a median of less than 2%.  
One school division reported a drop-out rate of over 6%, and a few school divisions had a drop-
out rate of 0%.  Among the population, a mean of almost 44% of teachers had post graduate 
degrees with a standard deviation of 9.33 and a median of 43%.  One school division reported 
that 77% percent of their teachers had a post graduate degree and one school division reported 
that 23% of its teachers had a post graduate degree. 
 
The mean growth for the population was 3% with a standard deviation of 8.78 and a median of 
about 2%.  One school division grew by nearly 44% while one division declined by nearly 14%.  
The mean percentage of students enrolled in a limited English program was about 4% with a 
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standard deviation of 6.4 with a median of just over 1%.  One school division reported that over 
37% of its student population is enrolled in a limited English program and a few school divisions 
reported that none of its students are enrolled in a limited English program.  Table 5 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the intervening variables for the population. 
 
Table 5:  Intervening Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median SD High Low
Percentage of African-
American Students
25.4% 18.2% 22.57 94.4% 0.0%
Percentage of Hispanic/Latino 
Students
5.2% 2.6% 7.4 42.0% 0.0%
Percentage of White Students 66.1% 70.2% 24.19 99.8% 2.1%
Percentage of Students 
Elgibile for Free/Reduced 
Lunch
41.5% 41.9% 15.93 89.9% 11.8%
Dropout Rate 1.9% 1.7% 1.24 6.4% 0.0%
Teachers with Post-Graduate 
Degrees
42.9% 42.0% 9.04 76.0% 23.0%
5-Year Growth for Divisions 3.0% 1.9% 8.78 43.8% -13.8%
Percentage of Students 
Enrolled in Limited English 
Programs
3.5% 1.3% 6.4 37.5% 0.0%
 
 
Section II 
This section of the chapter presents the results of bivariate correlations run with the dependent, 
independent and intervening variables, and an explanation of which variables will be entered into 
the GLM for analysis in the next section.  The first part of this section presents the results of a 
series of bivaraite correlations to determine which variables are most likely to influence a change 
in the dependent variables.  This section includes a key for how the variables were coded in 
SPSS as well as a correlation matrix. 
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Variable Interaction 
Prior to running a full statistical analysis on the dependent, independent, and intervening 
variables, a correlation matrix was produced in SPSS to understand what relationships variables 
have with each other.  The correlation matrix gives clues to how the variables will influence or 
will be influenced by each other in the GLM analyses.  Figure 8 is a key that provides a 
definition for each variable label in the SPSS dataset.  Table 6 is a correlation matrix.  The 
descriptions of variable interaction will refer to Table 6. 
 
Variable SPSS Code Definition
Dependent Variables AllRead Percentage of high school students passing reading for the school division
AllWrite Percentage of high school students passing writing for the school division
AllAlg1 Percentage of high school students passing algebra I for the school division
Allgeo Percentage of high school students passing geometry for the school division
AllAlg2 Percentage of high school students passing algebra II for the school division
Independent Variables TeachDay Mean day rate salary of teachers for the school division
Adj08TS Mean adjusted day rate salary of teachers for the school division
T_Pratio Ratio of teacher day rate salaries to principal day rate salaries as a percentage 
Intervening Variables PerAA Percentage of African-American students for the school division
PerH Percentage of Hispanic / Latino students for the school division
PerW Percentage of white students for the school division
FRLunch Percentage of students receiving free or reduced lunch for the school division
Dropout Dropout rate for the school division
PostGrad Percentage of teachers with post graduate degrees for the school division
Chang5yr Percentage change in division enrollment over a five year period
LimitEng Percentage of strudents for the school division participating in limited English programs  
Figure 8:  Definitions of SPSS Codes  
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix 
1 .671** .271** .465** .285** .089 -.216* .101 -.455** -.019 .411** -.339** -.365** .074 .162 -.031
.000 .002 .000 .001 .313 .014 .249 .000 .826 .000 .000 .000 .401 .064 .727
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.671** 1 .303** .421** .137 .117 -.266** -.023 -.277** -.048 .244** -.300** -.297** .128 .108 -.050
.000 .000 .000 .117 .182 .002 .797 .001 .586 .005 .000 .001 .144 .220 .573
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.271** .303** 1 .536** .372** .041 .003 .104 -.335** .040 .299** -.066 -.253** .016 .101 .044
.002 .000 .000 .000 .645 .971 .237 .000 .652 .001 .452 .004 .854 .250 .619
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.465** .421** .536** 1 .494** .085 -.208* .005 -.508** .023 .453** -.301** -.350** .157 .280** .024
.000 .000 .000 .000 .333 .018 .956 .000 .793 .000 .000 .000 .074 .001 .785
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.285** .137 .372** .494** 1 -.021 .057 -.007 -.323** .040 .292** -.006 -.127 .036 .010 .053
.001 .117 .000 .000 .813 .521 .937 .000 .651 .001 .947 .149 .681 .908 .550
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.089 .117 .041 .085 -.021 1 -.342** -.141 -.080 .596** -.22* -.304** -.140 .708** .273** .594**
.313 .182 .645 .333 .813 .000 .108 .364 .000 .011 .000 .110 .000 .002 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.216* -.266** .003 -.208* .057 -.342** 1 .371** .211* -.154 -.08 .658** .263** -.310** -.466** -.106
.014 .002 .971 .018 .521 .000 .000 .016 .081 .367 .000 .003 .000 .000 .233
129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129
.101 -.023 .104 .005 -.007 -.141 .371** 1 -.222* -.183* .297** .222* -.104 -.209* -.179* -.129
.249 .797 .237 .956 .937 .108 .000 .011 .036 .001 .011 .239 .016 .041 .143
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.455** -.277** -.335** -.508** -.323** -.080 .211* -.222* 1 -.045 -.92** .488** .512** -.062 -.307** -.063
.000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .364 .016 .011 .607 .000 .000 .000 .485 .000 .476
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.019 -.048 .040 .023 .040 .596** -.154 -.183* -.045 1 -.34** -.050 -.012 .375** .154 .967**
.826 .586 .652 .793 .651 .000 .081 .036 .607 .000 .573 .890 .000 .080 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.411** .244** .299** .453** .292** -.220* -.080 .297** -.916** -.336** 1 -.390** -.461** -.155 .194* -.314**
.000 .005 .001 .000 .001 .011 .367 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .078 .026 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.339** -.300** -.066 -.301** -.006 -.304** .658** .222* .488** -.050 -.39** 1 .344** -.223* -.526** -.009
.000 .000 .452 .000 .947 .000 .000 .011 .000 .573 .000 .000 .011 .000 .923
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.365** -.297** -.253** -.350** -.127 -.140 .263** -.104 .512** -.012 -.46** .344** 1 -.114 -.286** -.018
.000 .001 .004 .000 .149 .110 .003 .239 .000 .890 .000 .000 .193 .001 .836
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.074 .128 .016 .157 .036 .708** -.310** -.209* -.062 .375** -.15 -.223* -.114 1 .210* .397**
.401 .144 .854 .074 .681 .000 .000 .016 .485 .000 .078 .011 .193 .016 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.162 .108 .101 .280** .010 .273** -.466** -.179* -.307** .154 .194* -.526** -.286** .210* 1 .099
.064 .220 .250 .001 .908 .002 .000 .041 .000 .080 .026 .000 .001 .016 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.031 -.050 .044 .024 .053 .594** -.106 -.129 -.063 .967** -.31** -.009 -.018 .397** .099 1
.727 .573 .619 .785 .550 .000 .233 .143 .476 .000 .000 .923 .836 .000 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
TeachDay
Adj08TS
T_Pratio
PerAA
PerH
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
All
Read
All
Write
All
Alg1
All
geo
All
Alg2
Teach
Day
Adj08
TS
T_P
ratio
Per
AA
Per
H
Per
W
FR
Lunch
Dro
pout
Post
Grad
Chan
g5yr
Limi
tEng
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Dependent Variables Interaction 
The dependent variables generally have positive and significant relationships with each other.  
English variables of AYP performance in reading (AllRead) and writing (AllWrite) are strongly 
correlated with each other, and mathematics variables of AYP performance in algebra 1 
(AllAlg1), geometry (AllGeo), and algebra 2 (AllAlg2) are strongly correlated with each other.  
The English AYP performance variables correspond best with the mathematics AYP 
performance variable AllGeo.  While the mathematics AYP performance variables do not 
correlate with each other as strongly as the English AYP performance variables correlate with 
each other, the mathematics AYP performance variables do correlate better with each other than 
they do with the English AYP performance variables. 
 
The dependent variables do not correlate strongly to the independent variables, but there are 
significant relationships between the independent variable adjusted teacher day rate for 2008 
(Adj08TS) and three dependent variables: APY performance in reading, writing, and geometry.  
The relationship between Adj08TS and AllWrite is significant to the p<.01.  The relationships 
between Adj08TS and Allread and Adj08TS and AllGeo are significant to the p<.05 level.  The 
Pearson correlations between Adj08TS and the three dependent variables with which it is 
significant are negative (AllRead = -.216, AllWrite = -.266, and AllGeo = -.208).   
 
The dependent variables vary in their relationships with the intervening variables.  The 
dependent variables correlate best with two of the three race/ethnicity variables, percentage of 
African-American students (PerAA) and percentage of white students (PerW).  The relationships 
between PerAA and all five dependent variables are negative.  The strongest negative 
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relationship is between PerAA and AllGeo with a Pearson correlation of -.508.  Relationships 
between PerAA and all five dependent variables are significant to the p<.01 level.  The 
relationships between PerW and all five dependent variables are positive.  PerW is correlated 
strongest to AllGeo with a Pearson correlation of .453.  Relationships between PerW and all five 
dependent variables are significant to the p<.01 level.  The dependent variables do not correlate 
much with the race/ethnicity variable of percentage of Hispanic/Latino students (PerH), and none 
of the bivariate parings yielded any significance. 
 
The dependent variables do not correlate strongly with the socioeconomic variables of 
free/reduced lunch (FRLunch) and the drop-out rate (Dropout) as they do with the race/ethnicity 
variables, but there are some significant relationships among the dependent variables and the 
socioeconomic variables.  The relationships between the intervening variables of FRLunch and 
Dropout and all five dependent variables are negative.  The relationships between the DV 
AllRead and intervening variables FRLunch and Dropout are negative, yielding Pearson 
correlations of -.339 and -.365 respectively.  The relationships between FRLunch and the DVs 
AllRead, AllWrite, and AllGeo are significant to the p<.01 level.  The relationships between 
FRLunch and the DVs AllAlg1 and AllAlg2 are not significant.  The relationships between 
Dropout and the DVs AllRead, AllWrite, AllAlg1, and AllGeo are significant to the p<.01 level.  
The relationship between Dropout and AllAlg2 is not significant. 
 
The relationships between the dependent variables and the division characteristic variables of 
teachers with post graduate degrees (PostGrad), the division change over a five year period 
(Chang5yr), and students enrolled in limited English programs (LimitEng) are mostly not 
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significant.  Of the 15 pairings between the dependent variables and the division characteristic 
variables, only the relationship between AllGeo and Chang5yr is significant, p<.01.  The 
relationship between AllGeo and Chang5yr is positive with a Person correlation of .280. 
 
Independent Variables Interaction 
The relationships between the independent variables are not as strong as the relationships 
between the dependent variables, but two of the three parings are significant.  The variable 
Adj08TS has a positive relationship with the teacher-to-principal salary difference variable 
(T_Pratio) yielding a Pearson correlation of .371 and a negative relationship with teacher day 
rate salary (TeachDay) yielding a Pearson correlation of -.342.  The relationships between 
Adj08TS and T_Pratio and Adj08TS and TeachDay are both significant to the p<.01 level.  The 
relationship between T_Pratio and TeachDay is negative (Pearson correlation = -.141), and is not 
significant (p=.109). 
 
The strength of the relationships between the independent variables and intervening variables 
varies.  The relationships between TeachDay and the intervening variables PerH, PostGrad, 
Chang5yr, and LimitEng are positive.  The relationships between TeachDay and intervening 
variables PerAA, PerW, FRLunch, and Dropout are negative.  The relationship between 
TeachDay and PerW is significant to the p<.05 level, and the relationship between TeachDay and 
the intervening variables PerH, FRLunch, PostGrad, Chang5yr, and LimitEng are significant to 
the p<.01 level.  The strength of the relationships between TeachDay and the intervening 
variables PostGrad, PerH, and LimitEng are strong with Pearson correlations of .708, .596, and 
.594 respectively.  The relationship between TeachDay and FRLunch is negative, yielding a 
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Pearson correlation of -.304.  The relationships between Adj08TS and the intervening variables 
PerAA, FRLunch, and Dropout are positive.  The relationships between Adj08TS and the 
intervening variables PerH, PerW, PostGrad, Chang5yr, and LimitEng are negative.  The 
relationship between Adj08TS and PerAA is significant at the p<.05 level, and the relationships 
between Adj08TS and the intervening variables FRLunch, Dropout, PostGrad, and Chang5yr are 
significant at the p<.01.  Adj08TS relates most strongly with FRLunch, yielding a Pearson 
correlation of .658.  Adj08TS relates most negatively with Chang5yr, yielding a Pearson 
correlation of -.466.  The relationships between T_Pratio and PerW and FRLunch are positive.  
The relationships between T_Pratio and the intervening variables PerAA, PerH, Dropout, 
PostGrad, Chang5yr, and LimitEng are negative.  The relationships between T_PRatio and the 
intervening variables PerAA, PerH, FRLunch, PostGrad, and Chang5yr are significant to the 
p<.05 level.  The relationship between T_Pratio and PerW is significant to the p<.01 level. 
 
Intervening Variables 
The intervening variables vary in their correlation with one another.  The race/ethnicity variables 
are negatively correlated with each other.  The relationships between PerAA and PerW and PerH 
and PerW are negative.  The relationship between of PerAA and PerW is strong (Pearson 
correlation = -.916) and is significant to the p<.01 level.  The relationship between PerH and 
PerW is significance to the p<.01 level, but the relationship (Pearson correlation = -.336) is 
weaker than the relationship between PerAA and PerW.  The relationships between PerAA and 
FRLunch and PerAA and Dropout are positive, but the relationships between PerAA and 
PostGrad, PerAA and Chang5yr, and PerAA and LimitEng are negative.  The relationships 
between PerAA and FRLunch and PerAA andDropout are significant to the p<.01 level.  While 
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PerAA is negatively correlated with all three division characteristics variables, only the 
relationship between PerAA and Chang5yr is significant, p<.01.  The relationships between PerH 
and PerW, PerH and PostGrad, and  PerH and LimitEng are significant to the p<.01 level.  The 
relationship between PerH and LimitEng is strong (Pearson correlation = .967).  PerW has a 
positive relationship with Chang5yr and negative relationships with FRLunch, Dropout, 
PostGrad, and LimitEng.  The relationships between PerW and FRLunch, PerW and Dropout and 
PerW and LimitEng are significant to the p<.01 level.  The relationship between PerW and 
Chang5yr is significant to the p<.05 level.  The relationship between PerW and PostGrad is not 
significant. 
 
The relationship between FRLunch and Dropout is positive and significant to the p<.01 level.  
The relationships between FRLunch and PostGrad, FRLunch and Chang5yr and FRLunch and 
LimitEng are negative.  The relationships between Dropout and PostGrad, Dropout and 
Chang5yr, and Dropout and LimitEng are negative. The relationship between FRLunch and 
Chang5yr is significant to the p<.01, and the relationship between FRLunch and PostGrtad is 
significance to the p<.05 level.  The relationship between FRLunch and Chang5yr is fairly strong 
and negative (Pearson correlation = -.526).  The relationship between Dropout and Chang5yr is 
negative and significant to the p<.01 level. 
 
The relationship between PostGrad and Chang5yr, PostGrad and LimitEng and Chang5yr and 
LimitEng are positive.  The relationship between PostGrad and LimitEng is significant to the 
p<.01 level.  The relationshp between PostGrad and Chang5yr is significant to the p<.05 level.  
The relationship between Chang5yr and LimitEng is not significant. 
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Variables Included in Modeling 
To test the six hypotheses posited for this research, nine models were run.  For testing 
hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a a GLM model including the five dependent variables and one 
independent variable, stated in each hypothesis, was created.  These models do not include any 
intervening variables as they test the relationships between independent variables and the 
dependent variables.  These models are referred to as the simple models.  Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 
3a are stated below with their corresponding null hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: High teacher salaries will lead to high student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1a (0): High teacher salaries will not lead to high student achievement as measured 
by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: When adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher salaries 
and student achievement as measured by AYP will occur. 
 
Hypothesis 2a (0): When adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher 
salaries and student achievement as measured by AYP will not occur. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Student achievement, as measured by AYP, will be higher in school divisions 
where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow. 
 
  
100 
 
Hypothesis 3a (0): Student achievement, as measured by AYP, will not be higher in school 
divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow. 
 
For testing hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, two GLM models were run for each hypothesis.  The first 
model in each grouping includes the independent variable from the corresponding hypothesis 
with all five dependent variables and all the intervening variables.  These models are referred to 
as the whole models.  The second model in each grouping includes the corresponding 
independent variable to each hypothesis, the five dependent variables, and selected intervening 
variables identified as having the greatest influence on the outcome of hypothesis testing.  These 
models are referred to as the reduced models.  Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b are stated below with 
their corresponding null hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: In the presences of intervening variables, high teacher salaries will lead to high 
student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1b (0): In the presences of intervening variables, high teacher salaries will not lead to 
high student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: In the presence of intervening variables, an inverse relationship between teacher 
salaries, adjusted for cost-of-living, and student achievement as measured by AYP will occur. 
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Hypothesis 2b (0): In the presence of intervening variables, an inverse relationship between 
teacher salaries, adjusted for cost-of-living, and student achievement as measured by AYP will 
not occur. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: In the presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, will be higher in school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Hypothesis 3b (0): In the presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, will not be higher in school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries is narrow. 
 
The simple models do not include any intervening variables, but the whole models and reduced 
models do include intervening variables and how those models are built is described below.  
Though the whole models include all the intervening variables, the variables that relate to the 
percentage of African-Americans in the student population and percentage of Hispanics/Latinos 
in the student population have been combined into one variable.  The education literature 
provides evidence that the African-American student population and the Hispanic/Latino 
population often have shared experiences within primary and secondary education (Roderick, 
Jacob, & Byrk, 2002; Gill & Meier, 2001; Winfield, 1990; Edmunds, 1979; Good & Brophy, 
1986; Kyle, 1985; Mackenzie, 1983; Purkey & Smith, 1983; Stedman, 1987; Stringfield & 
Teddlie, 1988).  As evidenced by Table 6, PerAA and PerH have negative relationships with 
PerW.  The relationships between PerAA and PerW and PerH and PerW are significant at the 
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p<.01 level.  Table 7 is a correlation matrix with the new combined African-American and 
Hispanic/Latino variable (PerAA_H). 
 
The relationship between the new variable PerAA_H and all five dependent variables is negative.  
The strongest relationship is between PerAA_H and AllGeo (Pearson correlation = -.482).  The 
relationship between PerAA_H and all five dependent variables is significant at the p<.01 level.  
The relationships between PerAA_H and TeachDay and PerAA_H and Adj08TS are positive, 
but the relationship between PerAA_H and T_Pratio is negative.  The relationship between 
PerAA_H and T_Pratio is significant at the p<.01 level.  The relationship between PerAA_H and 
PerW is strong and negative (Pearson correlation = -.988), and the relationship is significant at 
the p<.01 level.  Of all the intervening variables, only the relationship between PerAA_H and 
Chang5yr is negative.  The relationship between PerAA_H and the intervening variables is 
significant at the p<.01 level, except PostGrad with which PerAA_H is not significantly related. 
 
In the reduced models, only the intervening variables PerAA_H, Dropout, and FRLunch are 
included with the independent variable identified in the hypothesis and the dependent variables.  
The reduced models are built to reduce the degrees of freedom in modeling to produce a more 
focused determination of which predictive variables have the strongest relationships with the 
dependent variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  While PostGrad, Chang5yr, and LimitEng 
have influence on the independent variables and other intervening variables, they have relative 
little influence on the dependent variables.   
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However, when presenting the results, these variables will be mentioned as having an indirect 
influence on the dependent variables due to their influence on other variables in the reduced 
models.  PerW is also removed from the reduced model because of it high collinearity with 
PerAA_H.  All intervening variables were tested with each dependent variable separately to 
identify variables with high collinearity.  In every case, PerAA_H and PerW were highly 
collinear.  In each case, PerAA_H produced a higher correlation with the dependent variable than 
PerW.  The results of collinearity testing are included in appendix B.  The following section 
includes results of nine GLMs and analyses of the models.   Table 7, a correlation matrix 
including the new variable PerAA_H is presented on the next page. 
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix with Combined African-American and Hispanic/Latino Variable 
1 .671** .271** .465** .285** .089 -.216* .101 -.444** .411** -.339** -.365** .074 .162 -.031
.000 .002 .000 .001 .313 .014 .249 .000 .000 .000 .000 .401 .064 .727
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.671** 1 .303** .421** .137 .117 -.266** -.023 -.282** .244** -.300** -.297** .128 .108 -.050
.000 .000 .000 .117 .182 .002 .797 .001 .005 .000 .001 .144 .220 .573
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.271** .303** 1 .536** .372** .041 .003 .104 -.310** .299** -.066 -.253** .016 .101 .044
.002 .000 .000 .000 .645 .971 .237 .000 .001 .452 .004 .854 .250 .619
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.465** .421** .536** 1 .494** .085 -.208* .005 -.482** .453** -.301** -.350** .157 .280** .024
.000 .000 .000 .000 .333 .018 .956 .000 .000 .000 .000 .074 .001 .785
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.285** .137 .372** .494** 1 -.021 .057 -.007 -.299** .292** -.006 -.127 .036 .010 .053
.001 .117 .000 .000 .813 .521 .937 .001 .001 .947 .149 .681 .908 .550
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.089 .117 .041 .085 -.021 1 -.342** -.141 .112 -.22* -.304** -.140 .708** .273** .594**
.313 .182 .645 .333 .813 .000 .108 .204 .011 .000 .110 .000 .002 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.216* -.266** .003 -.21* .057 -.342** 1 .371** .155 -.08 .658** .263** -.310** -.466** -.106
.014 .002 .971 .018 .521 .000 .000 .080 .367 .000 .003 .000 .000 .233
129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129
.101 -.023 .104 .005 -.007 -.141 .371** 1 -.272** .297** .222* -.104 -.209* -.179* -.129
.249 .797 .237 .956 .937 .108 .000 .002 .001 .011 .239 .016 .041 .143
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.444** -.282** -.310** -.48** -.299** .112 .155 -.272** 1 -.99** .455** .489** .060 -.247** .246**
.000 .001 .000 .000 .001 .204 .080 .002 .000 .000 .000 .499 .005 .005
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.411** .244** .299** .453** .292** -.220* -.080 .297** -.988** 1 -.390** -.461** -.155 .194* -.314**
.000 .005 .001 .000 .001 .011 .367 .001 .000 .000 .000 .078 .026 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.339** -.300** -.066 -.30** -.006 -.304** .658** .222* .455** -.39** 1 .344** -.223* -.526** -.009
.000 .000 .452 .000 .947 .000 .000 .011 .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 .923
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.365** -.297** -.253** -.35** -.127 -.140 .263** -.104 .489** -.46** .344** 1 -.114 -.286** -.018
.000 .001 .004 .000 .149 .110 .003 .239 .000 .000 .000 .193 .001 .836
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.074 .128 .016 .157 .036 .708** -.310** -.209* .060 -.15 -.223* -.114 1 .210* .397**
.401 .144 .854 .074 .681 .000 .000 .016 .499 .078 .011 .193 .016 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.162 .108 .101 .280** .010 .273** -.466** -.179* -.247** .194* -.526** -.286** .210* 1 .099
.064 .220 .250 .001 .908 .002 .000 .041 .005 .026 .000 .001 .016 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.031 -.050 .044 .024 .053 .594** -.106 -.129 .246** -.31** -.009 -.018 .397** .099 1
.727 .573 .619 .785 .550 .000 .233 .143 .005 .000 .923 .836 .000 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 129 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
TeachDay
Adj08TS
T_Pratio
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
All
Read
All
Write
All
Alg1
All
geo
All
Alg2
Teac
hDay
Adj08
TS
T_P
ratio
Per
AA_H
Per
W
FRL
unch
Drop
out
Post
Grad
Chan
g5yr
Limit
Eng
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Section III 
Teacher Day Rate Salary 
Hypothesis 1a: High teacher salaries will lead to high student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1a (0): High teacher salaries will not lead to high student achievement as measured 
by AYP. 
 
Teacher day rate salary as an independent variable in the simple, whole, and reduced model has 
little influence on the dependent variables.  In the simple model, the multivariate tests, found on 
Table 8, produce an F-value of .503 and no significance with a p-value of .774 for all four tests 
of effect.  In the tests of between-subjects effects, found on Table 9, teacher day rate salary is a 
relatively weak predictor of student achievement having no significant relationships with any of 
the dependent variables.  Since the influence of teacher day rate on student achievement is weak, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: In the presences of intervening variables, high teacher salaries will lead to high 
student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
Hypothesis 1b (0): In the presences of intervening variables, high teacher salaries will not lead to 
high student achievement as measured by AYP. 
 
In the whole model, the multivariate tests, found on Table 10, produce an F-value of .427 and no 
significance with a p-value of .829 for teacher day rate salary for all four tests of effect.   In the 
presence of all the identified intervening variables, teacher day rate salary has little influence on 
student achievement as evidenced in tests of between-subjects effects found on Table 11.  In the 
reduced model, the multivariate tests, found on Table 12, produce an F-value of .436 and no 
significance for teacher day rate with a p-value of .823 for all four tests of effect. In the presence 
of selected intervening variables, entered in the order of PerAA_H, Dropout, and FRLunch, 
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teacher day does not have a significant relationship with any of the dependent variables as 
evidenced by the tests of between-subjects effects found on Table 13.  Since the relationships 
between the independent variable and the dependent variables in the whole and reduced models 
are weak, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
The findings in the simple model as well as the whole and reduced models confirm the findings 
of Gill and Meier’s (2001) research that teacher salaries are not necessarily a strong indicator of 
student achievement.  Their research reported that there was a positive relationship between 
teacher salaries and student achievement (i.e. higher salaries translated to higher student 
achievement), but that teacher salaries are not one of the major factors that predict student 
achievement (Gill & Meier, 2001). 
 
Table 8: Multivariate Tests – Teacher Day Rate 
.953 507.249a 5.000 125.000 .000
.047 507.249a 5.000 125.000 .000
20.290 507.249a 5.000 125.000 .000
20.290 507.249a 5.000 125.000 .000
.020 .503a 5.000 125.000 .774
.980 .503a 5.000 125.000 .774
.020 .503a 5.000 125.000 .774
.020 .503a 5.000 125.000 .774
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
TeachDay
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 9 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects – Teacher Day Rate 
.001a 1 .001 1.024 .313
.003b 1 .003 1.800 .182
.000c 1 .000 .214 .645
.006d 1 .006 .946 .333
.000e 1 .000 .056 .813
1.795 1 1.795 1870.056 .000
1.647 1 1.647 1017.613 .000
1.768 1 1.768 892.406 .000
1.377 1 1.377 221.946 .000
1.784 1 1.784 448.712 .000
.001 1 .001 1.024 .313
.003 1 .003 1.800 .182
.000 1 .000 .214 .645
.006 1 .006 .946 .333
.000 1 .000 .056 .813
.124 129 .001
.209 129 .002
.256 129 .002
.800 129 .006
.513 129 .004
115.801 131
110.209 131
112.482 131
96.887 131
107.905 131
.125 130
.212 130
.256 130
.806 130
.513 130
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
TeachDay
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = .000)a. 
R Squared = .014 (Adjusted R Squared = .006)b. 
R Squared = .002 (Adjusted R Squared = -.006)c. 
R Squared = .007 (Adjusted R Squared = .000)d. 
R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.007)e. 
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Table 10: Multivariate Tests – Teacher Day Rate with Intervening Variables 
.483 22.254a 5.000 119.000 .000
.517 22.254a 5.000 119.000 .000
.935 22.254a 5.000 119.000 .000
.935 22.254a 5.000 119.000 .000
.018 .427a 5.000 119.000 .829
.982 .427a 5.000 119.000 .829
.018 .427a 5.000 119.000 .829
.018 .427a 5.000 119.000 .829
.073 1.861a 5.000 119.000 .106
.927 1.861a 5.000 119.000 .106
.078 1.861a 5.000 119.000 .106
.078 1.861a 5.000 119.000 .106
.044 1.098a 5.000 119.000 .365
.956 1.098a 5.000 119.000 .365
.046 1.098a 5.000 119.000 .365
.046 1.098a 5.000 119.000 .365
.035 .858a 5.000 119.000 .511
.965 .858a 5.000 119.000 .511
.036 .858a 5.000 119.000 .511
.036 .858a 5.000 119.000 .511
.049 1.215a 5.000 119.000 .306
.951 1.215a 5.000 119.000 .306
.051 1.215a 5.000 119.000 .306
.051 1.215a 5.000 119.000 .306
.038 .943a 5.000 119.000 .456
.962 .943a 5.000 119.000 .456
.040 .943a 5.000 119.000 .456
.040 .943a 5.000 119.000 .456
.029 .709a 5.000 119.000 .618
.971 .709a 5.000 119.000 .618
.030 .709a 5.000 119.000 .618
.030 .709a 5.000 119.000 .618
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
TeachDay
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
PerAA_H
PerW
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 11: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects – Teacher Day Rate with Intervening Variables 
.033a 7 .005 6.216 .000
.037b 7 .005 3.757 .001
.034c 7 .005 2.712 .012
.235d 7 .034 7.216 .000
.063e 7 .009 2.451 .022
.069 1 .069 92.260 .000
.082 1 .082 57.737 .000
.050 1 .050 27.592 .000
.051 1 .051 10.882 .001
.054 1 .054 14.619 .000
8.51E-006 1 8.51E-006 .011 .915
.001 1 .001 .486 .487
.001 1 .001 .627 .430
.001 1 .001 .168 .683
4.44E-006 1 4.44E-006 .001 .972
.001 1 .001 1.219 .272
.004 1 .004 2.480 .118
.005 1 .005 2.893 .091
.000 1 .000 .070 .792
.012 1 .012 3.229 .075
.002 1 .002 3.321 .071
.005 1 .005 3.561 .061
.003 1 .003 1.591 .210
.006 1 .006 1.280 .260
7.57E-005 1 7.57E-005 .021 .886
7.09E-005 1 7.09E-005 .095 .759
8.53E-005 1 8.53E-005 .060 .807
.000 1 .000 .170 .681
.010 1 .010 2.100 .150
.001 1 .001 .378 .540
.000 1 .000 .586 .445
.002 1 .002 1.561 .214
.000 1 .000 .270 .604
.010 1 .010 2.059 .154
4.42E-005 1 4.42E-005 .012 .913
.003 1 .003 3.384 .068
.005 1 .005 3.712 .056
.001 1 .001 .500 .481
.004 1 .004 .779 .379
.003 1 .003 .893 .346
.002 1 .002 2.076 .152
.005 1 .005 3.180 .077
.000 1 .000 .099 .753
.001 1 .001 .117 .732
.001 1 .001 .223 .638
.092 123 .001
.174 123 .001
.222 123 .002
.571 123 .005
.450 123 .004
115.801 131
110.209 131
112.482 131
96.887 131
107.905 131
.125 130
.212 130
.256 130
.806 130
.513 130
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
TeachDay
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
PerAA_H
PerW
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .261 (Adjusted R Squared = .219)a. 
R Squared = .176 (Adjusted R Squared = .129)b. 
R Squared = .134 (Adjusted R Squared = .084)c. 
R Squared = .291 (Adjusted R Squared = .251)d. 
R Squared = .122 (Adjusted R Squared = .072)e. 
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Table 12: Multivariate Tests – Teacher Day Rate Reduced Model 
.940 384.467a 5.000 122.000 .000
.060 384.467a 5.000 122.000 .000
15.757 384.467a 5.000 122.000 .000
15.757 384.467a 5.000 122.000 .000
.018 .436a 5.000 122.000 .823
.982 .436a 5.000 122.000 .823
.018 .436a 5.000 122.000 .823
.018 .436a 5.000 122.000 .823
.186 5.570a 5.000 122.000 .000
.814 5.570a 5.000 122.000 .000
.228 5.570a 5.000 122.000 .000
.228 5.570a 5.000 122.000 .000
.043 1.097a 5.000 122.000 .366
.957 1.097a 5.000 122.000 .366
.045 1.097a 5.000 122.000 .366
.045 1.097a 5.000 122.000 .366
.087 2.330a 5.000 122.000 .046
.913 2.330a 5.000 122.000 .046
.095 2.330a 5.000 122.000 .046
.095 2.330a 5.000 122.000 .046
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
TeachDay
PerAA_H
Dropout
FRLunch
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 13: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects – Teacher Day Rate Reduced Model 
.031a 4 .008 10.293 .000
.030b 4 .008 5.276 .001
.033c 4 .008 4.711 .001
.212d 4 .053 11.249 .000
.060e 4 .015 4.165 .003
1.173 1 1.173 1570.773 .000
1.121 1 1.121 779.395 .000
1.038 1 1.038 587.062 .000
.949 1 .949 201.398 .000
.957 1 .957 266.018 .000
.000 1 .000 .589 .444
.001 1 .001 .401 .528
.002 1 .002 1.386 .241
.007 1 .007 1.476 .227
.003 1 .003 .887 .348
.008 1 .008 10.164 .002
.002 1 .002 1.514 .221
.017 1 .017 9.492 .003
.083 1 .083 17.676 .000
.050 1 .050 14.016 .000
.002 1 .002 2.988 .086
.004 1 .004 2.966 .087
.003 1 .003 1.785 .184
.008 1 .008 1.705 .194
9.13E-005 1 9.13E-005 .025 .874
.001 1 .001 1.566 .213
.004 1 .004 2.656 .106
.005 1 .005 2.561 .112
.001 1 .001 .170 .681
.014 1 .014 3.810 .053
.094 126 .001
.181 126 .001
.223 126 .002
.594 126 .005
.453 126 .004
115.801 131
110.209 131
112.482 131
96.887 131
107.905 131
.125 130
.212 130
.256 130
.806 130
.513 130
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
TeachDay
PerAA_H
Dropout
FRLunch
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .246 (Adjusted R Squared = .222)a. 
R Squared = .143 (Adjusted R Squared = .116)b. 
R Squared = .130 (Adjusted R Squared = .102)c. 
R Squared = .263 (Adjusted R Squared = .240)d. 
R Squared = .117 (Adjusted R Squared = .089)e. 
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Adjusted Teacher Day Rate Salary 
Hypothesis 2a: When adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher salaries 
and student achievement as measured by AYP will occur. 
 
Hypothesis 2a (0): When adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher 
salaries and student achievement as measured by AYP will not occur. 
 
Adjusted teacher day rate salary as an independent variable in the simple model does have 
significant relationships with three of the dependent variables: performance as measured by AYP 
in reading, writing, and geometry.  However, adjusted day rate salary does not have a significant 
relationship with any of the dependent variables in the whole and reduced models.  In the simple 
model, the multivariate tests, found on Table 14, produce an F-value of 3.686 and is significant 
to the p<.01 level for all four tests of effect.  In the tests of between-subjects effects, found on 
Table 15, the adjusted teacher day rate salary is significantly related to performance in writing to 
the  p<.01 level, and is significantly related to performance in reading and geometry to the p<.05. 
 
Three linear regressions were run including adjusted teacher day rate as the independent variable 
with achievement in reading in the first linear regression, with achievement in writing in the 
second linear regression, and with achievement in geometry in the third linear regression.  In all 
three linear regression models, the coefficient was negative.  The results of the three linear 
regressions are included in Appendix C.  Since there are relatively significant relationships 
between the IV and three of the DVs, and inverse relationships occur, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
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Hypothesis 2b: In the presence of intervening variables, an inverse relationship between teacher 
salaries, adjusted for cost-of-living, and student achievement as measured by AYP will occur. 
 
Hypothesis 2b (0): In the presence of intervening variables, an inverse relationship between 
teacher salaries, adjusted for cost-of-living, and student achievement as measured by AYP will 
not occur. 
 
In the whole model, the multivariate tests found on Table 16 produce an F-value of .560 and no 
significance with a p-value of .730 for adjusted teacher day rate salary for all four tests of effect.   
In the presence of all the identified intervening variables, adjusted teacher day rate salary has 
little influence on the student achievement as evidenced in tests of between-subjects effects 
found on Table 17.  In the reduced model, the multivariate tests found on Table 18 produce an F-
value of .749 and no significance for teacher day rate with a p-value of .588 for all four tests of 
effect. In the presence of selected intervening variables, entered in the order of PerAA_H, 
Dropout, and FRLunch, adjusted teacher day does not produce a significant relationship with any 
of the dependent variables as evidenced by the tests of between-subjects effects found on Table 
19.  The relationships between the IV and the DVs are weak, therefore the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. 
 
These findings contradict the findings of Gill and Meier (2001) in showing a positive 
relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement.  In the simple model where 
significant relationships between adjusted teacher salaries and performance in reading, writing, 
and geometry existed, an inverse relationship occurred.  In this research, higher salaries after 
adjustment for cost-of-living do not translate to higher student achievement, but in Gill & 
Meier’s research, salaries were not adjusted to geographic location or for cost-of-living.  
However, in the whole and reduced models, where intervening variables (Lomax et al., 1995; 
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Madaus, 1991) are present, teacher salaries do not have significant influence on student 
achievement, which confirms Gill and Meier’s findings on the significance of the relationship 
between teacher salaries and student achievement. 
 
Table 14: Multivariate Tests – Adjusted Teacher Day Rate 
.985 1612.927a 5.000 123.000 .000
.015 1612.927a 5.000 123.000 .000
65.566 1612.927a 5.000 123.000 .000
65.566 1612.927a 5.000 123.000 .000
.130 3.686a 5.000 123.000 .004
.870 3.686a 5.000 123.000 .004
.150 3.686a 5.000 123.000 .004
.150 3.686a 5.000 123.000 .004
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
Adj08TS
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 15: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects – Adjusted Teacher Day Rate 
.006a 1 .006 6.216 .014
.015b 1 .015 9.685 .002
2.63E-006c 1 2.63E-006 .001 .971
.034d 1 .034 5.732 .018
.002e 1 .002 .413 .521
5.944 1 5.944 6538.004 .000
5.874 1 5.874 3879.059 .000
5.430 1 5.430 2775.591 .000
5.456 1 5.456 921.376 .000
5.035 1 5.035 1352.244 .000
.006 1 .006 6.216 .014
.015 1 .015 9.685 .002
2.63E-006 1 2.63E-006 .001 .971
.034 1 .034 5.732 .018
.002 1 .002 .413 .521
.115 127 .001
.192 127 .002
.248 127 .002
.752 127 .006
.473 127 .004
113.918 129
108.365 129
110.893 129
95.388 129
106.446 129
.121 128
.207 128
.248 128
.786 128
.474 128
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Adj08TS
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .047 (Adjusted R Squared = .039)a. 
R Squared = .071 (Adjusted R Squared = .064)b. 
R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.008)c. 
R Squared = .043 (Adjusted R Squared = .036)d. 
R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = -.005)e. 
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Table 16: Multivariate Tests – Adjusted Teacher Day Rate with Intervening Variables 
.590 33.674a 5.000 117.000 .000
.410 33.674a 5.000 117.000 .000
1.439 33.674a 5.000 117.000 .000
1.439 33.674a 5.000 117.000 .000
.023 .560a 5.000 117.000 .730
.977 .560a 5.000 117.000 .730
.024 .560a 5.000 117.000 .730
.024 .560a 5.000 117.000 .730
.033 .808a 5.000 117.000 .546
.967 .808a 5.000 117.000 .546
.035 .808a 5.000 117.000 .546
.035 .808a 5.000 117.000 .546
.044 1.077a 5.000 117.000 .377
.956 1.077a 5.000 117.000 .377
.046 1.077a 5.000 117.000 .377
.046 1.077a 5.000 117.000 .377
.030 .715a 5.000 117.000 .613
.970 .715a 5.000 117.000 .613
.031 .715a 5.000 117.000 .613
.031 .715a 5.000 117.000 .613
.048 1.189a 5.000 117.000 .319
.952 1.189a 5.000 117.000 .319
.051 1.189a 5.000 117.000 .319
.051 1.189a 5.000 117.000 .319
.037 .911a 5.000 117.000 .476
.963 .911a 5.000 117.000 .476
.039 .911a 5.000 117.000 .476
.039 .911a 5.000 117.000 .476
.027 .658a 5.000 117.000 .656
.973 .658a 5.000 117.000 .656
.028 .658a 5.000 117.000 .656
.028 .658a 5.000 117.000 .656
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
Adj08TS
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
PerAA_H
PerW
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 17: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects – Adjusted Teacher Day Rate with Intervening 
Variables 
.031a 7 .004 5.922 .000
.036b 7 .005 3.608 .001
.035c 7 .005 2.869 .008
.235d 7 .034 7.379 .000
.065e 7 .009 2.726 .012
.100 1 .100 133.961 .000
.107 1 .107 75.264 .000
.086 1 .086 48.734 .000
.059 1 .059 12.964 .000
.073 1 .073 21.631 .000
.000 1 .000 .145 .704
.002 1 .002 1.358 .246
.001 1 .001 .296 .588
.001 1 .001 .316 .575
.000 1 .000 .110 .741
.000 1 .000 .297 .587
.000 1 .000 .297 .587
.002 1 .002 1.323 .252
.002 1 .002 .507 .478
.008 1 .008 2.483 .118
.002 1 .002 3.002 .086
.003 1 .003 2.434 .121
.005 1 .005 3.096 .081
.007 1 .007 1.544 .216
.000 1 .000 .125 .724
8.36E-005 1 8.36E-005 .112 .738
9.53E-006 1 9.53E-006 .007 .935
8.82E-006 1 8.82E-006 .005 .944
.011 1 .011 2.398 .124
.003 1 .003 .799 .373
.000 1 .000 .440 .509
.002 1 .002 1.696 .195
.001 1 .001 .363 .548
.009 1 .009 2.026 .157
1.82E-006 1 1.82E-006 .001 .982
.003 1 .003 3.361 .069
.004 1 .004 2.476 .118
.002 1 .002 1.176 .280
.001 1 .001 .314 .576
.003 1 .003 .792 .375
.001 1 .001 1.962 .164
.003 1 .003 1.875 .173
.001 1 .001 .530 .468
1.18E-005 1 1.18E-005 .003 .960
.001 1 .001 .156 .694
.090 121 .001
.171 121 .001
.213 121 .002
.551 121 .005
.410 121 .003
113.918 129
108.365 129
110.893 129
95.388 129
106.446 129
.121 128
.207 128
.248 128
.786 128
.474 128
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Adj08TS
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
PerAA_H
PerW
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .255 (Adjusted R Squared = .212)a. 
R Squared = .173 (Adjusted R Squared = .125)b. 
R Squared = .142 (Adjusted R Squared = .093)c. 
R Squared = .299 (Adjusted R Squared = .259)d. 
R Squared = .136 (Adjusted R Squared = .086)e. 
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Table 18: Multivariate Tests – Adjusted Teacher Day Rate Reduced Model 
.988 1917.083a 5.000 120.000 .000
.012 1917.083a 5.000 120.000 .000
79.878 1917.083a 5.000 120.000 .000
79.878 1917.083a 5.000 120.000 .000
.030 .749a 5.000 120.000 .588
.970 .749a 5.000 120.000 .588
.031 .749a 5.000 120.000 .588
.031 .749a 5.000 120.000 .588
.173 5.027a 5.000 120.000 .000
.827 5.027a 5.000 120.000 .000
.209 5.027a 5.000 120.000 .000
.209 5.027a 5.000 120.000 .000
.049 1.233a 5.000 120.000 .298
.951 1.233a 5.000 120.000 .298
.051 1.233a 5.000 120.000 .298
.051 1.233a 5.000 120.000 .298
.030 .751a 5.000 120.000 .587
.970 .751a 5.000 120.000 .587
.031 .751a 5.000 120.000 .587
.031 .751a 5.000 120.000 .587
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
Adj08TS
PerAA_H
Dropout
FRLunch
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 19: Tests of Between-Subject Effects – Adjusted Teacher Day Rate Reduced Model 
.029a 4 .007 9.770 .000
.030b 4 .008 5.309 .001
.033c 4 .008 4.746 .001
.209d 4 .052 11.219 .000
.058e 4 .014 4.314 .003
5.764 1 5.764 7759.938 .000
5.674 1 5.674 3981.397 .000
5.322 1 5.322 3062.776 .000
5.489 1 5.489 1179.381 .000
5.005 1 5.005 1490.272 .000
.000 1 .000 .481 .489
.003 1 .003 2.083 .152
7.23E-005 1 7.23E-005 .042 .839
.006 1 .006 1.284 .259
2.59E-006 1 2.59E-006 .001 .978
.008 1 .008 10.196 .002
.003 1 .003 2.109 .149
.012 1 .012 6.683 .011
.079 1 .079 16.946 .000
.040 1 .040 11.891 .001
.002 1 .002 3.112 .080
.003 1 .003 2.347 .128
.007 1 .007 3.760 .055
.012 1 .012 2.528 .114
.001 1 .001 .251 .618
.000 1 .000 .410 .523
.000 1 .000 .222 .639
.001 1 .001 .763 .384
.000 1 .000 .025 .876
.007 1 .007 2.203 .140
.092 124 .001
.177 124 .001
.215 124 .002
.577 124 .005
.416 124 .003
113.918 129
108.365 129
110.893 129
95.388 129
106.446 129
.121 128
.207 128
.248 128
.786 128
.474 128
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Adj08TS
PerAA_H
Dropout
FRLunch
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .240 (Adjusted R Squared = .215)a. 
R Squared = .146 (Adjusted R Squared = .119)b. 
R Squared = .133 (Adjusted R Squared = .105)c. 
R Squared = .266 (Adjusted R Squared = .242)d. 
R Squared = .122 (Adjusted R Squared = .094)e. 
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Teacher-to-Principal Salary Difference 
Hypothesis 3a: Student achievement, as measured by AYP, will be higher in school divisions 
where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Hypothesis 3a (0): Student achievement, as measured by AYP, will not be higher in school 
divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow. 
 
The difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries as an independent variable in the 
simple and whole models has little influence on the dependent variables.  However, there is 
evidence in the reduced model that the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries 
does have a relationship with one of the dependent variables.  In the simple model, the 
multivariate tests, found on Table 20, produce an F-value of 1.220 and no significance with a p-
value of .303 for all four tests of effect.  In the tests of between-subjects effects, found on Table 
21, the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is a relatively weak predictor of 
student achievement with no significance produced with any of the dependent variables.  Since 
the relationships between the teacher-to-principal salary difference variable and the DVs are 
weak, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: In the presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, will be higher in school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries is narrow. 
 
Hypothesis 3b (0): In the presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by 
AYP, will not be higher in school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and 
principal salaries is narrow. 
 
In the whole mode, the multivariate tests found on Table 22 produce an F-value of 1.220 and no 
significance with a p-value of .304 for teacher-to-principal salary difference for all four tests of 
effect.   In the presence of all the identified intervening variables, the difference between teacher 
salaries and principal salaries has little influence on the student achievement as evidenced in tests 
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of between-subjects effects found on Table 23.  In the reduced model, the multivariate tests 
found on Table 24 produce an F-value of 1.387 and a weak significance for the difference 
between teacher salaries and principal salaries with a p-value of .234 for all four tests of effect. 
In the presence of selected intervening variables, entered in the order of PerAA_H, Dropout, and 
FRLunch, the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries does not produce a 
significant relationship with four of the dependent variables as evidenced by the tests of 
between-subjects effects found on Table 25.  However, the difference between teacher salaries 
and principal salaries does have a significant relationship with algebra 2 to the p<.05 level.  
Since the relationships between the IV and the DVs are relatively weak, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.  However there is evidence that in the presence of intervening variables that 
the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries does have a relationship with 
algebra 2. 
 
These findings confirm the findings of Patrick, Mahoney and Petrosko (2008) and Kalleberg, 
Marsden, Reynold and Knoke (2006) suggesting that individuals working in the public (Perry, 
2003) and non-profit sectors (Kalleberg et al., 2006) are not primarily motivated by extrinsic 
rewards (Herzberg, 1966).  According to Patrick et al. (2008), organizations that are less 
corporate in structure follow a more equality driven rewards format as opposed to an equity 
rewards format where contribution is used to determine the amount or level of rewards 
distributed by organizations.  Though the relationship between the teacher-to-principal salary 
difference and student achievement is weak, it supports the findings of Kalleberg et al. (2006) 
and Patrick et al. (2008) that public sector employees might not be as driven by extrinsic rewards 
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as their private sector counterparts might be (Perry 2003; Perry & Wise, 1990; Perry, 
Hondeghem & Wise, 2008; Perry, Hondeghem & Wise, 2010) .  
 
Table 20: Multivariate Tests – Teacher-to-Principal Salary Difference 
.913 262.795a 5.000 125.000 .000
.087 262.795a 5.000 125.000 .000
10.512 262.795a 5.000 125.000 .000
10.512 262.795a 5.000 125.000 .000
.047 1.220a 5.000 125.000 .303
.953 1.220a 5.000 125.000 .303
.049 1.220a 5.000 125.000 .303
.049 1.220a 5.000 125.000 .303
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
T_Pratio
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 21: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects – Teacher-to-Principal Salary Difference 
.001a 1 .001 1.343 .249
.000b 1 .000 .067 .797
.003c 1 .003 1.411 .237
1.91E-005d 1 1.91E-005 .003 .956
2.48E-005d 1 2.48E-005 .006 .937
.941 1 .941 982.909 .000
.982 1 .982 599.094 .000
.880 1 .880 448.381 .000
.832 1 .832 133.199 .000
.949 1 .949 238.558 .000
.001 1 .001 1.343 .249
.000 1 .000 .067 .797
.003 1 .003 1.411 .237
1.91E-005 1 1.91E-005 .003 .956
2.48E-005 1 2.48E-005 .006 .937
.124 129 .001
.212 129 .002
.253 129 .002
.806 129 .006
.513 129 .004
115.801 131
110.209 131
112.482 131
96.887 131
107.905 131
.125 130
.212 130
.256 130
.806 130
.513 130
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
T_Pratio
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .010 (Adjusted R Squared = .003)a. 
R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.007)b. 
R Squared = .011 (Adjusted R Squared = .003)c. 
R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.008)d. 
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Table 22: Multivariate Tests – Teacher-to-Principal Salary Difference with Intervening Variables 
.559 30.161a 5.000 119.000 .000
.441 30.161a 5.000 119.000 .000
1.267 30.161a 5.000 119.000 .000
1.267 30.161a 5.000 119.000 .000
.049 1.220a 5.000 119.000 .304
.951 1.220a 5.000 119.000 .304
.051 1.220a 5.000 119.000 .304
.051 1.220a 5.000 119.000 .304
.078 2.008a 5.000 119.000 .082
.922 2.008a 5.000 119.000 .082
.084 2.008a 5.000 119.000 .082
.084 2.008a 5.000 119.000 .082
.044 1.083a 5.000 119.000 .373
.956 1.083a 5.000 119.000 .373
.046 1.083a 5.000 119.000 .373
.046 1.083a 5.000 119.000 .373
.023 .559a 5.000 119.000 .731
.977 .559a 5.000 119.000 .731
.024 .559a 5.000 119.000 .731
.024 .559a 5.000 119.000 .731
.049 1.229a 5.000 119.000 .300
.951 1.229a 5.000 119.000 .300
.052 1.229a 5.000 119.000 .300
.052 1.229a 5.000 119.000 .300
.043 1.080a 5.000 119.000 .375
.957 1.080a 5.000 119.000 .375
.045 1.080a 5.000 119.000 .375
.045 1.080a 5.000 119.000 .375
.031 .772a 5.000 119.000 .572
.969 .772a 5.000 119.000 .572
.032 .772a 5.000 119.000 .572
.032 .772a 5.000 119.000 .572
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
T_Pratio
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
PerAA_H
PerW
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 23: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects – Teacher-to-Principal Salary Difference with 
Intervening Variables 
.033a 7 .005 6.257 .000
.037b 7 .005 3.712 .001
.033c 7 .005 2.613 .015
.239d 7 .034 7.423 .000
.076e 7 .011 3.039 .006
.088 1 .088 118.163 .000
.102 1 .102 71.575 .000
.080 1 .080 43.980 .000
.071 1 .071 15.369 .000
.092 1 .092 26.003 .000
.000 1 .000 .221 .639
.000 1 .000 .227 .635
4.30E-005 1 4.30E-005 .024 .878
.006 1 .006 1.196 .276
.013 1 .013 3.609 .060
.001 1 .001 1.420 .236
.002 1 .002 1.641 .203
.005 1 .005 2.512 .116
.002 1 .002 .409 .524
.019 1 .019 5.468 .021
.002 1 .002 3.226 .075
.005 1 .005 3.386 .068
.003 1 .003 1.861 .175
.006 1 .006 1.330 .251
8.65E-006 1 8.65E-006 .002 .961
9.31E-005 1 9.31E-005 .124 .725
2.90E-005 1 2.90E-005 .020 .887
7.00E-006 1 7.00E-006 .004 .951
.008 1 .008 1.700 .195
.001 1 .001 .230 .632
.000 1 .000 .528 .469
.002 1 .002 1.722 .192
.001 1 .001 .284 .595
.008 1 .008 1.755 .188
.000 1 .000 .078 .780
.003 1 .003 3.666 .058
.005 1 .005 3.373 .069
.002 1 .002 1.304 .256
.004 1 .004 .800 .373
.005 1 .005 1.500 .223
.002 1 .002 2.352 .128
.004 1 .004 2.772 .098
.001 1 .001 .566 .453
.000 1 .000 .054 .816
.001 1 .001 .372 .543
.092 123 .001
.175 123 .001
.223 123 .002
.567 123 .005
.437 123 .004
115.801 131
110.209 131
112.482 131
96.887 131
107.905 131
.125 130
.212 130
.256 130
.806 130
.513 130
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
T_Pratio
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
PerAA_H
PerW
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .263 (Adjusted R Squared = .221)a. 
R Squared = .174 (Adjusted R Squared = .127)b. 
R Squared = .129 (Adjusted R Squared = .080)c. 
R Squared = .297 (Adjusted R Squared = .257)d. 
R Squared = .147 (Adjusted R Squared = .099)e. 
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Table 24: Multivariate Tests – Teacher-to-Principal Salary Difference Reduced Model 
.921 284.731a 5.000 122.000 .000
.079 284.731a 5.000 122.000 .000
11.669 284.731a 5.000 122.000 .000
11.669 284.731a 5.000 122.000 .000
.054 1.387a 5.000 122.000 .234
.946 1.387a 5.000 122.000 .234
.057 1.387a 5.000 122.000 .234
.057 1.387a 5.000 122.000 .234
.178 5.283a 5.000 122.000 .000
.822 5.283a 5.000 122.000 .000
.217 5.283a 5.000 122.000 .000
.217 5.283a 5.000 122.000 .000
.050 1.296a 5.000 122.000 .270
.950 1.296a 5.000 122.000 .270
.053 1.296a 5.000 122.000 .270
.053 1.296a 5.000 122.000 .270
.100 2.716a 5.000 122.000 .023
.900 2.716a 5.000 122.000 .023
.111 2.716a 5.000 122.000 .023
.111 2.716a 5.000 122.000 .023
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
T_Pratio
PerAA_H
Dropout
FRLunch
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
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Table 25: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects – Teacher-to-Principal Salary Difference Reduced 
Model 
.031a 4 .008 10.193 .000
.030b 4 .008 5.204 .001
.031c 4 .008 4.331 .003
.214d 4 .054 11.405 .000
.071e 4 .018 5.028 .001
.850 1 .850 1135.822 .000
.870 1 .870 603.609 .000
.836 1 .836 467.743 .000
.975 1 .975 207.573 .000
.981 1 .981 279.338 .000
.000 1 .000 .286 .594
.000 1 .000 .155 .694
9.08E-005 1 9.08E-005 .051 .822
.009 1 .009 1.939 .166
.014 1 .014 3.955 .049
.005 1 .005 7.041 .009
.002 1 .002 1.316 .254
.013 1 .013 7.284 .008
.085 1 .085 18.161 .000
.061 1 .061 17.370 .000
.003 1 .003 3.523 .063
.005 1 .005 3.517 .063
.004 1 .004 2.467 .119
.012 1 .012 2.542 .113
1.82E-005 1 1.82E-005 .005 .943
.002 1 .002 3.030 .084
.004 1 .004 2.856 .094
.003 1 .003 1.501 .223
.000 1 .000 .093 .761
.020 1 .020 5.750 .018
.094 126 .001
.182 126 .001
.225 126 .002
.592 126 .005
.442 126 .004
115.801 131
110.209 131
112.482 131
96.887 131
107.905 131
.125 130
.212 130
.256 130
.806 130
.513 130
Dependent Variable
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
AllRead
AllWrite
AllAlg1
Allgeo
ALLAlg2
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
T_Pratio
PerAA_H
Dropout
FRLunch
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .244 (Adjusted R Squared = .220)a. 
R Squared = .142 (Adjusted R Squared = .115)b. 
R Squared = .121 (Adjusted R Squared = .093)c. 
R Squared = .266 (Adjusted R Squared = .243)d. 
R Squared = .138 (Adjusted R Squared = .110)e. 
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Summary 
An analysis of the 131 school divisions in Virginia that comprised the dataset found that the 
relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement in the areas of English and 
mathematics is of little significance.  Absent any intervening variables, the relationship between 
teacher salaries adjusted for cost-of-living and student achievement in the subjects of reading, 
writing and geometry is significant and negative.  However, when intervening variable are 
introduced into the model, the relationship weakens.  These results support the earlier findings of 
Gill and Meier (2001) that teacher salaries should be considered when looking at student 
achievement, but the influence of teacher salaries on student achievement is weak. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of research projects conducted in the field of education have looked at theories of 
motivation (Odden and Kelley, 2002), but there is little research on the relationship between 
teacher salaries and student achievement.  The purpose of this research is to answer the question, 
what is the relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement as measured by 
adequate yearly progress (AYP)?  Student achievement, in this context, is relative to the 
minimum passing requirements for students in English subjects and mathematics subjects.  
Based on the results of nine general linear models, the relationship between teacher salaries and 
student achievement is weak.  According to research conducted by Gill and Meier (2001), there 
is a positive relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement, but that high teacher 
salaries are not among the leading characteristics of high achieving school districts. 
 
This research is framed utilizing an equity theory (Adams, 1965) and distributive justice 
(Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990) perspective.  Equity theory posits that individuals evaluate an 
organization’s fairness based on how well they are rewarded for their inputs relative to another 
individual (Adams, 1965).  These evaluations might lead to one of three potential outcomes: 
equitable payment, overpayment inequality or underpayment inequality (Greenberg & Baron, 
2007).  The consequences of underpayment inequity could lead to individual impropriety 
consisting of reduced effort, indifference, and possibly corporate theft (Greenberg, 1989).  In this 
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context, if an individual feels they are not adequately compensated for their job duties, their 
performance might influence organizational outcomes (Greenberg, 1987, 1989, 1990). 
 
Distributive justice, one of the four elements of organizational justice, posits that individuals will 
feel satisfied when they perceive that organizational resources, including compensation, are 
distributed fairly (Greenberg & Baron, 2007; Greenberg, 1987).  According to Deutsch (1975), 
there are three perceived forms of fairness in the distribution of organizational resources: needs 
based fairness, equality based fairness, and equity based or contribution based needs.  School 
divisions, like most public and non-profit organizations, are likely to follow the equality model 
(Patrick et al., 2008) embodied by the single-schedule pay system (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 
2002).  While there have been research projects and articles dedicated to alternative pay 
schedules, such as merit-based pay, evidence has shown that school divisions are not likely to 
move away from the current single-schedule pay scale that is used by a majority of school 
divisions in the United States (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  The results of nine general linear models 
built for this research support Odden and Kelley’s position that the current compensation model 
is likely to remain in continuous use. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections with a summary at the end of the chapter.  The first 
section presents a brief discussion of the findings from chapter four.  The second section presents 
the limitations of this research and recommendations for future research.  The third section 
presents conclusions and policy recommendations based on the results of the data analysis found 
in chapter four.  A summary follows after the third section of this chapter. 
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Discussion 
The rejection of five of the six posited hypotheses suggests that the general relationship between 
teacher salaries and student achievement as measured by AYP is weak.  Though the relationship 
between the salaries teachers receive from their school divisions and student achievement 
relative to the requirements of AYP is generally positive, it is a weak relationship.  As Gill and 
Meier (2001) suggest from their study of school districts in Texas, the relationship between 
teacher salaries and student achievement is positive, in that as teacher salaries increase so does 
student achievement.  However, Gill and Meier also note that teacher salaries are not one of the 
factors that separate superior achieving school districts from average or high achieving school 
districts. 
 
In the absence of intervening variables such as high racial minority presence, the drop-out rate 
and percentage of students receiving free or reduced lunches, there is a significant inverse 
relationship between teacher salaries adjusted for cost-of-living and student achievement.  In this 
case, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 2a was rejected as the model showed that there was a 
significant inverse relationship between teacher salaries adjusted for cost-of-living and 
achievement as measured by AYP in reading, writing and geometry.  The rejection of the null 
hypothesis for hypothesis 2a when intervening variables are excluded does expose a need for 
certain school divisions, especially in the northern region of the state, to consider revaluating 
how teachers are compensated such that teachers do not leave the classroom or the profession.  
The caveat is that this relationship does not hold when intervening variables are introduced into 
the mode. 
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The relatively weak relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement, in general, 
might be relative to the dependent variables used in this research.  This research used adequate 
yearly progress (AYP) as a measure of student achievement.  AYP represents the minimal 
standards for which students are to meet in order to be labeled ―proficient‖ by the United States 
Department of Education (2010a).  Since these standards require minimal proficiency and all 
schools and school divisions are expected to meet the standards of AYP by 2014 (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), it is difficult to determine how strong the 
relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement is when the standards for 
proficiency are required by the NCLBA (U.S. Department of Education 2010a). 
 
Another factor possibly influencing the relationship between teacher salaries and student 
achievement is public service motivation (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008; Perry, Hondeghem, & 
Wise, 2010).  As Odden & Kelley (2002) explain, teachers are often motivated to teach for 
reasons other than monetary compensation.  It is possible that altruistic motivation to contribute 
to organizationally defined goals (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008) mediates the desire of individuals 
in the teaching field to leave.  Civic duty and compassion are often identified as elements of 
public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990), which fit well with the teaching profession 
(Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  These findings are confirmed by the POINT program in 
Nashville, Tennessee that found little difference in achievement between students in classes 
where the teachers were incentivized with financial rewards to increase student achievement in 
mathematics and classes where teachers were not receiving incentives (Springer et al., 2010). 
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The teacher-to-principal salary difference does not have a strong relationship with student 
achievement.  Only one model produced evidence that the teacher-to-principal salary difference 
might influence student achievement in algebra 2, but there is not enough evidence to suggest 
that resources should be reallocated to ameliorate teacher salaries in relationship to principal 
salaries.  This finding confirms the work of Patrick et al. (2008), who suggest that organizations 
that are more reflective of the public and non-profit sector follow a more equality based 
(Deutsch, 1975) approach to distributing resources, meaning that individuals are paid based on 
the position they hold.  The single-salary pay schedule is often perceived as fair because it does 
not differentiate between race, sex, or physical capability.  Since the single-salary pay schedule 
is widely used throughout the United States, teachers are familiar with it and generally accept it 
as fair (Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
This research is bound by the limitations inherent in performing analyses of secondary data.  
According the Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000), there are three major caveats to 
performing secondary data analysis: insufficient or missing data, errors conveyed from the initial 
collection, and utilizing data that are not suitable for the proposed project.  For this research, the 
major limitation is the level at which the data were analyzed. 
 
The data that comprise the data set for this research are school division level data culled from the 
Virginia Department of Education.  Though there are data by high school building for 
achievement in reading, writing, algebra 1, geometry, and algebra 2 as defined by AYP, there are 
insufficient data regarding salaries, principal salaries in particular.  While these data exist, and 
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are available upon request, collecting the data might be time prohibitive.  Also, the collection of 
these data might be inconsistent from school division to school division. 
 
For the purposes of conducting this research, school division level data are appropriate for 
testing the hypotheses posited.  In previous research, Gill and Meier (2001) utilized school 
district level data for testing organizational behavior based hypotheses.  While school division 
level data pertinent to high schools provides confidentiality for people holding certain positions 
such as principal or assistant principal, differences between high school buildings are muted.  As 
evidenced by Table 26, the school division level data analyzed in this research do not reflect the 
differences between high school buildings.  Table 26 provides teacher and principal salaries; 
average years of teacher experience; and, AYP in English and mathematics for high schools in 
one of the school divisions located in Virginia for school year 2007-2008.  The high school 
names are replaced with numbers to provide confidentiality to those in positions where there is 
only one incumbent. 
 
Table 26: Salaries and AYP Results for high schools in a Virginia School Division 
Virginia School Division for School Year 2007-2008 
School Building (Average 
Teacher Experience in 
parentheses) 
Average 
Teacher Salary Principal Salary English AYP Mathematics AYP 
HS-1 (12) $47,668 $78,222 95% 86% 
HS-2 (12) $47,665 $105,117 95% 84% 
HS-3 (12) $47,458 $116,671 99% 96% 
HS-4 (13) $48,086 $118,697 96% 89% 
HS-5 (13) $47,652 $110,531 92% 86% 
HS-6 (10) $45,716 $106,061 94% 81% 
HS-7 (10) $46,101 $77,330 90% 76% 
HS-8 (17) $51,258 $104,851 98% 95% 
HS-9 (15) $49,294 $82,788 92% 88% 
HS-10 (12) $47,185 $107,295 96% 84% 
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Table 26 elucidates some of the challenges of working with aggregate level data. The data in the 
dataset are an average of averages, which might mask differences between individual units.  In 
the context of this research, differences between school buildings might be muted such that 
underachieving school buildings benefit from the success of other school buildings within the 
same school division.  In terms of achievement according to table 26, HS-7 benefits from the 
other high schools in the school division in the area of achievement in English according to the 
standards of AYP.  For achievement in mathematics according to the standards of AYP, high 
achievement scores posted by HS-3 and HS-8 help raise the overall achievement in mathematics 
for all high schools in the school division.  The differences between schools are not limited to 
achievement. 
 
According to table 26, school building HS-8 has the highest average teacher salary in the school 
division, and building HS-8 has the highest average number of years of teaching experience.  It is 
reasonable to expect that the school which has the most experienced teachers would also have 
the highest average teacher salaries.  Though HS-8 has an average salary of just over $51,000, 
the school with the lowest average teacher salary is paying its teachers on average almost 
$46,000.  The difference between average principal salaries among the high schools according to 
table 26 is much wider than the difference between average teacher salaries.  The principal with 
the lowest salary in the school division is making just over $77,000, and the principal with the 
highest salary in the school division is making nearly $119,000.  An aggregate study, such as the 
one performed for this research, would mask the relationship between teacher-to-principal salary 
differences and student achievement.  As shown in table 26, HS-4 performed better in English 
and mathematics than HS-7, though the difference between average teacher salaries and the 
  
136 
 
principal’s salary is about $70,000 for HS-4 compared to a $30,000 difference between average 
teacher salaries and the principal’s salary at HS-7.  Though HS-4 out-performs HS-7 despite the 
higher teacher-to-principal salary difference, intervening factors such as the dropout rate and the 
number of students (Lomax et al., 1995) receiving free or reduced lunches are likelier to predict 
the differences in student achievement between HS-4 and HS-7. 
 
There are two potential projects for future research that can build upon the research presented 
here.  One potential research project is to collect data from every high school in the state of 
Virginia and compare the results from using school building level data to the data presented in 
this research.  As Table 26 suggests, executing an analysis of secondary data at the school 
building level might elucidate nuances that this research could not because these analyses are 
performed with school division level data.  A second potential research project is a mixed-
methods approach combing quantitative and qualitative techniques.  In the mixed-methods 
approach, a researcher could concentrate on a particular division or sample several school 
divisions and compare the results gained from a quantitative analysis to data gathered from 
individual interviews with teachers and principals.  Mixed-methods approaches are often 
considered stout because they allow the researcher to triangulate findings to confirm hypotheses 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). 
 
The approach recommended above expands on the research done for this project, which is 
limited to looking at salary as a motivator for performance.  As Herzberg (1966, 1969) suggests, 
salary can be as much an inhibitor for motivation as it is for motivation.  An alternative to 
looking at pay as a motivator is to construct a research project focused on testing several types of 
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motivation, which might include salary.  As noted by Odden and Kelley (1997, 2002), teachers 
are motivated when they are invested in the schools and school divisions where they work.  
Herzberg (1966, 1969) outlined three motivators that allowed employees to feel more invested in 
the organizations for which they work: ownership, autonomy, and pride.  Individuals who have 
ownership of their projects are motivated to produce high quality outcomes.  When individuals 
are allowed to work on their projects without much interference or supervision, these employees 
are freer to express their creativity and ingenuity.  Generally, according to Herzberg (1966), 
individuals who have ownership over projects and are allowed to work independently of 
supervision derive a sense of pride from their work. 
 
Utilizing a theoretical framework consisting of participative-management theory and goal-setting 
theory, a project could be constructed to test whether other motivators, as outlined by Herzberg, 
are better predictors of organizational success than salary.  As Odden and Kelley (2002) observe, 
when teachers are a part of the goal setting process (Locke, 1968) and the procedural 
management team (Lawler, 1990) for reaching organizational goals, they are more invested and 
have ownership in the schools and school divisions for which they work.  In order to collect data 
relative to measuring individual autonomy and project ownership as they relate to motivation, a 
survey would likely need to be constructed to effectively represent the different types of 
motivation as they relate to organizational success.  Once constructed, the survey can be 
administered to a sample of teachers from a cross-section (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2000) of school divisions in the state.  A mixed-methods approach that includes in-depth 
interviews or focus groups will help triangulate the motivators that the best predictors of 
organizational success (Creswell, 2003; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). 
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The main limitation of this research is that it focuses on salary as a motivator.  While conducting 
the research recommended above might not reveal the most significant motivator for 
organizational success, it would provide insight into where salaries stand as a motivator for 
organizational success when it comes to the teaching profession.  It is likely, with respect to 
public service motivation (Perry, 2003; Perry & Wise, 1990), that salary is not the most 
significant motivator of teachers, and that there is a point where too much salary can inhibit 
motivation in the way that too little salary can inhibit motivation (Herzberg, 1966, 1969).  In a 
future research project, several types of motivation can represent the independent variables. 
 
For the dependent variables, future research should consider the limitations of AYP.  While 
standardized tests are accepted as measures of organizational success or failure (Gill & Meier, 
2001) for schools and school districts, AYP might not be the best indicator or success.  It is 
difficult to discern true achievement in education because there are differences between schools 
and school districts (Odden & Kelley, 2002; Tuck, Berman & Hill, 2009).  As the education 
literature suggests, high incidents of concentrated poverty and racial isolation can negatively 
influence achievement as measured by standardized testing (Lomax et al., 1995).  Several 
measurements are used to formulate AYP including student attendance, but AYP might not be 
able to detect individual student improvement.  As a measurement of student achievement, AYP 
is appropriate for the study performed in this research, but might not be a true indicator of 
student achievement in future studies. 
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Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The results of general linear modeling suggest that alternative pay structures might not have 
significant influence on student achievement relative to the requirements of adequate yearly 
progress (AYP).  These results confirm Odden and Kelley’s (2002) concerns that finding an 
effective alternative to the single-salary pay schedule might be elusive.  However, as Kalleberg 
et al. (2006) have suggested, individuals working in the public and non-profit sector might not be 
motivated by strictly by monetary rewards.  According to Kalleberg et al. (2006), individuals in 
the public and non-profit sectors might feel they are justly compensated if they are given 
opportunities to increase their knowledge base or skill set through access to free or reduced 
continuing education or training seminars.  These auxiliary benefits might allow individuals to 
prepare themselves for higher paying positions in the future (Kalleberg et al., 2006), which in the 
education field means that teachers might feel justly compensated if they are able to prepare 
themselves for jobs in administration later in their careers (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  
 
In light of Liu et al.’s (2004) research with signing bonuses, as well as the observations of Odden 
and Kelley (2002), it is unlikely that school divisions in Virginia or school districts throughout 
the United States will abandon the single-salary pay schedule.  The benefit of the current salary 
construct is that it is considered fair and most employees employed within the school districts 
that use this system are familiar with it.  However, as Odden and Kelley (2002) note, teachers are 
no less interested in extrinsic rewards than those who work in the private sector where 
performance bonuses and merit pay are widely used incentives.  The caveat for public and non-
profit organizations is that they are often unable to employ these incentives due to budget 
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constraints and limited revenue streams compared to organizations in the private sector 
(Kalleberg et al., 2006). 
 
Based on the findings of this research and those from Gill and Meier’s (2001) research, the 
relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement is relatively weak in comparison 
to other factors like: the concentration of racial minorities in school districts, the drop-out rate, 
and the percentage of students receiving free or reduced lunches.  While these findings and 
others do not suggest that the single-salary pay scale should be replaced, the findings do suggest 
that the single-salary pay scale should be maintained in a manner such that it reflects the cost-of-
living in the area where it is used.  As this research shows, when adjusted to the cost-of-living for 
the state of Virginia, teachers who work in the northern part of the state make less income for 
producing high organizational outcomes. 
 
Though the rigors of AYP might not be demanding, AYP is the standard utilized in making a lot 
of organizational decisions.  When isolated, teacher pay adjusted for cost-of-living does have a 
significant inverse relationship with student achievement.  In light of equity theory (Adams, 
1965), teachers in some school divisions, especially in Northern Virginia, are producing higher 
results with lesser individual rewards in comparison to teachers in other school divisions in 
Virginia.  This underpayment inequity (Greenberg & Baron, 2007) suggests that certain school 
divisions, most notably school divisions located in Northern Virginia, should consider revising 
their pay scales such that they do not incur situations where gifted teaches are leaving the 
classroom to take administrative positions (Odden and Kelley, 2002). 
 
  
141 
 
Another policy recommendation is for school divisions in Virginia to consider constructing 
customized definitions for what student achievement is.  While AYP provides a standardized 
format for school districts to measure student achievement, it is likely that AYP does not provide 
a comprehensive description of what student achievement is.  School divisions in urban areas, 
such as Richmond, Norfolk and Hampton, are facing different issues than school divisions in 
suburban areas like Chesterfield, Loudoun and Prince William.  In order to find an appropriate 
method to reward teachers for achievement, school divisions might need to develop student 
achievement indicators that are not as restrictive as standardized testing.  Indicators of student 
success should be weighted differently from one school division to the next to reflect the 
different challenges that each school division faces.  For some school divisions, lowering the 
dropout rate might increase student achievement; whereas, other divisions might make few or no 
changes because those changes might negatively influence student achievement where 
achievement is currently high.  Customizing the definition of student achievement allows school 
divisions to determine student achievement based on the challenges they face and the resources 
they have. 
 
Summary 
The rejection of five of the six hypotheses posited for this research suggests that there is a weak 
relationship between teacher salaries and student achievement as measured by the requirements 
of AYP.  But, there is evidence to suggest that certain school divisions in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia might want to reconsider how their pay scales are fashioned in light of the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that there is not an inverse relationship between teacher salaries and student 
achievement, absent of intervening variables, when salaries are adjusted for cost-of-living.  The 
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policy implications of this research are limited, but indicate that school divisions in the northern 
part of the state might want to examine and possible revise their pay scales to reflect the high 
achievement by students in their districts relative to the requirements of AYP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
143 
 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE CITED 
Adams, J. S.  (1963).  Toward an understanding of inequity.  Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 67, 422-436. 
 
Adams, J. S.  (1965).  Inequity in social exchanges. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 2, p. 267-299).  New York: Academic Press. 
 
Adams, J. S., & Jacobsen, P. R.  (1964).  Effects of wage inequities on work quality, Journal of 
Abnormal Social Psychology, 69, 19-25. 
 
Airasian, P.  (1987).  State mandated testing and educational reform: Contexts and consequences.  
American Journal of Education, 95, p. 393-412. 
 
Appelbaum, E. & Batt, R.  (1994).  The new American workplace: Transforming Work Systems 
in the United States.  Ithaca, New York: ILR Press. 
 
Appelbaum, E., Bailey, T. Berg, P., & Kalleberg, A. L.  (2000).  Manufacturing Advantage: Why 
High Performance Work Systems Pay Off.  Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Asgari, A., Silong, A. D., Ahmad, A., & Samah, B. A.  (2008).  The relationship between 
transformational behaviors, organizational justice, leader-member exchange, perceived 
organizational support, trust in management and organizational citizenship behaviors.  
European Journal of Scientific Research, 23 (2), 227-242. 
 
Beth Curran, L., Wolman, H., Hill, E. W., & Furdell, K.  (2006).  Economic wellbeing and where 
we live: Accounting for geographical cost-of-living differences in the U.S.  Urban 
Studies (Routledge), 43 (13), 2443-2466. 
 
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley. 
 
Clay-Warner, J., Hegtvedt, K. A., & Roman, P.  (2005).  Procedural justice, distributive justice: 
How experiences with downsizing condition their impact on organizational commitment.  
Social Psychology Quarterly, 68 (1), 89-102. 
 
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., & Vigdor, J. L.  (2006).  Teacher-student matching and the 
assessment of teacher effectiveness.  The Journal of Human Resources, 41 (4), 778-820. 
 
  
144 
 
Cochran-Smith, M., & Fries, K. M.  (2005).  The AERA panel on research teacher education: 
Context and goals.  In Studying Teacher Education: The report of the AERA panel on 
research and teacher education, edited by M. Cochran-Smith & K. Zeichner.  
Washington D.C.: American Education Research Association. 
 
Colquitt, J. C. & Chertkoff, J. M.  (2002).  Explaining injustice: The interactive effect of 
explanation and outcome on fairness perceptions and task motivation.  Journal of 
Management, 28 (5), 591-610. 
 
Colquitt, J. A. & Greenberg, J. (2003). Organizational justice: A fair assessment of the state of 
the literature. In Organizational Behavior: The State of the Science, edited by J. 
Greenberg. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Corbo, A. & Kleiner, B.H. (1991). How to effectively link compensation with performance. 
Industrial Management, 33(3), 21-22. 
 
Corpanzano, R., & Ambrose, M. L.  (2001).  Procedural and distributive justice are more similar 
than you think: A monistic perspective and a research agenda.  In Advances in 
Organizational Justice, edited by J. Greenberg & R. Corpanzano.  Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press 
 
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches, 2
nd
 ed. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
 
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the 
self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268. 
 
Diesing, P.  (1991).  How Does Social Science Work? Reflections on Practice.  Pittsburgh, PA.: 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Deutsch, M.  (1975).  Equity, equality, and need: What determines which will be used as the 
basis for distributive justice?  The Journal of Social Issues, 31, 137-149. 
 
Edmunds, R. R.  (1979).  Effective schools for the urban poor.  Educational Leadership, 37, 15-
24. 
 
Fadil, P.A., Williams, R. J., Limpaphayom, W., & Smart, C.  (2005).  Equity or equality? A 
conceptual examination of the influence of individual/collectivism on cross-cultural 
application of equity theory.  Cross Cultural Management, 12, 17-35. 
 
Folger, R.  (1984).  Perceived injustice, referent cognitions, and the concept of comparison level.  
Representative Research in Social Psychology, 14, 88-108. 
 
Folger, R.  (1986).  Rethinking equity theory: A referent cognitions model.  In Justice in Social 
Relations, edited by H. W. Bierhoff, R. L. Cohen, & J. Greenberg (pp. 145-162).  New 
York: Plenum Press. 
  
145 
 
Frankfort-Nachmias, C., and Nachmias, D. (2000). Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 6
th
 
ed. New York: Worth Publishers. 
 
Gill, J., & Meier, K. J.  (2001).  Ralph’s pretty-good grocery versus Ralph’s Super Market: 
Separating excellent agencies from the good ones.  Public Administration Review, 61 (1), 
9-17. 
 
Godard, J., & Delaney, J.T.  (2000).  Reflections on the ―high performance‖ paradigm’s 
implications for industrial relations as a field.  Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 53 
(3), 482-502. 
 
Goldhaber, D. D., & Brewer, D. J.  (1997).  Why don’t schools and teachers seem to matter?  
Assessing the impact of unobservables on educational productivity.  The Journal of 
Human Resources, 32 (3), 505-523. 
 
Goldhaber, D. D., Anthony, E. A.  (2007).  Can teacher quality be effectively assessed?  The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 89 (1), 134-150. 
 
Good T. L., & Brophy, J. E.  (1986).  School effects.  In Handbook of research on teaching (p. 
570-602).  M. C. Wittrock, editor.  New York: MacMillan.  
 
Goslin, D. A., & Glass, D. C.  (1967).  The social effects of standardized testing in American 
elementary and secondary schools.  Sociology of Education, 40 (2), 115-131. 
 
Greenberg, J.  (1987).  A taxonomy of organizational justice theories.  Academy of Management 
Review, 12, 9-22. 
 
Greenberg, J.  (1989).  Cognitive reevaluation of outcomes in response to underpayment 
inequality.  Academy of Management Journal, 32, 176-184. 
 
Greenberg, J. (1990). Organizational justice: Yesterday, today and tomorrow. Journal of 
Management, 16, 399-432. 
 
Greenberg, J., (1996).  The Quest for Justice on the Job: Essays and Experiments.  Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
 
Greenberg, J., & Baron, R. A.  (2007).  Behavior in Organizations.  Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall 
 
Harmon, M.M. & Mayer, R.T. (1986). Organization Theory for Public Administration. Burke, 
Virginia: Chatelaine Press. 
 
Hart, A. W.  (1994).  Work feature values of today’s and tomorrow’s teachers: Work redesign as 
an incentive and school improvement policy.  Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 16, 458-473. 
 
  
146 
 
Hart, A. W.  (1995).  Reconceiving school leadership: Emergent views.  Elementary School 
Journal, 96, 9-28. 
 
Heneman, R. L., Ledford, G. E., Jr., & Gresham, M. T.  (2000).  The changing nature of work 
and its effects on compensation design and delivery. In Compensation in Organizations: 
Current research and practice, edited by S. L. Rynes & B. Gerhart.  San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
 
Hegtvedt, K. A. (1988).  Social determinnats of perception: Power, equity, and status effects in 
an exchange situation.  Social Psychology Quarterly, 51 (2), 141-153. 
 
Hegtvedt, K. A. (1990).  The effects of relationship structure on emotional response to inequity.  
Social Psychology Quarterly, 53, 214-228. 
 
Hegtvedt, K. A. (1993). Approaching distributive and procedural justice: Are separate routes 
necessary? In Advances in Group Processes, Vol. 10, edited by E. J. Lawler, B. 
Markovsky, K. Heimer, & J. O’Brien. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAL. 
 
Herzberg, F.  (1966). Work and the Nature of Man. Cleveland: World Publishing. 
 
Herzberg, F.  (1969).  One more time: How do we motivate employees?  Harvard Business 
Review, 46 (1), 53-62. 
 
Hill, J., & Johnson, F.  (2005).  Revenues and expenditures for public elementary 
and secondary education: School year 2002–03 (NCES 2005-353R).  Washington, DC: 
National Center for Education Statistics. 
 
Homans, C. G. (1961). Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World. 
 
Hums, M. A., & Chelladurai, P.  (1994).  Distributive justice in intercollegiate athletics: The 
views of NCAA coaches and administrators.  Journal of Sports Management, 8, 200-217. 
 
Jacques, E.  (1961).  Equitable Payment.  London: Heinemann Educational Books. 
 
Jasso, G. (1980). A new theory of distributive justice. American Sociological Review, 45 (1), 3-
32. 
 
Jasso, G. (1986).  A new representation of the just term in distributive justice theory: Its 
properties and operation in theoretical derivation and empirical estimations.  Journal of 
Mathematical Sociology, 12, 251-274. 
 
Jepsen, C.  (2005).  Teacher characteristics and student achievement: Evidence from teacher 
surveys.  Journal of Urban Economics, 57 (2), 302-319. 
 
  
147 
 
Jupp, B.  (2005).  The uniform salary schedule: A progressive leader proposes differential pay.  
Education Next, (5) 1, 10-12. 
 
Justice, L. M., Breit-Smith, A., Rogers, M.  (2010).  Data recycling: Using existing databases to 
increase research capacity in speech-language development and disorders.  Language, 
Speech, & Hearing Services in Schools, 41 (1), 39-43.  
 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A.  (1982).  Availability and the simulation heuristic. In Judgment 
under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. 
Tversky (pp. 201-208). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kalleberg, A. L., Marsden, P. V., Reynold, J. R., & Knoke, D.  (2006).  ―Beyond profit? Sectoral 
differences in high-performance work practices.‖  Work and Occupations, 33 (3), 271-
302. 
 
Katz, D. (1964). The motivational basis of organizational behavior. Behavior Science, 9 (April) 
131-146. 
 
Kelley, C., & Protsik, J.  (1997).  Risk and reward: Perspectives on the implementation of 
Kentucky’s school-based performance reward program.  Educational Administration 
Quarterly, 33 (4), 474-505. 
 
Kelley, C.  (1998).  The Kentucky school-based performance award program: School-level 
effects.  Educational Policy, 12 (3), 305-324. 
 
Kukla-Acevedo, S.  (2009).  Do teachers characteristics matter? New results on the effects of 
teacher preparation on student achievement.  Economics of Education Review, 28 (1), 49-
57. 
 
Krueger, A. B.  (1999).  Experimental estimates of education production functions.  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (2), 497-532. 
 
Kyle, R. M. J. (Ed.).  (1985).  Research for excellence: An effective schools sourcebook.  
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 
 
Lawler, E. E., III.  (1971).  Pay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View.  New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Lawler, E. E., III.  (1981).  Pay and Organizational Development.  Reading, MA.: Addison- 
Wesley. 
 
Lawler, E. E., III.  (1990).  Strategic Pay: Aligning Organizational Strategies and Pay Systems.  
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Lawler, E. E., III.  (1992).  The Ultimate Advantage: Creating the High Involvement 
Organization.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
  
148 
 
Lawler, E. E., III (2000). Pay strategy: New thinking for the new millennium. Compensation and 
Benefits Review, Jan./Feb., 7-12. 
 
Linn, R. L., Baker, E. L., & Betebenner, D. W.  (2002).  Accountability systems: Implications of 
requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.  Educational Researcher, 31 (6), 
3-16. 
 
Liu, E., Johnson, S. M., &  Peske, H. G.  (2004).  New teachers and the Massachusetts signing 
bonus: The limitations of inducements.  Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 26 
(3), p. 217-236.  
 
Locke, E. A.  (1968).  Towards a theory of task motivation and incentives.  Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance, 3, 157-189. 
 
Lomax, R. G., West, M. M., Harmon, M. C., Viator, K. A., & Madaus, G. F.  (1995).  The 
impact of mandated standardized testing on minority students.  The Journal of Negro 
Education, 64 (2), 171-185. 
 
Loseman, A., Miedema, J., Van Den Bos, K. & Vermunt, R.  (2009).  Exploring how people 
respond to conflicts between self-interest and fairness: Influence of threats to the self on 
affective reactions to advantageous inequity.  Australian Journal of Psychology, 61 (1), 
13-21 
 
Mackenzie, D. E.  (1983).  Research for school improvement: An appraisal of some recent 
trends.  Educational Researcher.  12 (4), 5-17. 
 
Madaus, G. F. (1991).  The effects of important tests on students: Implications for a national or 
system of examinations.  Paper presented at the AERA Invitational Conference on 
Accountability as a State Reform Instrument: Impact on Teaching, Learning, Minority 
Issues and Incentives for Improvement; Washington D. C. 
 
Madaus, G. F., & Kellaghan, T.  (1992).  Curriculum evaluation and assessment.  In P. W. 
Jackson (Ed.) Handbook of research on Curriculum (p. 119-154). New York: Macmillan. 
 
Mahoney, D. F., Hums, M. A., & Riemer, H. A.  (2002).  Distributive justice in intercollegiate 
athletics: Perceptions of athletic directors and athletic board chairs.  Journal of Sports 
Management, 16, 331-357. 
 
Mahoney, D. F., Riemer, H. A., Breeding, J. L., & Hums, M. A.  (2006).  Organizational justice 
in sport organizations: Perceptions of students-athletes and other college students.  
Journal of Sport Management, 20, 159-188. 
 
Mardia, K. V., Kent, J. T., & Bibby, J. M.  (1979).  Multivariate Analysis.  Oxford: Academic 
Press. 
 
Maslow, A. H.  (1970).  Motivation and Personality, 2
nd
 Ed.  New York: Harper & Row. 
  
149 
 
Massachusetts State Legislature.  (1998).  Chapter 260, Section 4 of the Acts of 1998.  Located at 
http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw98/sl980260.htm. 
 
McGregor, D.C. (1960). The human Side of Enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Miedema, J. Van den Bos, K., & Vermunt, R.  (2006).  The influence of self-threats on fairness 
judgments and affective measures.  Social Justice Research, 19, 228-253. 
 
Nardi, R. M.  (2006).  Doing survey research: A guide to quantitative methods, 2
nd
 Edition.  
Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
 The National Commission on Excellence in Education.  (1983).  A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative of Educational Reform, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education. 
 
National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future.  (1996).  What Matters Most: 
Teaching for America’s Future. 
 
National Commission on Testing and Public Policy.  (1990).  From gatekeeper to gateway: 
Transforming testing in America.  Chestnut Hill, MA.: Author. 
 
O’Conner, R. E., Bocian, K., Beebe-Frankenberger, M., & Linlater, D.  (2010).  Responsiveness 
of students with language difficulties to early intervention in reading.  The Journal of 
Special Education, 43 (4), 220-235. 
 
Odden, A., & Kellye, C.  (1997).  Paying Teachers for What They Know and Do: New and 
Smarter Compensation Strategies to Improve Schools.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin 
Press. 
 
Odden, A., & Kellye, C.  (2002).  Paying Teachers for What They Know and Do: New and 
Smarter Compensation Strategies to Improve Schools, 2
nd
 Edition.  Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Corwin Press. 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  (1995)  Education at a 
glance: OECD indicators (Paris: OECD).  In Using What We Have To Get the Schools 
We Need: A Productivity Focus for American Education New York: The Consortium on 
Productivity in the Schools. 
 
Paarlberg, L. E., & Lavigna, B.  (2010).  Transformation leadership and public service 
motivation: Driving individual and organizational performance.  Public Administration 
Review, 70 (5), 710-718. 
 
Paris, S. G., Lawton, T. A., Turner, J. C., Roth, J. L.  (1991).  A developmental perspective on 
standardized achievement testing.  Educational Researcher, 20 (5), 12-40. 
 
  
150 
 
Patrick, I. S. C., Mahoney, D. F., & Petrosko, J. M.  (2008).  Distributive justice in 
intercollegiate athletics: An examination of equality, revenue production, and need.  
Journal of Sports Management, 22, 165-183. 
 
Perry, J. L. (2003). Compensation, merit pay, and motivation. In Public Personnel 
Administration: Problems and Prospects 4
th
 ed., edited by Steven W. Hays and Richard 
C. Kearney. Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
 
Perry, J. L., & Wise, L. R.  (1990).  The motivational bases of public service.  Public 
Administration Review, 50 (3), 367-373. 
   
Perry, J. L., & Hondeghem, A., eds.  (2008).  Motivation in Public Management: The Call of 
Public Service.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Perry, J. L., Hondeghem, A., & Wise, L. R.  (2010).  Revisiting the motivational bases of public 
service: Twenty years of research and an agenda for the future.  Public Administration 
Review, 70 (5), 681-690. 
 
Pipho, C., & Hadley, C.  (1984).  Clearinghouse notes, state activity: Minimum competency 
testing as of December 1984.  Denver, CO.: Education Commission of the States. 
 
Purkey S. C., & Smith, M. S.  (1983).  Effective schools: A review.  The Elementary School 
Journal, 83 (4), 427-452. 
 
Randall, C. S. & Mueller, C. W. (1995). Extensions of justice theory: Justice evaluations and 
employee’s reactions to in a natural setting. Social Psychology Quarterly, 58 (3), 178-
194. 
Report of the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future.  (1996).  What Matters 
Most: Teaching for America’s Future.  New York: The National Commission on 
Teaching and America’s future. 
 
Rivkin, S. G., Hanushek, E. A., & Kain, J. F.  (2005).  Teachers, schools and academic 
achievement.  Econometrica, 73 (2), 417-458. 
 
Rockoff, J. E.  (2004).  The impact of individual teachers on student achievement: Evidence 
from panel data.  American Economic Review, 94 (2), 247-252. 
 
Roderick, M., Jacob, B. A., & Bryk, A. S.  (2002).  The impact of high-staked testing in Chicago 
on student achievement in promotional gate grades.  Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 24 (4), 333-357. 
 
Romzek, B. S. & Hendricks, S. J. (1982). Organizational involvement and representative 
bureaucracy: Can we have it both ways? The American Political Science Review, 76 (1), 
75-82. 
 
  
151 
 
Rose, D. & Sullivan, O. (1996).  Introducing Data Analysis for Social Scientist, 2
nd
 Ed.  
Philadelphia: Open University Press. 
 
Rosenholtz, S. J.  (1989).  Teacher’s Workplace: The social organization of schools.  New York: 
Longman. 
Runge, C. F.  (1984).  Institutions and the free ride: The assurance problem in collective action.  
Journal of Politics, 46 (1), 154-181. 
 
Salamon, L. M.  (2002).  The Tool of Government: A Guide to the New Governance.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Schuster, J. R., & Zingheim, P.  (1992).  The New Pay: Linking Employee and Organizational 
Performance.  New York: Lexington Books. 
 
Scott, C.,  (2009).  Improving  low-performing schools: Lessons from five years of studying 
school restructuring under No Child Left Behind.  Washington D.C.: Center on Education 
Policy.  
 
Solomon, L.C.  (2005).  Recognizing differences.  Education Next, 5 (1), 16-20. 
 
Springer, M.G., Ballou, D., Hamilton, L., Le, V., Lockwood, J.R., McCaffrey, D., Pepper, M., 
and Stecher, B.  (2010).  Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the 
Project on Incentives in Teaching. Nashville, TN: National Center on Performance 
Incentives at Vanderbilt University. 
 
Stedman, L. C.  (1987).  It’s time we changed the effective schools formula.  Phi Delta Kappan, 
69, 215-224. 
 
Stringfield S., & Teddlie, C.  (1988).  A time to summarize: The Louisiana school effectiveness 
study.  Educational Leadership, 46, 43-49. 
 
Stronge, J. H., Gareis, C. R., & Little, C. A.  (2006).  Teacher pay & teacher quality: Attracting, 
developing, and retaining the best teachers.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press. 
 
Tabachnick, B. G. & Fidell, L. S.  (2001).  Using Multivariate Statistics, 4
th
 Ed.  Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon. 
 
Tinmar, T., & Kirp, D.  (1989).  Education reform in the 1980s: Lessons from the states.  Phi 
Delta Kappan, 70, p. 504-511. 
 
Tuck, B., Berman, M., & Hill, A.  (2009).  Local amenities, unobserved quality, and market 
clearing: Adjusting teacher compensation to provide equal education opportunities.  
Economics of Education Review, 28 (1), 58-66. 
 
  
152 
 
U.S. Department of Education.  (1995).  National center for education statistics, statistics of state 
school systems, common core of data.  The Condition of Education 1993, p. 148-149 and 
The Digest of Education Statistics, 1995, p.89 
 
U.S. Department of Education (2010a). Overview: Four pillars of No Child Left Behind.  
Retrieved on January 29, 2010, from www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html. 
 
U.S. Department of Education (2010b). An exploratory analysis of Adequate Yearly Progress, 
identification for improvement, and student achievement in two states and three students.  
A report from the National Longitudinal Study of No Child Left Behind (NLS-NCLB)  
Retrieved on January 30, 2010, from  www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/rd-
ayp/report.pdf. 
 
U.S. Department of Education (2010c).  Lead and manage my school: Approved State 
Accountability Plans (Virginia).  Retrieved on January 30, 2010, from 
www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/index.htm 
 
Van den Bos, K., Peters, S., Bobocel, D. R., & Ybema, J. F.   (2006).  On preferences and doing 
the right thing: Satisfaction with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is 
limited. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 273-289. 
 
Virginia Department of Education.  (2010).  Testing and Standards of Learning.  Retrieved on 
January 29, 2010, from www.doe.virginia.gov. 
 
Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information System, State Budget.  (2005) 
 
The Volcker Commission.  (2005).  Urgent business for America: Revitalizing the federal 
government for the 21st century.  In High Performance Government: Structure, 
Leadership, Incentives. R. Klitgaard, & P. C. Light, editors.  Washington D.C.: RAND 
Corporation. 
 
Vroom, V.H. (1964). Work and Motivation. New York: John Wiley. 
 
Walster, E., Bersheid, E., & Walster, G. W.  (1973).  New directions in equity research.  Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 151-76. 
 
Weick, K. E.  (1966).  The concept of equity in the perception of pay.  Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 11 (3), 414-439. 
 
Winfield, L. F.  (1990).  School competency testing reforms and student achievement: Exploring 
a national perspective.  Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 12 (2), 157-173. 
 
Wood, S.  (1999).  Human resource management and performance.  International Journal of 
Management Reviews, 1 (4), 367-413. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A – DIVISION DATA 
The tables listed below contain the data that were included in this research.  The data come from 
the Virginia Department of Education and are related to the 2007-2008 school year.  The tables 
include data for all school divisions in Virginia.  However, in the analysis, data for Lexington, 
Virginia are excluded because the Lexington School Division does not offer high school 
instruction.  There are four tables in this appendix labeled A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4. 
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Table A-1: Adequate Yearly Progress by Division for English and Mathematics for School Year 
2007-2008 
School Division
Counties Reading Writing Algebra I Geometry Algebra II
Accomack County Public Schools 94% 91% 97% 89% 93%
Albemarle County Public Schools 96% 93% 97% 93% 93%
Alleghany County Public Schools 92% 89% 90% 84% 91%
Amelia County Public Schools 96% 85% 94% 93% 94%
Amherst County Public Schools 90% 89% 96% 92% 96%
Appomattox County Public Schools 97% 94% 87% 83% 90%
Arlington County Public Schools 95% 95% 95% 86% 92%
Augusta County Public Schools 93% 91% 95% 94% 96%
Bath County Public Schools 100% 94% 88% 86% 87%
Bedford County Public Schools 95% 92% 93% 93% 87%
Bland County Public Schools 99% 91% 91% 89% 94%
Botetourt County Public Schools 95% 91% 96% 87% 89%
Brunswick County Public Schools 89% 91% 91% 90% 79%
Buchanan County Public Schools 96% 90% 96% 92% 96%
Buckingham County Public Schools 90% 89% 97% 85% 100%
Campbell County Public Schools 96% 95% 98% 88% 91%
Caroline County Public Schools 86% 85% 88% 71% 81%
Carroll County Public Schools 95% 92% 97% 95% 95%
Charles City County Public Schools 98% 97% 81% 68% 94%
Charlotte County Public Schools 97% 97% 93% 89% 99%
Chesterfield County Public Schools 95% 87% 92% 84% 88%
Clarke County Public Schools 96% 95% 84% 89% 89%
Craig County Public Schools 98% 95% 96% 75% 95%
Culpeper County Public Schools 95% 83% 94% 92% 88%
Cumberland County Public Schools 88% 83% 96% 84% 90%
Dickenson County Public Schools 94% 93% 94% 95% 99%
Dinwiddie County Public Schools 89% 91% 94% 84% 87%
Essex County Public Schools 89% 83% 92% 64% 94%
Fairfax County Public Schools 96% 96% 95% 92% 92%
Fauquier County Public Schools 91% 93% 95% 92% 89%
Floyd County Public Schools 97% 97% 97% 86% 95%
Fluvanna County Public Schools 98% 95% 96% 93% 88%
Franklin County Public Schools 94% 92% 97% 86% 97%
Frederick County Public Schools 95% 91% 96% 89% 87%
Giles County Public Schools 94% 86% 93% 86% 91%
Gloucester County Public Schools 95% 93% 95% 84% 83%
Goochland County Public Schools 99% 98% 86% 92% 80%
Grayson County Public Schools 87% 87% 91% 79% 99%
Greene County Public Schools 93% 91% 97% 94% 99%
Greensville County Public Schools 97% 95% 94% 84% 96%
Halifax County Public Schools 92% 91% 94% 91% 92%
Hanover County Public Schools 95% 93% 96% 92% 93%
Henrico County Public Schools 95% 89% 94% 87% 94%
Henry County Public Schools 96% 94% 96% 85% 89%
Highland County Public Schools 93% 97% 100% 92% 77%
Isle Of Wight County Public Schools 94% 94% 95% 85% 88%
King George County Public Schools 92% 92% 86% 91% 89%
King And Queen County Public Schools 90% 89% 90% 59% 64%
2007-2008 AYP By School Division
English Mathematics
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Table A-1 (Continued): Adequate Yearly Progress by Division for English and Mathematics for 
School Year 2007-2008 
School Division
Counties Reading Writing Algebra I Geometry Algebra II
King William County Public Schools 94% 93% 91% 82% 81%
Lancaster County Public Schools 93% 88% 98% 71% 93%
Lee County Public Schools 95% 91% 96% 95% 88%
Loudoun County Public Schools 96% 96% 96% 91% 93%
Louisa County Public Schools 91% 86% 92% 82% 89%
Lunenburg County Public Schools 95% 88% 91% 82% 96%
Madison County Public Schools 98% 95% 87% 83% 95%
Mathews County Public Schools 96% 98% 95% 88% 91%
Mecklenburg County Public Schools 95% 91% 94% 94% 93%
Middlesex County Public Schools 93% 97% 97% 90% 95%
Montgomery County Public Schools 93% 90% 90% 88% 83%
Nelson County Public Schools 96% 96% 97% 96% 95%
New Kent County Public Schools 93% 92% 94% 92% 98%
Northampton County Public Schools 89% 89% 91% 86% 92%
Northumberland County Public Schools 98% 94% 96% 94% 93%
Nottoway County Public Schools 94% 93% 90% 78% 91%
Orange County Public Schools 92% 87% 84% 81% 86%
Page County Public Schools 93% 89% 92% 87% 92%
Patrick County Public Schools 96% 91% 98% 93% 97%
Pittsylvania County Public Schools 94% 95% 93% 90% 92%
Powhatan County Public Schools 96% 94% 93% 86% 90%
Prince Edward County Public Schools 93% 92% 91% 88% 97%
Prince George County Public Schools 94% 96% 94% 92% 96%
Prince William County Public Schools 94% 94% 92% 86% 91%
Pulaski County Public Schools 92% 88% 92% 85% 95%
Rappahannock County Public Schools 95% 87% 77% 83% 93%
Richmond County Public Schools 95% 94% 97% 87% 93%
Roanoke County Public Schools 97% 97% 95% 93% 93%
Rockbridge County Public Schools 93% 92% 84% 86% 88%
Rockingham County Public Schools 96% 95% 96% 95% 98%
Russell County Public Schools 98% 96% 98% 91% 93%
Scott County Public Schools 96% 94% 99% 98% 93%
Shenandoah County Public Schools 93% 92% 96% 90% 92%
Smyth County Public Schools 95% 89% 96% 81% 88%
Southampton County Public Schools 97% 96% 96% 94% 89%
Spotsylvania County Public Schools 94% 92% 89% 88% 86%
Stafford County Public Schools 96% 95% 93% 88% 88%
Surry County Public Schools 94% 94% 96% 88% 90%
Sussex County Public Schools 94% 91% 87% 73% 99%
Tazewell County Public Schools 96% 95% 90% 78% 89%
Warren County Public Schools 89% 85% 83% 82% 93%
Washington County Public Schools 97% 94% 92% 87% 88%
Westmoreland County Public Schools 91% 90% 96% 81% 89%
Wise County Public Schools 94% 93% 97% 88% 95%
Wythe County Public Schools 97% 92% 89% 87% 96%
York County Public Schools 97% 95% 94% 96% 87%
AYP By School Division
English Mathematics
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Table A-1 (Continued): Adequate Yearly Progress by Division for English and Mathematics for 
School Year 2007-2008 
School Division
Cities Reading Writing Algebra I Geometry Algebra II
Alexandria City Public Schools 90% 90% 85% 76% 90%
Bristol City Public Schools 99% 97% 92% 85% 99%
Buena Vista City Public Schools 94% 97% 96% 78% 90%
Charlottesville City Public Schools 85% 85% 88% 77% 82%
Colonial Heights City Public Schools 96% 93% 92% 80% 84%
Covington City Public Schools 96% 89% 92% 89% 89%
Danville City Public Schools 91% 93% 88% 72% 83%
Falls Church City Public Schools 97% 96% 97% 95% 96%
Fredericksburg City Public Schools 93% 90% 94% 83% 91%
Galax City Public Schools 94% 79% 92% 77% 93%
Hampton City Public Schools 90% 92% 89% 80% 91%
Harrisonburg City Public Schools 94% 91% 94% 95% 95%
Hopewell City Public Schools 93% 92% 79% 73% 82%
Lynchburg City Public Schools 92% 91% 92% 90% 86%
Martinsville City Public Schools 89% 88% 89% 77% 93%
Newport News City Public Schools 92% 92% 92% 76% 78%
Norfolk City Public Schools 94% 92% 86% 80% 85%
Norton City Public Schools 87% 85% 95% 84% 94%
Petersburg City Public Schools 87% 81% 85% 47% 64%
Portsmouth City Public Schools 88% 88% 91% 82% 90%
Radford City Public Schools 96% 90% 97% 87% 99%
Richmond City Public Schools 89% 79% 87% 82% 89%
Roanoke City Public Schools 86% 79% 81% 74% 89%
Staunton City Public Schools 93% 91% 91% 79% 91%
Suffolk City Public Schools 95% 94% 88% 77% 75%
Virginia Beach City Public Schools 97% 95% 96% 90% 92%
Waynesboro City Public Schools 96% 90% 92% 87% 96%
Williamsburg Public Schools 95% 94% 96% 92% 91%
Winchester City Public Schools 94% 94% 94% 82% 90%
Franklin City Public Schools 92% 92% 89% 80% 81%
Chesapeake City Public Schools 93% 93% 96% 94% 96%
Lexington City Public Schools . . 100% . .
Salem City Public Schools 97% 95% 97% 93% 96%
Poquoson City Public Schools 98% 96% 97% 95% 98%
Manassas City Public Schools 93% 90% 91% 82% 86%
Manassas Park City Public Schools 98% 94% 98% 90% 97%
Towns
Colonial Beach Public Schools 94% 94% 84% 76% 72%
West Point Public Schools 100% 98% 94% 96% 97%
AYP By School Division
English Mathematics
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Table A-2: Teacher Compensation and Comparisons to Principals for School Year 2007-2008 
Counties Teacher Day Rate
Adjusted   Teacher 
Day Rate
Teacher-to-
Principal Ratio
Accomack County Public Schools $197.88 $321.96 71.8%
Albemarle County Public Schools $256.12 $239.84 71.2%
Alleghany County Public Schools $227.90 $326.93 81.5%
Amelia County Public Schools $221.74 $252.01 73.0%
Amherst County Public Schools $214.08 $290.59 80.1%
Appomattox County Public Schools $205.14 $297.43 76.6%
Arlington County Public Schools $338.71 $218.51 69.1%
Augusta County Public Schools $220.31 $257.92 79.6%
Bath County Public Schools $210.19 $295.91 83.1%
Bedford County Public Schools $204.14 $225.95 69.9%
Bland County Public Schools $198.81 $310.25 96.1%
Botetourt County Public Schools $239.52 $242.91 72.8%
Brunswick County Public Schools $192.98 $326.99 67.9%
Buchanan County Public Schools $197.60 $407.03 84.0%
Buckingham County Public Schools $210.48 $345.30 71.6%
Campbell County Public Schools $211.02 $288.07 64.0%
Caroline County Public Schools $216.50 $250.46 71.8%
Carroll County Public Schools $184.69 $307.14 68.6%
Charles City County Public Schools $192.55 $238.43 71.3%
Charlotte County Public Schools $210.20 $365.40 89.3%
Chesterfield County Public Schools $240.90 $206.25 69.8%
Clarke County Public Schools $227.01 $210.82 64.1%
Craig County Public Schools $212.15 $261.57 83.9%
Culpeper County Public Schools $241.74 $238.67 74.6%
Cumberland County Public Schools $195.54 $299.06 79.7%
Dickenson County Public Schools $199.79 $405.94 80.9%
Dinwiddie County Public Schools $225.90 $283.96 78.3%
Essex County Public Schools $214.06 $292.24 75.6%
Fairfax County Public Schools $312.29 $177.21 69.2%
Fauquier County Public Schools $275.89 $201.91 77.3%
Floyd County Public Schools $209.48 $316.12 77.0%
Fluvanna County Public Schools $254.96 $266.30 73.9%
Franklin County Public Schools $219.18 $288.65 75.3%
Frederick County Public Schools $235.43 $218.49 67.2%
Giles County Public Schools $204.52 $295.83 73.4%
Gloucester County Public Schools $229.29 $243.39 71.0%
Goochland County Public Schools $226.79 $180.76 55.9%
Grayson County Public Schools $185.54 $354.79 83.1%
Greene County Public Schools $180.28 $183.67 67.8%
Greensville County Public Schools $216.59 $344.01 81.2%
Halifax County Public Schools $202.59 $371.47 73.1%
Hanover County Public Schools $225.01 $178.62 63.5%
Henrico County Public Schools $243.88 $249.67 69.5%
Henry County Public Schools $200.91 $338.60 74.4%
Highland County Public Schools $201.68 $329.00 86.7%
Isle Of Wight County Public Schools $248.71 $251.81 74.5%
King George County Public Schools $230.86 $199.84 72.6%
King And Queen County Public Schools $212.83 $293.56 79.5%
2007-2008 Compensation by School Division
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Table A-2 (Continued): Teacher Compensation and Comparisons to Principals for School Year 
2007-2008 
Counties Teacher Day Rate
Adjusted   Teacher 
Day Rate
Teacher-to-
Principal Ratio
King William County Public Schools $226.57 $217.53 75.7%
Lancaster County Public Schools $220.93 $310.48 77.6%
Lee County Public Schools $204.34 $414.55 86.5%
Loudoun County Public Schools $287.59 $159.83 65.1%
Louisa County Public Schools $241.52 $273.99 70.3%
Lunenburg County Public Schools $200.62 $353.85 73.9%
Madison County Public Schools $221.26 $262.93 71.6%
Mathews County Public Schools $196.31 $214.87 74.2%
Mecklenburg County Public Schools $203.16 $333.74 83.6%
Middlesex County Public Schools $198.33 $259.21 76.5%
Montgomery County Public Schools $218.36 $309.52 79.0%
Nelson County Public Schools $222.11 $287.65 72.2%
New Kent County Public Schools $216.49 $188.45 65.4%
Northampton County Public Schools $192.03 $336.98 61.8%
Northumberland County Public Schools $236.31 $312.26 86.4%
Nottoway County Public Schools $210.12 $335.82 75.1%
Orange County Public Schools $209.00 $233.88 71.6%
Page County Public Schools $219.78 $324.94 80.8%
Patrick County Public Schools $200.60 $355.86 82.1%
Pittsylvania County Public Schools $204.62 $316.47 71.3%
Powhatan County Public Schools $228.18 $190.76 73.1%
Prince Edward County Public Schools $217.54 $355.25 74.3%
Prince George County Public Schools $234.98 $234.17 76.5%
Prince William County Public Schools $298.28 $205.92 78.0%
Pulaski County Public Schools $214.38 $315.92 75.8%
Rappahannock County Public Schools $226.56 $222.95 73.8%
Richmond County Public Schools $226.21 $335.27 74.9%
Roanoke County Public Schools $238.49 $240.57 70.5%
Rockbridge County Public Schools $203.10 $277.18 79.6%
Rockingham County Public Schools $222.42 $268.53 72.7%
Russell County Public Schools $185.03 $327.27 75.1%
Scott County Public Schools $217.71 $417.79 81.8%
Shenandoah County Public Schools $224.18 $277.85 66.1%
Smyth County Public Schools $214.93 $355.97 73.3%
Southampton County Public Schools $215.39 $294.38 80.4%
Spotsylvania County Public Schools $261.45 $209.43 68.1%
Stafford County Public Schools $261.26 $179.18 66.3%
Surry County Public Schools $223.23 $291.27 79.3%
Sussex County Public Schools $227.60 $378.38 63.5%
Tazewell County Public Schools $227.60 $390.74 86.6%
Warren County Public Schools $219.11 $236.21 66.9%
Washington County Public Schools $212.99 $324.13 74.0%
Westmoreland County Public Schools $216.93 $270.24 79.4%
Wise County Public Schools $220.65 $408.55 80.0%
Wythe County Public Schools $213.59 $334.57 74.9%
York County Public Schools $240.68 $183.28 70.2%
2007-2008 Compensation by School Division
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Table A-2 (Continued): Teacher Compensation and Comparisons to Principals for School Year 
2007-2008 
Cities Teacher Day Rate
Adjusted   Teacher 
Day Rate
Teacher-to-
Principal Ratio
Alexandria City Public Schools $341.57 $258.35 76.6%
Bristol City Public Schools $218.03 $388.56 74.0%
Buena Vista City Public Schools $212.30 $329.22 80.9%
Charlottesville City Public Schools $264.93 $424.33 74.5%
Colonial Heights City Public Schools $250.79 $312.18 74.7%
Covington City Public Schools $223.55 $381.53 89.7%
Danville City Public Schools $220.98 $445.47 76.2%
Falls Church City Public Schools $314.38 $177.60 78.3%
Fredericksburg City Public Schools $233.93 $324.45 62.2%
Galax City Public Schools $210.81 $384.35 88.1%
Hampton City Public Schools $191.60 $245.68 64.7%
Harrisonburg City Public Schools $228.29 $366.41 73.2%
Hopewell City Public Schools $223.43 $333.85 70.0%
Lynchburg City Public Schools $224.29 $367.35 73.4%
Martinsville City Public Schools $221.56 $414.78 63.0%
Newport News City Public Schools $227.55 $302.01 76.3%
Norfolk City Public Schools $230.81 $341.24 63.4%
Norton City Public Schools $223.31 $434.00 84.4%
Petersburg City Public Schools $203.99 $350.92 70.4%
Portsmouth City Public Schools $184.62 $256.14 60.1%
Radford City Public Schools $232.12 $418.89 72.3%
Richmond City Public Schools $243.34 $378.50 72.3%
Roanoke City Public Schools $236.22 $379.29 81.8%
Staunton City Public Schools $213.30 $324.45 69.3%
Suffolk City Public Schools $240.64 $249.13 78.3%
Virginia Beach City Public Schools $262.03 $254.93 76.5%
Waynesboro City Public Schools $227.38 $316.71 78.5%
Williamsburg Public Schools $262.72 $357.54 79.2%
Winchester City Public Schools $242.49 $322.41 70.1%
Franklin City Public Schools $224.69 $363.87 68.7%
Chesapeake City Public Schools $264.43 $249.99 72.7%
Lexington City Public Schools $209.50 N/A N/A
Salem City Public Schools $260.43 $330.87 72.5%
Poquoson City Public Schools $232.87 $177.43 82.0%
Manassas City Public Schools $302.28 $243.84 74.0%
Manassas Park City Public Schools $302.09 $282.61 66.0%
Towns
Colonial Beach Public Schools $205.16 N/A 100.0%
West Point Public Schools $208.65 N/A 76.2%
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Table A-3: Student Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Characteristics for School Year 2007-2008 
School Division
Counties
Percentage 
African-
American
Percentage 
Hispanic/Latino
Percentage 
White
Free/Reduced 
Lunch
Drop-out 
Rate
Accomack County Public Schools 38.7% 14.7% 45.3% 62.3% 2.8%
Albemarle County Public Schools 13.5% 5.6% 74.3% 20.4% 1.6%
Alleghany County Public Schools 7.6% 1.1% 90.6% 40.2% 1.4%
Amelia County Public Schools 30.8% 2.6% 65.4% 40.1% 1.9%
Amherst County Public Schools 26.0% 2.0% 69.1% 44.0% 1.3%
Appomattox County Public Schools 30.4% 0.7% 67.9% 40.4% 2.4%
Arlington County Public Schools 12.9% 27.2% 47.0% 31.1% 1.8%
Augusta County Public Schools 3.2% 2.6% 93.1% 31.0% 2.5%
Bath County Public Schools 2.1% 0.3% 95.1% 30.5% 1.0%
Bedford County Public Schools 8.8% 1.5% 87.1% 30.9% 0.8%
Bland County Public Schools 0.4% 0.1% 98.9% 35.5% 0.2%
Botetourt County Public Schools 3.2% 0.8% 93.8% 15.7% 0.8%
Brunswick County Public Schools 78.8% 1.3% 19.6% 75.6% 2.2%
Buchanan County Public Schools 0.1% 0.0% 99.8% 66.9% 1.0%
Buckingham County Public Schools 42.7% 1.1% 55.7% 55.2% 4.0%
Campbell County Public Schools 18.0% 1.6% 78.1% 33.3% 1.5%
Caroline County Public Schools 37.7% 4.1% 54.7% 38.6% 1.9%
Carroll County Public Schools 0.5% 4.3% 94.7% 50.6% 1.7%
Charles City County Public Schools 60.1% 1.4% 27.7% 43.5% 3.3%
Charlotte County Public Schools 34.9% 2.0% 61.4% 50.6% 1.0%
Chesterfield County Public Schools 27.7% 7.9% 59.5% 23.5% 2.4%
Clarke County Public Schools 6.4% 5.4% 86.2% 13.6% 0.0%
Craig County Public Schools 0.1% 0.0% 99.4% 33.7% 0.9%
Culpeper County Public Schools 18.8% 11.9% 64.5% 30.8% 1.8%
Cumberland County Public Schools 44.9% 2.5% 49.2% 56.5% 0.4%
Dickenson County Public Schools 0.8% 0.2% 98.8% 52.8% 1.2%
Dinwiddie County Public Schools 38.7% 3.2% 55.9% 48.4% 4.4%
Essex County Public Schools 56.1% 2.3% 40.7% 56.5% 1.6%
Fairfax County Public Schools 10.6% 17.8% 46.4% 20.5% 1.5%
Fauquier County Public Schools 11.1% 7.6% 79.1% 16.6% 0.9%
Floyd County Public Schools 2.3% 2.8% 93.5% 36.8% 2.2%
Fluvanna County Public Schools 17.9% 2.4% 77.0% 21.7% 1.4%
Franklin County Public Schools 11.2% 3.6% 84.3% 41.0% 2.7%
Frederick County Public Schools 5.6% 8.7% 81.8% 22.7% 1.3%
Giles County Public Schools 2.3% 1.0% 96.3% 36.9% 3.2%
Gloucester County Public Schools 10.2% 2.2% 84.8% 26.6% 3.4%
Goochland County Public Schools 25.0% 3.0% 70.2% 20.2% 1.4%
Grayson County Public Schools 2.7% 3.3% 93.7% 54.1% 5.7%
Greene County Public Schools 11.2% 4.9% 81.9% 29.1% 2.1%
Greensville County Public Schools 72.3% 2.0% 24.2% 63.8% 1.3%
Halifax County Public Schools 47.2% 1.9% 50.5% 56.9% 1.5%
Hanover County Public Schools 9.9% 1.8% 84.6% 12.4% 0.8%
Henrico County Public Schools 36.0% 4.5% 46.0% 25.5% 2.5%
Henry County Public Schools 24.2% 8.1% 66.3% 50.3% 3.1%
Highland County Public Schools 0.0% 1.8% 98.2% 48.6% 0.0%
Isle Of Wight County Public Schools 32.0% 1.6% 62.4% 30.4% 1.2%
King George County Public Schools 23.5% 3.3% 67.4% 21.2% 2.9%
2007-2008 Student Characteristics by School Division
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Table A-3 (Continued): Student Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Characteristics for School Year 
2007-2008 
School Division
Counties
Percentage 
African-
American
Percentage 
Hispanic/Latino
Percentage 
White
Free/Reduced 
Lunch
Drop-out 
Rate
King And Queen County Public Schools 45.8% 3.4% 49.8% 53.1% 0.8%
King William County Public Schools 20.1% 0.7% 72.5% 25.2% 0.5%
Lancaster County Public Schools 51.2% 0.7% 46.8% 54.9% 2.5%
Lee County Public Schools 0.5% 0.7% 98.0% 59.6% 2.8%
Loudoun County Public Schools 8.0% 13.0% 62.7% 13.6% 0.7%
Louisa County Public Schools 21.2% 2.0% 72.2% 41.9% 1.7%
Lunenburg County Public Schools 42.9% 3.1% 52.0% 60.5% 4.1%
Madison County Public Schools 12.9% 1.9% 81.6% 26.1% 1.4%
Mathews County Public Schools 11.1% 1.0% 85.7% 24.7% 0.9%
Mecklenburg County Public Schools 46.8% 2.1% 49.5% 54.5% 2.1%
Middlesex County Public Schools 25.9% 2.3% 71.2% 34.4% 2.7%
Montgomery County Public Schools 5.9% 2.5% 85.9% 36.8% 2.2%
Nelson County Public Schools 17.2% 4.4% 75.6% 55.2% 0.8%
New Kent County Public Schools 14.6% 1.9% 80.9% 13.2% 1.8%
Northampton County Public Schools 48.4% 12.8% 37.4% 66.8% 2.1%
Northumberland County Public Schools 39.6% 4.1% 55.9% 47.2% 2.0%
Nottoway County Public Schools 44.9% 4.2% 49.6% 53.4% 2.6%
Orange County Public Schools 18.9% 3.9% 74.0% 32.6% 1.2%
Page County Public Schools 2.4% 1.6% 94.9% 40.6% 1.1%
Patrick County Public Schools 7.8% 4.1% 87.1% 48.8% 1.4%
Pittsylvania County Public Schools 26.6% 2.4% 70.5% 42.3% 1.8%
Powhatan County Public Schools 9.6% 1.6% 87.3% 11.8% 0.6%
Prince Edward County Public Schools 57.6% 1.5% 38.9% 60.2% 2.0%
Prince George County Public Schools 36.0% 5.5% 53.3% 33.7% 2.5%
Prince William County Public Schools 22.8% 24.1% 40.5% 29.9% 1.4%
Pulaski County Public Schools 6.9% 1.1% 90.0% 42.6% 0.5%
Rappahannock County Public Schools 5.8% 2.8% 90.6% 20.2% 0.4%
Richmond County Public Schools 31.4% 6.2% 60.1% 41.6% 2.1%
Roanoke County Public Schools 6.4% 2.0% 87.1% 17.9% 0.9%
Rockbridge County Public Schools 4.1% 1.4% 92.9% 34.2% 2.1%
Rockingham County Public Schools 2.2% 8.4% 88.4% 32.6% 1.5%
Russell County Public Schools 0.8% 0.4% 98.6% 52.1% 1.3%
Scott County Public Schools 1.1% 1.1% 97.2% 51.1% 0.9%
Shenandoah County Public Schools 2.8% 10.2% 85.7% 31.2% 2.0%
Smyth County Public Schools 1.9% 1.9% 95.4% 51.0% 0.7%
Southampton County Public Schools 44.4% 1.0% 53.4% 42.1% 3.1%
Spotsylvania County Public Schools 19.8% 8.1% 65.9% 20.2% 1.7%
Stafford County Public Schools 20.6% 8.9% 63.4% 16.5% 1.1%
Surry County Public Schools 60.2% 0.9% 33.9% 50.2% 4.1%
Sussex County Public Schools 75.3% 2.9% 21.1% 73.5% 4.8%
Tazewell County Public Schools 2.9% 0.3% 95.3% 47.9% 1.7%
Warren County Public Schools 6.9% 4.2% 86.9% 27.8% 1.5%
Washington County Public Schools 1.6% 1.4% 96.0% 40.5% 1.5%
Westmoreland County Public Schools 49.1% 10.1% 39.1% 55.6% 1.3%
Wise County Public Schools 1.7% 0.6% 97.0% 52.7% 1.9%
Wythe County Public Schools 4.8% 1.1% 92.6% 41.9% 0.9%
York County Public Schools 15.5% 4.5% 70.9% 15.0% 0.7%
2007-2008 Student Characteristics by School Division
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Table A-3 (Continued): Student Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Characteristics for School Year 
2007-2008 
School Division
Cities
Percentage 
African-
American
Percentage 
Hispanic/Latino
Percentage 
White
Free/Reduced 
Lunch
Drop-out 
Rate
Alexandria City Public Schools 38.6% 26.9% 24.2% 51.4% 2.5%
Bristol City Public Schools 10.1% 1.7% 86.8% 54.9% 2.4%
Buena Vista City Public Schools 5.0% 1.0% 91.5% 34.3% 1.4%
Charlottesville City Public Schools 44.2% 5.5% 41.0% 53.8% 2.8%
Colonial Heights City Public Schools 15.1% 4.8% 74.8% 28.6% 3.0%
Covington City Public Schools 18.2% 0.9% 78.7% 44.1% 4.3%
Danville City Public Schools 70.2% 3.7% 24.6% 68.0% 3.5%
Falls Church City Public Schools 5.4% 8.7% 74.3% 63.8% 0.1%
Fredericksburg City Public Schools 47.0% 11.6% 38.2% 45.8% 0.6%
Galax City Public Schools 9.9% 21.4% 66.0% 55.5% 1.7%
Hampton City Public Schools 63.6% 3.3% 30.4% 44.1% 2.3%
Harrisonburg City Public Schools 12.1% 37.8% 46.5% 54.4% 3.6%
Hopewell City Public Schools 55.2% 6.2% 37.3% 65.4% 4.7%
Lynchburg City Public Schools 52.8% 2.1% 40.2% 51.1% 3.0%
Martinsville City Public Schools 59.7% 6.0% 33.1% 60.6% 0.1%
Newport News City Public Schools 57.3% 6.8% 30.3% 49.8% 2.3%
Norfolk City Public Schools 63.5% 4.0% 23.4% 58.3% 3.9%
Norton City Public Schools 11.9% 0.8% 86.7% 50.3% 1.3%
Petersburg City Public Schools 94.4% 2.7% 2.1% 60.2% 6.4%
Portsmouth City Public Schools 73.6% 2.0% 23.3% 52.1% 5.2%
Radford City Public Schools 13.4% 1.0% 83.9% 34.8% 0.3%
Richmond City Public Schools 86.5% 4.7% 7.8% 70.9% 4.3%
Roanoke City Public Schools 47.7% 5.5% 44.4% 62.3% 3.9%
Staunton City Public Schools 24.1% 1.9% 72.1% 45.1% 1.9%
Suffolk City Public Schools 58.0% 1.9% 36.7% 38.8% 2.7%
Virginia Beach City Public Schools 27.8% 6.0% 55.5% 27.2% 1.2%
Waynesboro City Public Schools 16.6% 10.1% 72.2% 45.9% 0.8%
Williamsburg Public Schools 20.3% 5.7% 68.7% 22.8% 2.0%
Winchester City Public Schools 18.6% 20.0% 57.3% 45.2% 0.2%
Franklin City Public Schools 78.8% 1.0% 18.9% 62.4% 2.7%
Chesapeake City Public Schools 35.3% 3.2% 54.9% 25.3% 2.3%
Lexington City Public Schools 9.2% 4.1% 79.6% 16.1% 0.0%
Salem City Public Schools 10.8% 2.3% 82.8% 21.9% 0.9%
Poquoson City Public Schools 0.6% 0.9% 94.5% 89.9% 0.4%
Manassas City Public Schools 17.1% 42.0% 35.1% 28.2% 1.9%
Manassas Park City Public Schools 13.3% 41.2% 33.8% 40.6% 1.0%
Towns
Colonial Beach Public Schools 27.8% 2.6% 67.0% 41.7% 0.0%
West Point Public Schools 13.3% 2.5% 79.3% 16.6% 1.1%
2007-2008 Student Characteristics by School Division
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Table A-4: Teacher Education and School Division Characteristics for School Year 2007-2008 
Counties
Teachers with Post-
Graduate Degrees
Population Change 
Over a 5-Year Period
Participation in Limited 
English Programs
Accomack County Public Schools 42% -4.4% 9.9%
Albemarle County Public Schools 57% 4.4% 6.2%
Alleghany County Public Schools 52% -0.5% 0.3%
Amelia County Public Schools 41% 8.9% 0.6%
Amherst County Public Schools 42% 2.6% 0.3%
Appomattox County Public Schools 42% -2.0% 0.0%
Arlington County Public Schools 65% -2.1% 26.6%
Augusta County Public Schools 41% 3.4% 2.1%
Bath County Public Schools 40% -4.7% 0.1%
Bedford County Public Schools 37% 0.8% 0.7%
Bland County Public Schools 38% 0.2% 0.0%
Botetourt County Public Schools 45% 5.6% 0.4%
Brunswick County Public Schools 42% -0.9% 0.7%
Buchanan County Public Schools 39% -13.8% 0.0%
Buckingham County Public Schools 34% -4.7% 0.1%
Campbell County Public Schools 39% -0.5% 0.9%
Caroline County Public Schools 41% 10.8% 1.6%
Carroll County Public Schools 41% 0.6% 3.9%
Charles City County Public Schools 39% -0.5% 0.9%
Charlotte County Public Schools 39% -0.4% 1.0%
Chesterfield County Public Schools 60% 9.2% 3.6%
Clarke County Public Schools 48% 7.3% 2.1%
Craig County Public Schools 32% 7.0% 0.0%
Culpeper County Public Schools 40% 23.9% 6.2%
Cumberland County Public Schools 31% 12.1% 2.2%
Dickenson County Public Schools 23% -6.8% 0.0%
Dinwiddie County Public Schools 36% 6.0% 0.9%
Essex County Public Schools 31% 2.2% 2.0%
Fairfax County Public Schools 67% 1.9% 19.8%
Fauquier County Public Schools 58% 12.4% 3.5%
Floyd County Public Schools 43% 1.4% 1.7%
Fluvanna County Public Schools 45% 14.5% 0.5%
Franklin County Public Schools 43% 3.9% 1.9%
Frederick County Public Schools 41% 18.5% 4.3%
Giles County Public Schools 36% -0.6% 0.1%
Gloucester County Public Schools 41% -3.9% 0.3%
Goochland County Public Schools 43% 16.7% 1.4%
Grayson County Public Schools 26% -7.5% 1.0%
Greene County Public Schools 40% 4.4% 3.4%
Greensville County Public Schools 35% -4.6% 1.7%
Halifax County Public Schools 43% 3.2% 0.6%
Hanover County Public Schools 52% 8.8% 0.8%
Henrico County Public Schools 47% 11.3% 5.4%
Henry County Public Schools 43% -9.9% 5.5%
Highland County Public Schools 24% -0.1% 1.8%
Isle Of Wight County Public Schools 38% 7.9% 0.6%
King George County Public Schools 42% 30.5% 1.3%
King And Queen County Public Schools 23% -5.5% 1.3%
King William County Public Schools 38% 11.7% 0.3%
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Table A-4 (Continued): Teacher Education and School Division Characteristics for School Year 
2007-2008 
Counties
Teachers with Post-
Graduate Degrees
Population Change 
Over a 5-Year Period
Participation in Limited 
English Programs
Lancaster County Public Schools 39% -4.9% 0.4%
Lee County Public Schools 34% -2.9% 0.1%
Loudoun County Public Schools 58% 43.8% 7.9%
Louisa County Public Schools 45% 9.6% 0.9%
Lunenburg County Public Schools 43% -2.5% 2.0%
Madison County Public Schools 42% 4.3% 1.5%
Mathews County Public Schools 34% -1.4% 0.0%
Mecklenburg County Public Schools 34% 0.1% 0.7%
Middlesex County Public Schools 30% 0.9% 0.9%
Montgomery County Public Schools 54% 4.7% 2.4%
Nelson County Public Schools 46% 3.9% 3.0%
New Kent County Public Schools 40% 13.3% 0.4%
Northampton County Public Schools 35% -7.7% 7.5%
Northumberland County Public Schools 34% 1.9% 2.3%
Nottoway County Public Schools 40% -3.4% 1.6%
Orange County Public Schools 39% 29.3% 2.0%
Page County Public Schools 33% 1.4% 1.1%
Patrick County Public Schools 33% 0.2% 4.3%
Pittsylvania County Public Schools 32% 3.3% 1.5%
Powhatan County Public Schools 45% 15.7% 0.7%
Prince Edward County Public Schools 39% -4.7% 0.5%
Prince George County Public Schools 36% 4.3% 0.7%
Prince William County Public Schools 54% 20.6% 18.4%
Pulaski County Public Schools 44% -0.8% 0.6%
Rappahannock County Public Schools 38% -10.0% 0.3%
Richmond County Public Schools 29% -2.4% 4.1%
Roanoke County Public Schools 45% 6.1% 2.1%
Rockbridge County Public Schools 46% -5.8% 0.2%
Rockingham County Public Schools 36% 6.5% 6.5%
Russell County Public Schools 37% 6.5% 0.0%
Scott County Public Schools 35% 7.9% 0.3%
Shenandoah County Public Schools 46% 10.3% 4.1%
Smyth County Public Schools 38% 0.0% 1.0%
Southampton County Public Schools 34% 3.5% 0.0%
Spotsylvania County Public Schools 45% 13.6% 3.3%
Stafford County Public Schools 49% 10.7% 3.9%
Surry County Public Schools 47% -10.9% 0.0%
Sussex County Public Schools 39% -5.1% 0.7%
Tazewell County Public Schools 39% -1.3% 0.1%
Warren County Public Schools 37% 5.0% 2.5%
Washington County Public Schools 41% 5.4% 0.5%
Westmoreland County Public Schools 39% -7.6% 7.3%
Wise County Public Schools 30% -1.0% 0.3%
Wythe County Public Schools 34% 2.2% 0.2%
York County Public Schools 52% 5.2% 1.3%
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Table A-4 (Continued): Teacher Education and School Division Characteristics for School Year 
2007-2008 
Cities
Teachers with Post-
Graduate Degrees
Population Change 
Over a 5-Year Period
Participation in Limited 
English Programs
Alexandria City Public Schools 70% -3.7% 22.9%
Bristol City Public Schools 46% 1.3% 0.3%
Buena Vista City Public Schools 46% 4.9% 0.2%
Charlottesville City Public Schools 56% -8.2% 8.8%
Colonial Heights City Public Schools 39% 5.3% 4.4%
Covington City Public Schools 47% 5.8% 0.1%
Danville City Public Schools 46% -10.0% 2.5%
Falls Church City Public Schools 76% 5.6% 9.9%
Fredericksburg City Public Schools 45% 14.2% 9.2%
Galax City Public Schools 33% 3.9% 17.0%
Hampton City Public Schools 42% -2.9% 2.2%
Harrisonburg City Public Schools 47% 13.2% 37.5%
Hopewell City Public Schools 36% 7.7% 2.4%
Lynchburg City Public Schools 47% -2.6% 1.3%
Martinsville City Public Schools 41% -7.1% 5.9%
Newport News City Public Schools 49% -4.0% 1.6%
Norfolk City Public Schools 48% -4.4% 1.5%
Norton City Public Schools 56% 14.8% 0.2%
Petersburg City Public Schools 36% -12.7% 0.9%
Portsmouth City Public Schools 48% -3.6% 0.3%
Radford City Public Schools 56% 1.4% 0.5%
Richmond City Public Schools 43% -9.1% 2.9%
Roanoke City Public Schools 40% -5.7% 6.2%
Staunton City Public Schools 45% 2.6% 1.0%
Suffolk City Public Schools 44% 10.6% 0.2%
Virginia Beach City Public Schools 51% -4.5% 1.4%
Waynesboro City Public Schools 44% 5.7% 4.2%
Williamsburg Public Schools 58% 21.7% 2.1%
Winchester City Public Schools 56% 5.4% 14.3%
Franklin City Public Schools 43% -5.0% 0.3%
Chesapeake City Public Schools 60% 1.6% 1.2%
Lexington City Public Schools 52% 4.3% 3.0%
Salem City Public Schools 49% 0.2% 1.1%
Poquoson City Public Schools 58% -0.4% 0.6%
Manassas City Public Schools 52% -3.0% 33.4%
Manassas Park City Public Schools 49% 8.1% 28.3%
Towns
Colonial Beach Public Schools 46% 2.7% 3.8%
West Point Public Schools 42% 2.0% 1.4%
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APPENDIX B – ASSUMPTIONS OF LINERARITY AND TESTS OF COLLINEARITY 
 
All dependent, independent and intervening variables included in the analysis are linear.  Five 
scatter plots of the dependent variables showed a linear pattern in each case.  Scatter plots 
performed on the independent and intervening variables produced linear results as well.  The 
linear nature of the variables allows for GLM to be incorporated in this research.  Below are five 
tests of collinearity to allow for the exclusion of certain variables from the reduced model.  In all 
five cases, PerAA_H and PerW are collinear.  For the purpose of inclusion in the reduced models 
in chapter four, PerAA_H is included and PerW is excluded.  
  
Table B-1: Reading - Coefficients 
1.116 .099 11.269 .000
-.189 .098 -1.431 -1.926 .056 .011 91.891
-.144 .095 -1.121 -1.518 .132 .011 90.951
-.022 .021 -.114 -1.078 .283 .535 1.868
-.421 .230 -.168 -1.827 .070 .712 1.404
-.013 .035 -.039 -.383 .702 .591 1.693
-.025 .033 -.071 -.765 .446 .694 1.442
-.006 .045 -.013 -.138 .890 .697 1.435
(Constant)
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
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Table B-2: Reading – Collinearity Diagnostics 
5.549 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .01
1.050 2.299 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .46 .01
.760 2.702 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .55
.392 3.761 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07 .00 .26 .13
.159 5.905 .00 .00 .00 .03 .89 .00 .00 .07
.067 9.116 .00 .00 .00 .64 .00 .10 .25 .05
.022 15.811 .00 .02 .01 .26 .03 .57 .01 .09
.000 123.117 1.00 .97 .99 .06 .00 .33 .01 .09
Dimension
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Model
1
Eigenvalue
Condition
Index (Constant) PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Variance Proportions
 
Table B-3: Reading - Correlations 
1 -.444** .411** -.339** -.365** .074 .162 -.031
.000 .000 .000 .000 .401 .064 .727
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.444** 1 -.988** .455** .489** .060 -.247** .246**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .499 .005 .005
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.411** -.988** 1 -.390** -.461** -.155 .194* -.314**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .078 .026 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.339** .455** -.390** 1 .344** -.223* -.526** -.009
.000 .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 .923
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.365** .489** -.461** .344** 1 -.114 -.286** -.018
.000 .000 .000 .000 .193 .001 .836
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.074 .060 -.155 -.223* -.114 1 .210* .397**
.401 .499 .078 .011 .193 .016 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.162 -.247** .194* -.526** -.286** .210* 1 .099
.064 .005 .026 .000 .001 .016 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.031 .246** -.314** -.009 -.018 .397** .099 1
.727 .005 .000 .923 .836 .000 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
AllRead
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
AllRead PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Table B-4: Writing - Coefficients 
1.203 .136 8.870 .000
-.283 .134 -1.642 -2.102 .038 .011 91.891
-.257 .130 -1.538 -1.980 .050 .011 90.951
-.039 .028 -.152 -1.367 .174 .535 1.868
-.611 .315 -.187 -1.937 .055 .712 1.404
.004 .047 .008 .078 .938 .591 1.693
-.056 .045 -.121 -1.235 .219 .694 1.442
-.079 .062 -.125 -1.282 .202 .697 1.435
(Constant)
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
 
Table B-5: Writing – Collinearity Diagnostics 
5.549 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .01
1.050 2.299 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .46 .01
.760 2.702 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .55
.392 3.761 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07 .00 .26 .13
.159 5.905 .00 .00 .00 .03 .89 .00 .00 .07
.067 9.116 .00 .00 .00 .64 .00 .10 .25 .05
.022 15.811 .00 .02 .01 .26 .03 .57 .01 .09
.000 123.117 1.00 .97 .99 .06 .00 .33 .01 .09
Dimension
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Model
1
Eigenvalue
Condition
Index (Constant) PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Variance Proportions
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Table B-6: Writing - Correlations 
1 -.282** .244** -.300** -.297** .128 .108 -.050
.001 .005 .000 .001 .144 .220 .573
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.282** 1 -.988** .455** .489** .060 -.247** .246**
.001 .000 .000 .000 .499 .005 .005
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.244** -.988** 1 -.390** -.461** -.155 .194* -.314**
.005 .000 .000 .000 .078 .026 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.300** .455** -.390** 1 .344** -.223* -.526** -.009
.000 .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 .923
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.297** .489** -.461** .344** 1 -.114 -.286** -.018
.001 .000 .000 .000 .193 .001 .836
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.128 .060 -.155 -.223* -.114 1 .210* .397**
.144 .499 .078 .011 .193 .016 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.108 -.247** .194* -.526** -.286** .210* 1 .099
.220 .005 .026 .000 .001 .016 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.050 .246** -.314** -.009 -.018 .397** .099 1
.573 .005 .000 .923 .836 .000 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
AllWrite
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
AllWrite PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
 
Table B-7: Algebra I – Coefficients 
.985 .153 6.425 .000
-.117 .152 -.618 -.770 .443 .011 91.891
-.052 .147 -.281 -.352 .726 .011 90.951
.048 .032 .172 1.499 .136 .535 1.868
-.448 .356 -.125 -1.258 .211 .712 1.404
-.010 .053 -.021 -.191 .849 .591 1.693
.026 .051 .051 .511 .610 .694 1.442
.077 .070 .110 1.096 .275 .697 1.435
(Constant)
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
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Table B-8: Algebra I – Collinearity Diagnostics 
5.549 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .01
1.050 2.299 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .46 .01
.760 2.702 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .55
.392 3.761 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07 .00 .26 .13
.159 5.905 .00 .00 .00 .03 .89 .00 .00 .07
.067 9.116 .00 .00 .00 .64 .00 .10 .25 .05
.022 15.811 .00 .02 .01 .26 .03 .57 .01 .09
.000 123.117 1.00 .97 .99 .06 .00 .33 .01 .09
Dimension
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Model
1
Eigenvalue
Condition
Index (Constant) PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Variance Proportions
 
Table B-9: Algebra I - Correlations 
1 -.310** .299** -.066 -.253** .016 .101 .044
.000 .001 .452 .004 .854 .250 .619
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.310** 1 -.988** .455** .489** .060 -.247** .246**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .499 .005 .005
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.299** -.988** 1 -.390** -.461** -.155 .194* -.314**
.001 .000 .000 .000 .078 .026 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.066 .455** -.390** 1 .344** -.223* -.526** -.009
.452 .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 .923
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.253** .489** -.461** .344** 1 -.114 -.286** -.018
.004 .000 .000 .000 .193 .001 .836
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.016 .060 -.155 -.223* -.114 1 .210* .397**
.854 .499 .078 .011 .193 .016 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.101 -.247** .194* -.526** -.286** .210* 1 .099
.250 .005 .026 .000 .001 .016 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.044 .246** -.314** -.009 -.018 .397** .099 1
.619 .005 .000 .923 .836 .000 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
AllAlg1
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
AllAlg1 PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Table B-10: Geometry - Coefficients 
.833 .246 3.384 .001
-.127 .244 -.379 -.521 .603 .011 91.891
.021 .235 .064 .089 .929 .011 90.951
.012 .051 .024 .228 .820 .535 1.868
-.582 .572 -.091 -1.017 .311 .712 1.404
.112 .086 .129 1.308 .193 .591 1.693
.114 .082 .127 1.393 .166 .694 1.442
.089 .112 .072 .792 .430 .697 1.435
(Constant)
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
 
Table B-11: Geometry – Collinearity Diagnostics 
5.549 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .01
1.050 2.299 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .46 .01
.760 2.702 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .55
.392 3.761 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07 .00 .26 .13
.159 5.905 .00 .00 .00 .03 .89 .00 .00 .07
.067 9.116 .00 .00 .00 .64 .00 .10 .25 .05
.022 15.811 .00 .02 .01 .26 .03 .57 .01 .09
.000 123.117 1.00 .97 .99 .06 .00 .33 .01 .09
Dimension
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Model
1
Eigenvalue
Condition
Index (Constant) PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Variance Proportions
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Table B-12: Geometry – Correlations 
1 -.482** .453** -.301** -.350** .157 .280** .024
.000 .000 .000 .000 .074 .001 .785
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.482** 1 -.988** .455** .489** .060 -.247** .246**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .499 .005 .005
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.453** -.988** 1 -.390** -.461** -.155 .194* -.314**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .078 .026 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.301** .455** -.390** 1 .344** -.223* -.526** -.009
.000 .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 .923
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.350** .489** -.461** .344** 1 -.114 -.286** -.018
.000 .000 .000 .000 .193 .001 .836
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.157 .060 -.155 -.223* -.114 1 .210* .397**
.074 .499 .078 .011 .193 .016 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.280** -.247** .194* -.526** -.286** .210* 1 .099
.001 .005 .026 .000 .001 .016 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.024 .246** -.314** -.009 -.018 .397** .099 1
.785 .005 .000 .923 .836 .000 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Allgeo
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
Allgeo PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
 
Table B-13: Algebra II – Coefficients 
.892 .217 4.108 .000
-.124 .215 -.461 -.574 .567 .011 91.891
-.005 .208 -.020 -.025 .980 .011 90.951
.075 .045 .191 1.667 .098 .535 1.868
.141 .505 .028 .279 .781 .712 1.404
.037 .076 .053 .489 .626 .591 1.693
-.012 .072 -.016 -.164 .870 .694 1.442
.140 .099 .142 1.418 .159 .697 1.435
(Constant)
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
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Table B-14: Algebra II – Collinearity Diagnostics 
5.549 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .01
1.050 2.299 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .46 .01
.760 2.702 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .55
.392 3.761 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07 .00 .26 .13
.159 5.905 .00 .00 .00 .03 .89 .00 .00 .07
.067 9.116 .00 .00 .00 .64 .00 .10 .25 .05
.022 15.811 .00 .02 .01 .26 .03 .57 .01 .09
.000 123.117 1.00 .97 .99 .06 .00 .33 .01 .09
Dimension
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Model
1
Eigenvalue
Condition
Index (Constant) PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Variance Proportions
 
Table B-15: Algebra II - Correlations 
1 -.299** .292** -.006 -.127 .036 .010 .053
.001 .001 .947 .149 .681 .908 .550
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.299** 1 -.988** .455** .489** .060 -.247** .246**
.001 .000 .000 .000 .499 .005 .005
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.292** -.988** 1 -.390** -.461** -.155 .194* -.314**
.001 .000 .000 .000 .078 .026 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.006 .455** -.390** 1 .344** -.223* -.526** -.009
.947 .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 .923
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
-.127 .489** -.461** .344** 1 -.114 -.286** -.018
.149 .000 .000 .000 .193 .001 .836
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.036 .060 -.155 -.223* -.114 1 .210* .397**
.681 .499 .078 .011 .193 .016 .000
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.010 -.247** .194* -.526** -.286** .210* 1 .099
.908 .005 .026 .000 .001 .016 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
.053 .246** -.314** -.009 -.018 .397** .099 1
.550 .005 .000 .923 .836 .000 .262
131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
ALLAlg2
PerAA_H
PerW
FRLunch
Dropout
PostGrad
Chang5yr
LimitEng
ALLAlg2 PerAA_H PerW FRLunch Dropout PostGrad Chang5yr LimitEng
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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APPENDIX C: LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS 
Below are linear regression results for analysis for Adjusted Teacher Day Rate Salary and Teach-
to-Principal Salary Difference.  In tables C-1, C-2 and C-3, the coefficient is negative suggesting 
an inverse relationship.  As teacher salaries adjusted for cost-of-living increase, student 
achievement as measured by AYP decreases.  In table C-4, the coefficient is negative, suggesting 
that as the higher teacher salaries are in relationship to principal salaries, student achievement as 
measured by AYP decreases.  Tables C-1, C-2 and C-3 are related to hypothesis 2a (When 
adjusted for cost of living, an inverse relationship between teacher salaries and student 
achievement as measured by AYP will occur).  Table C-4 is related to hypothesis 3b (In the 
presence of intervening variables, student achievement, as measured by AYP, will be higher in 
school divisions where the difference between teacher salaries and principal salaries is narrow). 
 
Table C-1: Linear Regression – Reading Achievement and Adjusted Teacher Day Rate Salary  
Coefficientsa
.968 .012 80.858 .000
-9.9E-005 .000 -.216 -2.493 .014
(Constant)
Adj08TS
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: AllReada. 
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Table C-2: Linear Regression – Writing Achievement and Adjusted Teacher Day Rate Salary 
Coefficientsa
.963 .015 62.283 .000
.000 .000 -.266 -3.112 .002
(Constant)
Adj08TS
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: AllWritea. 
 
Table C-3: Linear Regression – Geometry Achievement and Adjusted Teacher Day Rate Salary 
Coefficientsa
.928 .031 30.354 .000
.000 .000 -.208 -2.394 .018
(Constant)
Adj08TS
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Allgeoa. 
 
Table C-4: Multiple Regression – Algebra II Achievement and Teacher-to-Principal Salary 
Difference with Reduced Model Intervening Variables 
Coefficientsa
1.028 .062 16.713 .000
-.167 .084 -.187 -1.989 .049
-.123 .029 -.458 -4.168 .000
-.035 .488 -.007 -.072 .943
.097 .041 .246 2.398 .018
(Constant)
T_Pratio
PerAA_H
Dropout
FRLunch
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: ALLAlg2a. 
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